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A TALE OF NEW PRECEDENTS: 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT AS 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS lAW 
GIL GOTT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recently published book on the status of civil liberties in 
wartime,l Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist offers a surprising de-
fense2 and rationalization3 of the Japanese American4 internment. One 
* DePaul University, Law and International Studies; Ph.D., University of California at 
Berkeley; J.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. For extremely insightful and encour-
aging comments on an earlier draft, thanks to Lisa Iglesias. I am grateful also to Holm Cho and 
Tom Gott for editing and conceptual assistance. I benefited in many ways from the help and 
camaraderie of members of the CLPEF collective: Keith Aoki, Sumi K. Cho, Chris Iijima, Natsu 
Saito, Robert Westley, Eric Yamamoto. This article was made possible through a grant from the 
Civil Liberties Public Education Fund. 
I See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CI\'IL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998). 
2 See id. at 209-10. Rehnquist defends with little qualification the internment of immigrant 
Japanese Americans (issei): "The Issei, however, who were not citizens, were both by tradition 
and by law in a quite different category .... Thus, distinctions that might not be permissible 
between classes of citizens must be viewed otherwise ,,·hen draml between classes of aliens." /d. 
3 See id. at 224. Regarding the internment of second generation Japanese Americans (nisei), 
Rehnquist is slightly more circumspect, acknowledging that such treatment of a racially defined 
class of citizens would violate current constitutional law. See id. at 207. However, Rehnquist argues 
"the law was by no means clear in 1943 and 1944." /d. He concludes that speculating about judicial 
restraint of governmental misconduct in "wartime" is "very largely academic. There is no reason 
to think that future wartime presidents will act differently from ... Roosevelt, or that future 
Justices of the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their predecessors." Id. at 
224. The Chief Justice states his belief in a "historic trend" against the "least justified of the 
curtailments of civil liberty in wartime," but by implication he would not count the internment 
among these. See id. For a more sympathetic view of Rehnquist's handling of the internment than 
the one offered in this article, see Cass R. Sunstein, Rights Undn Fire, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Nov. 
9, 1998, at 42, 46 (book review) (accepting that Rehnquist's "practical" approach to civil liberties 
in wartime "may be the most that we can reasonably expect"). 
4 I use the tennJapanese American to refer to both Japanese American citizens and residents 
of Japanese descent. Japanese immigrants to the United States were not eligible for citizenship 
until 1952. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). The second generation, comprising 
Japanese Americans born in the United States, obtained birthright citizenship status under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Thus, the 
distinction between citizen and noncitizen among people of Japanese descent was necessitated 
chiefly by a racially biased law of nationality. My use of the term Japanese American to refer to 
both citizens and noncitizens recognizes the de Jafto membership of issei in "American" society. 
Note that this view contradicts Justice Rehnquist who uses the formal distinction bet\\'een issei 
and nisei to defend the internment of issei. See REHNQUIST, sllpra note 1, at 209-10. 
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might have assumed that the official debate on the internment had 
closed in 1988 when, in an exceptional act of national contrition, 
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act that 
formally acknowledged the internment's injustices.5 Indeed, this Sym-
posium is a direct result of the Government's recognition of its debt 
to Japanese Americans and the need to repair and redress, at least sym-
bolically, their injuries. So why, and how, does Chief Justice Rehnquist 
re-open the debate on the internment's legitimacy? 
This article may help to answer these questions and refute the 
Chief Justice's position on the internment6 by identifYing and critiqu-
ing the conceptual and discursive foundations of foreign affairs and 
national security law (hereinafter foreign affairs law) 7 that underwrite 
and grow from the internment jurisprudence. These "background" 
conceptual and discursive features, though seldom examined by legal 
scholars, guide understandings of foreign affairs jurisprudence ema-
nating from across the political spectrum.s Scholars have typically ana-
lyzed foreign affairs law within a binary matrix of conflicting impera-
tives: on one side, the demands of "the national interest" and, on the 
other, the constraints of constitutional democracy. Debates then re-
5 See Ch-il Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 1989 (1988)). Of course, the Govemment would probably never have acknowledged 
wrongdoing absent the political activism of those working in the redress and reparations move-
ment. See generalZv LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE 
PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 (1993). For an incisive nitique of the redress and 
reparations movement, see Chris K. lijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of 
Acquiescence: Th~ Necessity to Refuse the Return to OIiginal Humiliation, in this issue, at 385. 
6 Indeed, it is ironic that the critique mounted here, conceived and mostly written before 
publication of Chief justice Rehnquist's book, is grounded in a new reading of the internment. 
So, whereas the Chief justice defends and rationalizes the intemment in the process offorwarding 
a theory of civil liberties in wartime, I use the internment as a central point of reference in 
critiquing the deficiencies of such traditional foreign affairs-based legal theory. 
7 Combining foreign affairs and national security law under one rubric and analysis may 
efface distinctions which the discipline has maintained between emergency and non-emergency 
exercises of "extemally" directed govemmental power. However, the structural similarities that 
are the focus of this article warrant the conflation. Indeed, one argument forwarded here is that 
the "tail" of national security law wags the "dog" of foreign affairs law through the operation of 
the realist ontology. See infra Part I; joel Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency 
and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 671-73 (1998) (arguing that appeals to geopolitical 
exigency drove foreign affairs law in the Cold War period). 
8 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 46 (characterizing Rehnquist's approach to civil liberties 
in wartime as "complicated and nuanced," "with considerable appeal of its own" as opposed to 
the polar exu'emes of the "national security camp" and "the civil libertarian camp"). Sunstein 
does not condemn Rehnquist's view of the intemment, although he would favor a slightly more 
moderate approach. See id. ("In the Korematsu case, for example, Uustice) jackson's moderate 
[dissenting) position seems better than Rehnquist's moderate position."). I would argue that a 
liberal theorist such as Sunstein can find common ground with a conservative such as Rehnquist 
on foreign affairs law because of shared assumptions regarding the natul'e of intemational 
relations. 
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volve around questions of how to apply the Constitution in the "vast 
external realm"9 of foreign affairs, a realm presumed to be constitu-
tionally sui generis. 1O But seldom is a serious attempt made to question 
the nature of this vast external realm, the assumed referent of foreign 
affairs law. 
With regard to the internment, the conceptual point of depar-
ture of this article is the familiar legal linchpin of internment jurispru-
dence-military necessity. The story goes that if military necessity 
could be shown or inferred from the record, under the expansive war 
power, the President, Congress, or both acting together would be 
authorized to take extreme measures to safeguard national security. 
Civil rights of Japanese American citizens and residents would be at 
their lowest ebb,. and the power of the political branches would be at 
its zenith. 11 Courts would be ill-add sed and perhaps without power to 
challenge a decision of the war makers (President, Congress and the 
military) regarding such "necessity. "12 It follows that internment was a 
"legitimate" response to an emergency situation arising in the external 
realm. 13 
In this article, I explore the nature of foreign affairs law's referen t 
external realm by taking seriously the military necessity argument and 
thus situating the Japanese American internment as foreign affairs law 
precedent. I will argue, contrary to most commentators, that the in-
ternment is an important instance of modern foreign affairs law and 
warrants consideration on par with two other great twentieth century 
foreign affairs precedents: of the 1936 case United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.14 and of the 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
9 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast 
external realm [of foreign affairs]' with its important complicated, delicate and manifold prob-
lems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representati"e of the nation."). 
10 See infra Part LB.2.a-c. 
11 See REHNQUlST, supra note 1, at 224 ("[I)n time of war the government's authority to 
restrict civil liberty is greater than in peacetime. "). 
12 See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Afilitm)" 3i N.Y.U. L. RE\,. 181, 192 (1962) 
("[TJhere are some circumstances in which the Court will, in effect, conclude that it is simply 
not in a position to reject descriptions by the Executive of the degree of military necessity."). 
13 Of course the case for internment was based on fraud. See infra Part II. 
14 299 U.S. 304. In Curtiss-Wright the Court examined the constitutionality of an executive 
pruclamation issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that forbade weapons trade with parties 
to an armed conflict in the South American region knml'l1 as the Chaco. The presidential 
proclamation, which had been authorized by a joint resolution of Congress, imposed both a 
monetary and prison penalty on violators. Curtiss-\Vright Export Corporation was indicted under 
the joint resolution and proclamation and challenged the constitutionality of the delegation to 
the President of essential congressional functions. The actual holding in the case thus dealt 
primarily with a delegation question, which has receded in constitutional significance. See LoUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 123-28 (1996). However,Justice Suther-
land's famous opinion, containing a range of dicta on the question of foreign affairs powers, has 
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v. Sawyer. 15 The discipline of foreign affairs lawI6 has canonized Curtiss-
Wright and Youngstown as polar extremes that define a limited spec-
trum of available foreign affairs constitutionalisms. From the perspec-
tive of the condemnable internment experience it may be possible to 
present an alternative vision of foreign affairs law that escapes the 
narrow vision of the disciplinary "tale of two precedents."17 
In order to understand the limitations of the disciplinary vision, 
Part I traces within foreign affairs law the effects of a conceptual and 
discursive formation I~ that has dominated the scientific study of inter-
national relationsl9-the so-called realist20 paradigm of international 
relations (hereinafter IR realism). First, I briefly introduce the basic 
intellectual paradigm of IR realism. Then I discuss how this paradigm 
remained a subject of intense debate in constitutional and foreign affairs jurisprudence and 
scholarship. 
15 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, a labor dispute threatened to disrupt steel production 
during the Korean conflict. President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take control 
of the mills to insure continued production. Congress did not take specific action in the mattel; 
although it had provided for plant seizures in such contexts under a different procedure. The 
Court ruled that the seizure m-erstepped the President's power under the circumstances. See id. 
at 588-89. 
16 Although I refer to foreign affairs as a discipline, technically it would probably be more 
correct to \;ew the area as a subdiscipline of law. However, foreign affairs/national security law 
is indeed discipline-like in the ways it structures and sets limits on intellectual and scholarly activity 
within the field of study that it defines. 
17 At first glance, this choice of precedents-the domestic internment of a racially defined 
group of citizens and residents-may seem out of place in the foreign affairs context. However, 
the approach taken here challenges precisely the distinction between a rigidly defined outside 
and inside that has led to the treatment of foreign affairs law as an area to be analyzed apart 
from the "normal" rule oflaw. Moreover, the government's war power, in a sense the quintessence 
of its externally focused powers, was expressly invoked to legalize the internment, thus creating 
a distinct bridge between the operation of foreign affairs law and the maintenance of "internal" 
social subordination. 
18 I use the term "discursive formation" to refer to elements of discourse that may operate 
across disciplines and evidence a certain epistemic unity. This notion of discursive formations 
includes the social conditions that make such formations possible. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF K,'WWLEDGE 38 (1972); ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW, 
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 7-9 (1994) (introducing Foucauldian concepts 
including discourse and discursive formation). 
IY International relations is usually understood as the international branch of political science 
and includes the study of international political economy, international organizations, foreign lit 
policy processes (diplomacy), and peace and security studies. 
20 The school of thought referred to herein as IR realism should not be confused with legal 
realism. Legal realism refers generally to the twentieth century movement challenging formalism 
and bears comparison with so-called post-positivist approaches to international relations, see infra 
Part III, that consciously diverge from IR realism. For a discussion of post-positivist approaches, 
see CHRIS BROWN, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 55-58 (1997). For an edited 
collection of legal realist writings, see MIERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 
1993). 
December 1998] 19 B.C. THIRD WOJUl) LAlI'JOURNAL 179 183 
informs the models of foreign affairs constitutionalism represen ted by 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown. I will argue that the operation of an IR 
realist-animated conceptual framework, or ontology, operates in both 
cases to construct foreign affairs as a legal realm that must be treated 
extra-constitutionally, i.e., outside standard rule of law process and 
discourse. 21 I then extend this critique by examining the "little" consti-
tutional dialectics problematized22 in the discipline-the President ver-
sus Congress, individual rights versus state interest, and judicial review 
versus political branch autonomy. 
At the heart of the IR realist paradigm is the concept of the 
sovereign state as a unified actor akin to the individual subject of mod-
ern philosophy.23 This understanding of the state leads to divergent 
conceptualizations of politics in the domestic and the international 
realm. The domestic realm is the site of a "politics" that coincides with 
the rule of law discourse of rational governance. The international 
realm comprises "relations," defined as the absence of rational politics 
and rule of law governance, i.e., anarchy. Inside the state, competing 
interests are harmonized through law and the processes of liberal 
governance. In its external affairs, the state must fend for itselfby using 
the methods of "power politics." Both IR realist conceptualizations, of 
21 See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND 
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 223 (1997) (describing a "prerogath'e interpretation" 
of the Constitution that creates "an artificial distinction between foreign and domestic policy 
powers that has no clear basis in the Constitution itself, and ... has the potential fundamentally 
to undermine the whole structure of government"). Silverstein fa\'ors a return to an institutionally 
balanced distribution of foreign affairs power. See id. at 223-24. 
22 Problematization refers to the intellectual method by which complexity and ambiguity are 
homogenized and normalized. See generally Polemics, Politics, and Problemalizations: An Interview 
with Michel Foucault, in THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul Rabinow ed. 1984). For example, for 30 
or more years, liberal advocates of a less imperialistic American foreign policy have often pursued 
their project by arguing for a more "democratic" foreign policy process and a greater role for 
Congress \is-a-vis the President. See generall), infra text accompanying notes 111-43. Although 
tactically this framing may ha\'e been wise, the President-Congress focus also inad\'ertently brack-
ets the critique of imperialism (normalization) and obscures important cultural and social deter-
minants of foreign affairs (homogenization). Such cultural and social determinants include those 
which are the focus of the analysis in this article-racism and xenophobia-as well as others such 
as heterosexism, patriarchy, class stratification, and nationalism in its majoritarian and regressive 
forms. 
23 The critique of the modern subject has been a central focus of poststructuralism. See, e.g., 
Catherine Belsey, Towards Cultuml Hist01)', inA POSHIODERN READER 551 (Joseph Natoli & Linda 
Hutcheon eds., 1993). Belsey provides a good, brief illustration of the critical discourse on the 
modern subject and links that critique to the international political context: "[0] ur [\\'estern 
modern] culture places the subject at the center of the system of signified truths, identifies it as 
the absolute, extra-linguistic presence \\'hich is the origin and guarantee of the fixity of meaning, 
and targets nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union in defense of its (imaginary) freedom," Id. at 
56l. 
184 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 179 [Symposium 
the unitary state and of foreign affairs as the realm of relations (not 
politics), inform the dominant models of foreign affairs constitution-
alism and the series of constitutional dialectics around which main-
stream and reform discourses have revolved. 
Part II looks "inside the state" to juxtapose the experience of the 
internment with the IR realist conceptual framework of foreign affairs 
law. The dense record developed by historians and lawyers of a later 
generation, who fought the internment in the courts and before Con-
gress, provides a telling counterpoint to the impenetrable structural-
ism of IR realism. In a manner explained by critical approaches to 
international relations (hereinafter IR critical theory), discussed in 
Part III, the internment is driven by identity-contingent politics oper-
ating in and through governmental bureaucracy. Rather than making 
a case for the "banality of evil,"24 this look at the micro-levels of state 
power will show the effects of purposive individual and group action 
in concert with a social, cultural, and political structure of racial and 
xenophobic subordination. 
Part III introduces the body of critical scholarship from the field 
of IR critical theory that has challenged the precepts of IR realism. Put 
simply, in this school of thought, the state along with other unexam-
ined elements of the IR realist paradigm such as sovereignty, anarchy, 
and security are understood to be dependent variables. Social and cul-
tural factors, ignored in IR realist theory, assume the status of "inde-
pendent" variables. 25 In other words, the "givens" of IR realist theory 
come to be viewed as contingent social and cultural constructions. 
Using such critical international relations theory to rethink foreign 
affairs law leads to a more central placement of the internment. This 
is so because the internment cases may be studied to reveal the state 
24 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REpORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL (1963). Arendt, who studied the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem and the manner in which 
the Holocaust was calTied out by the German state, believed that "the trouble with Eichmann 
was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, 
that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal." 1d. at 276. 
25 For examples of IR critical theory, see infra Part IIl.A. The reference to dependent and 
independent variables may actually do a disservice to the theoretical thrust of this work. Indeed, 
many critical theorists would no doubt be uncomfortable with an essentialized concept of the 
"social" or "cultural" that is suggested when these are characterized simply as independent 
variables. The reference should be understood as figurative, useful in grasping the critique of 
mainstream IR realist fetishisms of the state and other positivist concepts, but in no sense 
imposing an endorsement of "standard" social science method or etiology. For an interesting 
analysis of the limitations and promise of importing formal scientific method into the field, see 
James De~ardo, Complexity, Fann(d l'Hethods and Ideology in International Studies, in NEW THINK-
ING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 124 (Michael W. Doyle & G. John Ikenberry eds., 
1997) [hereinafter NEW THINKING]. 
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as a non-unitary, culturally contested and socially riven locus of rela-
tions. In order to understand how foreign affairs law has arrived at its 
current conjuncture, and to challenge the logic that may place foreign 
affairs law in the service of "bad globalization, "2() we must look precisely 
to examples, such as the internment, where social and cultural deter-
minants of state action are manifest. 
Of course, at a deeper level, this article is about the relationship 
of race and the international, race and foreign affairs, race and na-
tional security. In this context, Part IV discusses four possible models 
of understanding, which to varying degrees may capture the full sig-
nificance of race in the "external" context. First and worst, the positiv-
ist27 approach of IR realism shuts out analysis of actor identities, cul-
tural and social determinants of state action and, consequently, race. 
Second, post-positivist IR critical theory, like other postmodernisms, 
effectively challenges the positivist and essentialist fallacies of IR real-
ism and might, but need not, address the centrality of race to the field. 
Third is a body of legal scholarship that has linked race and foreign 
affairs, but in a way which may also incompletely account for race. 
Under this "interest convergence" model, domestic race relations re-
spond to perceived foreign policy needs. So, for example, societal 
desegregation efforts in the United States are understood to have 
2(j For a critical discussion of globalization, see, for example, SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998). Globalization ma\' take \'ariollS forms and represent the outcomes 
of various types of political intervention. See id. at xxxiv ("Globalization is a process that generates 
contradictory spaces, characterized by contestation, internal differentiation, continuous border 
crossings."). Globalization may, for example, be merely the latest variant of "first \\'Orld" imperi-
alism. See the essays collected in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Oeny Mander and 
Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). For an analysis of hm\' globalization might be useful (or hurtful) 
to subordinated groups such as transnational racial groups, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human 
Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinos/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REv. 361 (1997). One might think of the imposition of exploitative intellectual 
property regimes by first world economic pO\l'ers on "third \I'orld" producers of knmdedge and 
culture. See Keith Aoki, The Stakes of InteliecllIal Propert), Law, in THE POLITICS OF LA\\,: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 259 (David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998) [hereinafter POLITICS OF LA"']. 
Alternatively, globalization may increase the potential for subordinated groups to organize effec-
tively and challenge transnational forms of exploitation. See generally TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE Oackie Smith et al. eds., 
1997). 
27 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 37 (defining posith'ism as "the belief that the facts are out 
there to be discovered and that there is only one way to do this, only one form of reliable 
knowledge, that generated by methods based on the natural sciences .... "). See generally THE 
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 394 (lain McLean ed., 1996) (attributing the term to 
French sociologist August Comte and defining it as a rejection of \'alue judgements in social 
science). I define positivism here in the negative to refer to approaches that do not question the 
construction of basic disciplinary concepts such as state, "national interest," "security," etc. See 
infra Part lILA. 
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resulted from the imperatives of the Cold War, in particular the need 
to appear democratic before an audience of potentially alignable Third 
World nations. 2H Finally, I examine race internationalism and how it 
might inform a theory that would link race, international relations, 
and foreign affairs law at a more fundamental level. 
The approach taken here-understanding the internment as for-
eign affairs law precedent-accomplishes several critical objectives. 
First, it reveals the flawed structures of foreign affairs law by demysti-
fying the state and its processes in the "external" context. Second, it 
illustrates the socially and culturally constructed nature of the imag-
ined external realm and suggests a possible alternative model that 
would combat foreign affairs law's susceptibility to capture by narrow 
and objectionable-e.g., racist and xenophobic-understandings of 
the national interest. Finally, it combats the marginalization of race in 
law that occurs when areas other than civil rights and discrimination 
law are automatically theorized as transcending, in whole or in part, 
the effects of racialization. 
I. IR REALISM AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW 
This Part traces effects of IR realism in the structures of foreign 
affairs law. The IR realist paradigm, described briefly in general terms, 
can be seen at work in several conceptual formations central to the 
field. I will look specifically at the disciplinary tale of two precedents 
(Curtiss-Wright/ Youngstown) and the "competing" models of foreign 
affairs constitutionalism contained therein, and at the series of consti-
tutional "little dialectics" that site both reform and mainstream legal 
discourse. It should be noted that this article's discussion of the models 
and dialectics of foreign affairs constitutionalism is necessarily some-
what cursory. Given the particular focus of the article (internment), it 
has only been possible to outline in general terms the thesis of Part I, 
i.e., that foreign affairs law of the postwar period is largely the creature 
of a highly objectionable, but mostly undebated, IR realist intellectual 
paradigm. In the next Part, I undertake a critique of these realist 
underpinnings by looking "inside the state" to view the particular 
dynamics of internment. 
28 See infra Part IV. 
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A. IR Realisnz29 
International relations as a discrete intellectual discipline has ex-
isted only since around the time of the first world war.30 Competing 
theories emerged in the interwar years to explain why states and their 
populations were drawn to fight such devastating, all-encompassing 
modern wars. During the 1920s a so-called liberal or utopian variant 
of internationalism held sway and reasoned that if the security of states 
could be assured, for example through organizations of collective 
security such as the League of Nations, the underlying commonality of 
interests shared by the world's peoples would emerge as a dominant 
force guiding states' conduct. 31 There was a faith that once structural 
and political barriers were remm'ed, rational actors would begin the 
natural process of cooperatively pursuing their interests and creating 
stable and peaceful interstate relations and economies.'12 
By the 1930s, however, political events seemed to strain the credi-
bility of liberal-utopian internationalism. Militaristic and expansionist 
29 I collapse so-called neorealist and realist approaches under the shorthand "IR realism" 
primarily for purposes of verbal economy. Many \\'Oltld no doubt object that such a collapsing is 
not warranted analytically. Furthermore, some would claim that I unduly obscure the distinctness 
of a third mainstream school of international relations thought-liberalism/pluralism. See infra 
text accompanying notes 39-59. However, from a critical perspective, neorealism and liberal-
ism/pluralism may not in fact present a substantial mm'e beyond the positivist frame\mrk of 
realism. See Jim George, International Relations After the Cold nar: Probing BeJond the Realist 
Legacy, in CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL FLOWS, TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 33, 44 (Michael 
J. Shapiro & Howard R. Alker eds., 1996) (characterizing as "illusory" progress in the development 
of realist thinking usually attributed to the neorealist work of the 1970s and 1980s and arguing 
that "for all its developmental claims to the contrary, International Relations in the 1990s remains 
fundamentally incarcerated in the positivist-realist framework that characterized its under-
standing of the world 'out there' in the 1940s and 1950s"); Steve Smith, The Self Images of a 
Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations TheorJ, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
TODAY 1, 20 (Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds., 1995) (arguing that despite the disciplinary 
narrati\'e of competing paradigmatic "debates," most IR theory remains realist). 
30 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 21; Miles Kahler, IIIl/fllting International Relations: Interna-
tional Relations TheOl)' After 1945, in NEW THINKING, supra note 25, at 20,20. The "disciplinary 
home" of international relations has been in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. 
See Kahler, supra at 21. 
31 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 22-26. But see Kahler, supra note 30, at 23-24 (arguing that 
early liberal theorists have been falsely portrayed as "idealists" \"ho believed interdependence 
would insure peace). For an account of the contradictions inherent in liberal institutionalism of 
the period, see David Kennedy, The l1JOl'e to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. RE,·. 841 (1987). 
32 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 22-26. This thinking parallels to an extent liberal interna-
tional economic theory that uses concepts such as comparative advantage and Pareto optimality 
to argue for freer trade and open markets in order to unleash "natural" economic forces that 
would tend toward "welfare maximization." For an account of the relationship between economic 
and international legal theory of the period, see Nathaniel Berman, Economic Consequences, 
Nationalist Passions: Keynes, Crisis, Culture and Poli0', 10 AM. U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 619 (1995). 
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regimes in Japan, Italy, Spain and Germany came to be explained by 
so-called realist approaches that rejected the assumptions ofliberal and 
utopian theories. IR realism, again not be confused with legal real-
ism,:IJ began to develop and entrench its classical understanding of an 
international system of unevenly situated actors-states competing for 
scarce resources. 34 In this form, IR realism denied the basic liberal 
premise that enlightened self-interest could lead to international co-
operation, stability and welfare maximization. Instead, IR realists as-
sumed that the essentially anarchic structure of the international sys-
tem forced egoistic state actors to rely on self-help in pursuing a 
narrowly defined set of interests.35 Raw power and the possibility of 
stability through a "balance of power, "36 not through some underlying 
commonality of interest, were seen as the primary determinants of 
international order.37 
Classical IR realism dominated the field of international relations 
throughout the interwar and early postwar years. The earlier debate 
was replayed in the 1970s and 1980s in slightly different terms when 
so-called neorealists3~ defended the realist paradigm against reformu-
33 See supra note 20. 
34 For works in the classical realist tradition, see, for example, E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS 
CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939) 
(responsible for defining the terms of realism and its "other," utopianism); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, 
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948) (containing an early 
systematic rendering of realist theory). See also GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-
1950 (1952) (bemoaning the constraining effect of public opinion on the executive and profes-
sional class to face the perils of the external realm); HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994); 
MARTI:'< WIGHT, POWER POLITICS (1946) (analyzing the failure of the League of Nations to affect 
international anarchy). For an interesting attempt to rehabilitate early realism by putting its 
classical texts through a "rhetorical turn," see the essays collected in POST-REALISM: THE RHE-
TORICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Franscis A. Beer & Robert Hariman eds., 1996). 
35 See KEN:<fETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS lO6-07 (1979). 
:l6 See id. at 170-71. 
37 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 32-33. For a summary of IR realist theory-consistent with 
the conclusions drawn here-and its consequences for law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 
(1993). See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, lO6 HARV. L. REv. 1980, 
1999-2000 (1993) (book review) ("Political realists accept a model of states as unitary actors 
whose external behavior is unrelated to internal structure and purpose. Regardless of domestic 
political, economic, or social configuration, states' relations with one another revolve around the 
struggle for power. ~11en translated into law, realism argues for a radical break between domestic 
and foreign affairs."). 
3ti For works in the neorealist tradition, see WALTZ, supra note 35 (the leading neorealist text, 
integrating into the realist paradigm economic modes of analysis, in particular rational choice 
theory); NEOREALISM A.'1D ITs CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986) (containing neorealist 
texts and I'esponses by critics); HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977) (exemplifying 
the so-called English School which is considered a variant of neorealist thought because of its 
statist focus, although these approaches also posit the existence of an international society of 
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lated liberal-pluralist theory.39 Liberal-pluralist (later neo-liberal) the-
ory challenged the more extreme tenets of realism, in particular the 
thesis that states acted in utter isolation from one another.40 Neverthe-
less, neorealists continued to assert the primacy of states and structural, 
systemic factors in international relations,41 leading to the retention of 
the understanding of states as unitary and primary actors in an anar-
chic international system.42 
Liberal-pluralists argued that even assuming the rational-egoist 
nature of states, some degree of cooperation could be expected, at least 
some of the time, if only out of pure self-interest.4~1 Thus, the analytical 
spotlight was placed on how international institutions-formal organi-
zations such as the International Labor Organization, NATO or less 
formal alliances (regimes) such as those that seemed to unite liberal 
democratic states in the so-called "democratic peace"4'L-might bring 
about a degree of collective action.45 For example, an international 
organization could lower "transaction costs" of cooperation or other-
wise help to overcome the game theoretical problems of "prisoners' 
dilemma" and "free riding."41i Significantly, however, liberalism did not 
alter the core assumptions of realist modelsY States remained as the 
states). See generally BARRY BUZAN, ET AL., THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY: NEOREALIS~I TO STRUCTURAL 
REALISM (1993); ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN \\'ORLD POLITICS (1981) ; JOEL ROSENTHAL, 
RIGHTEOUS REALISTS: POLITICAL REALISM, RESPONSIBLE POWER, AND AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE 
NUCLEAR AGE (1991); MICHAEL]' SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KiSSINGER (1986). 
39 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 45-49. For a brief O\'erview of pluralist and neoliberal theory, 
see infia text accompanying notes 43-49, 
40 See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INDE-
PENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Ste\'en D. Krasner 
ed., 1983). 
41 See generally WALTZ, supra note 35, 
42 For neorealists, moving past the svstemic and structural le\'el, for example to examine the 
role of substate actors, is to engage in "reductionist" thinking. See id, at 18-20. 
4:1 See Kahler, supra note 30, at 32-38. 
44 See generall)' BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD (1993). 
45 See, e,g" Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STlJD. Q. 379 
(1988); Steven Weber, Institutions and Change, in NEW THINKING, supra note 25, at 229. 
46 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 49-50; Kahler, supra note 30, at 33; Peter]. Katzenstein, 
Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: 
NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 19 (Peter]. Katzenstein ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY]. 
47 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 49 (,The pluralists of the 1970s mostly became the 'neoliberal 
institutionalists' of the 1980s and 1990s, and in the process came rather closer to neorealisl1l that 
[sic] might have been expected .... They accepted the t\\'o basic assumptions of international 
anarchy and the rational egoism of states .. , ."); Richard Ashley, The POllert)' of Neorealislll, 38 
INT'L ORG. 225, 227 (1984) (finding similarities between various post-classical realist thinkers, 
including those such as Keohane, who are normally identified with neoliberalism) ;Joseph Grieco, 
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primary actors in an essentially anarchic, crisis-prone international 
system, and the underlying identity and interest formation processes 
of these supposedly unitary actors remained undertheorized.48 
The particularly statist focus of both IR realism and its liberal 
challengers produces several important conclusions regarding the na-
ture ofinternational relations. First, state interests are assumed to exist, 
and "states-as-subjects"49 are expected to, and indeed are justified in, 
pursuing these interests in egoistic fashion. Intra-state interest forma-
tion processes, which are arguably contingent upon social and cultur-
ally constructed processes and actor identities,5U are not analytically 
relevant.51 Second, since the international system comprises a multi-
plicity of unitary and mostly isolated state actors in an anarchic struc-
ture, the formation and functioning of global community or interna-
Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 
INT'L ORG. 485, 486-87 (1988) (noting that neoliberals accept the basic realist premise of anarchy 
and state egoistic rationalism); Smith, supra note 29, at 20. 
48 But cf Burley, Are Fot'l!ign Affairs Different?, supra note 37, at 2001 ("In a nutshell, liber-
alism looks beyond states to indh'idual and group actors in domestic and transnational civil 
society; emphasizes the repI'esentath'eness of governments as a key variable in determining state 
interests; and, focuses less on power than on the nature and strength of those intel'ests in 
international bargaining."). This description suggests pedlaps more openness in the liberal 
paradigm to identity and social construction in international relations than may be warranted. 
See Marysia Zalewski & Cynthia Enloe, Questions About Identity in International Relations, in 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY TODAY, supra note 29, at 279, 296-97 ("[T]he positivist 
undel'pinnings of pluralism [the liberal paradigm] make it doubtful that there would be imy 
space for theorizing about the construction of gender identity or sexual identity or racial identity 
and the enactment of international events and processes."). 
49 SeeE. FUAT KEYMAN, GLOBALIZATION, STATE, IDENTITy/DIFFERENCE: TOWARD A CRITICAL 
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56-57 (1997). Keyman has summarized the state-
as-subject problematic: 
[I] nstead of taking the state as an object of theoretical inquiry, international re-la-
tions theory has tended to conceive of it as the main actor, as an ontological entity, 
as an observable given institutional entity .... [I] t reduced the state to the deci-
sion-making process, whereby, the only objective was to maintain national interest 
defined as "the struggle for national power." ... [T] he decision-making process is 
considered to be independent from the domestic society .... The autonomy from 
and the externality to domestic politics, which realism accords to the state, and its 
ahistorical primary function, the struggle for national powel', makes the state an 
unproblematic entity, an ontological given .... 
In this context, the state does not need to be theorized, because it speaks fOl' 
itself-just as the facts do in positivism. Thus, the state is taken for granted, no 
theoretical question is raised about its precise nature, as well as about the basic 
characteristics of the social formation in which it is embedded. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
50 See infra Part III.A. 
51 See Ronald L.Jepperson et aI., Norms Identity, and Culture in National Security, in CULTURE 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 46, at 33, 43; Zalewski & Enloe, supra note 48, at 294-301 
(discllssing the insufficiencies of international relations theories in conceptualizing identity ques-
tions as they relate to the field). 
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tional society is unlikely and, theoretically, oflittle significance. 52 Third, 
"security" concerns are presumed to drive state action.53 States face a 
perpetual security dilemma because each individual state's security 
depends on it maintaining the relath'e insecurity of other states, which 
will in turn strive to maximize their own security, and so forth. 54 
Finally, the realm of international relations is treated as categori-
cally distinct from the internal political life of states. 55 In the (western) 
domestic "political" realm, for example, particularized interests are 
thought to compete for ascendancy within a liberal democratic sys-
tem governed by the rule of law, constituting an "authentic politics 
within."56 In the external realm of "relations," the unitary state and 
conditions of anarchy supplant pluralistic liberal politics and, to a large 
extent, the rule of law. As such, "relations" reflect the realist ontologi-
52 See Katzenstein, supra note 46, at 12. 
,,3 See BROWN, supra note 20, at 47. Recently, conceptualizations of security ha\'e been ex-
panded beyond military security to countenance "threats" to the state arising fl'Om em;ronmental 
dangers, migration flows, terl'Orism, trade in narcotics, economic globalization and even loss of 
national identity. See, e.g., BaITY Buzan, New Patterns of Global SeclIrit)' in the Twenty-First Centllr)', 
67 INT'L AFF. 431 (1991); Simon Dalby, Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in 
Contemporary Security Discourse, in CRITICAL SECl'RITY STUDIES 3 (Keith Krause & Michael C. 
Williams eds., 1997); Theodore C. Sorenson, Rethinking National Security, 69 FOREIGN An. 1 
(1990). 
54 See Ken Booth, Securil)' and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, in CRITICAL SECURITY 
STUDIES, supra note 53, at 99, 107-08. This line of realist reasoning coincided \\1th a uniquely 
American apocalyptic and "paranoid style" of politics during the Cold War which imagined the 
state in perpetual crisis mode. See Richard Hofstad tel', The Paranoid Sl)1e in American Politics, in 
THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 23 (1965); see alsoJules Lobel, 
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ. 1385, 1400-03 (1989) [hereinafter 
Lobel, Emergency PowerJ. 
The United States continues to see itself in perpetual crisis mode. A recent example of the 
paranoid style and permanent crisis mode thinking involves the "\\ar on terl'Orism" that the 
United States "escalated" with the bombings in August 1998 of targets in the Sudan and Afghani-
stan. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright predicted a pl'Otracted war against terl'Orism. See The 
"War of the Future": United States Bombardment of Sudan, Afghanistan, THE NATION, Sept. 21, 
1998, at 6. Later, it was learned that the bombed pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan, thought to 
be pl'Oducing weapons of mass destruction, was probably just a pharmaceutical plant. See Karl 
Vick, Many in Sudan Dispute Plant's Tie with Bomber, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at A29; Steve 
Chapman, Doubts Continue to Grow About Sudan Raid, CHI. TRIB., NO\'. 1, 1998, at 23. See generall), 
Illeana Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Fiolence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. RE\,. 119 
(examining how the hyperbolic imagery of "terl'Orism" unden\Tites extraordinarily violent re-
sponses by states). 
55 This last point is important in that it may explain wll\' international relations has been 
particularly resistant to post-posithist ("postmodern") types of inquiry that have flourished in 
blanches of the social sciences focusing on "domestic" affairs. Such "post-approaches" have met 
with some acceptance but also much hostility and rejection among international relations schol-
ars. For a telling anecdotal account of the sometimes luke\\arm or hostile reception to new IR 
appl'Oaches by the mainstream, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Preface to Cl'LTURE OF NATIONAL SECU-
RITY, supra note 46, at i, xiii. 
56 See R.BJ. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 
20-21 (1993). 
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cal bias against "utopian" visions of world community and liberal world 
politics.57 Figures (l) and (2) provide graphic depictions and brief 
prose descriptions of, respectively, liberal domestic and IR realist "ex-
ternal" models of political organization and law. 58 
B. IR Realism as Foreign Affairs Law 
The worldview of IR realism has permeated disciplinary bounda-
ries and conditioned legal liberalism's engagement of foreign affairs 
issues. The IR realist attitude can be discerned in the discipline's 
de-emphasis of traditional domestic public law concerns regarding 
the need to constrain-through rights, balancing and separation-the 
Hobbesian tendency to abuse institutionalized forms of power. Instead, 
the struggle of all-against-all is projected outward onto the interna-
tional realm with each nation state, in the "mere space of relations 
between states,"59 constituting a unified actor perpetually pitted against 
similar units in a survival struggle.GO This notion of the survivalist 
state-as-subject in the realm of anarchic relations is a condition of 
possibility for postwar foreign affairs jurisprudence. Gl 
The discussion below will trace the effects of IR realist ontology 
in the foreign affairs and national security law context. Generally, 
disciplines treat core concepts as objectively existing, thus affording 
them ontological status. The critique of such ontological privileging 
that I favor does not see an endgame in the claim that there is no 
objectively verifiable reality on which to apply the (admittedly flawed) 
tools of the scientific method or, for that matter, the insights of critical 
5; The terminology becomes confusing here for those familiar with foreign affairs law. 
Foreign affairs jurisprudence characterizes certain areas as "political questions," or as being within 
the proper purview of the "political branches." See Baker v. CaIT, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) 
(characterizing foreign affairs as an area frequently beyond the appropriate reach of judicial 
review). See infra Part II.B.2.c. This categorization parallels the politics/relations dichotomy of 
IR realism. The use of the terms "politics" and "political" varies in the two cases, but the general 
demarcation of a zone that is outside normal liberal political and legal theory is consistent. 
5~ See Appendix at the end of this article. Figures (1) and (2) are meant only as crude aids 
in visualizing the distinct ontological frameworks operating in the domestic and external contexts, 
and no claim to underlying theoretical comprehensiveness is implied. Figure (3) infta depicts an 
alternative transnational ontology in similar diagram form. 
59 See WALKER, supra note 56, at 20. 
60 See James DerDerian, The ~'(tlue of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, in 
ON SECURITY 24, 30 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995) (discussing Hobbes' theory of domestic 
peace bought at the price of ,,'ar in the international arena). 
61 Mapping the full dimension of the nexus between IR realism and foreign affairs/national 
security jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article. But see infra Part IV for an indication 
of possible future directions for developing a theory of race and foreign affairs that builds on 
the critique of IR realism. 
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theory. Instead, I want to consider the ways that the particular concep-
tual grid of foreign affairs law-IR realist in nature-itself distorts/ con-
structs "reality." There are real political consequences of this ontologi-
cal privileging and distortion/construction. 62 If foreign affairs law has 
been built up around facile and dubious assumptions of a pre-existing 
state-as-subject, national interest, national security, etc., then various 
disciplinary methods of rationalizing the current status quo should be 
questioned as well.63 In beginning this tracing process I will look at two 
main problem-framing discourses: constitutionalism and the "little dia-
lectics" of foreign affairs law. 
By working from a genealogical notion of precedent I am able to 
conclude that scholars have been remiss in their focus on the models 
of Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown and the "little dialectics."M The in-
ternment cases, in particular Hirabayashi v. United StateS'5 and Kore-
matsu v. United States,66 which happen to fall chronologically about 
midway between Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown, deserve a much more 
significant, if not "leading," role in the foreign affairs law plotline 
because they reveal the inadequacy of the discipline's IR realist-in-
spired conceptual and discursive framework and provide a glimpse at 
power relations submerged therein. 
62 See George, supra note 29, at 33-40 (discussing the political consequences of realist issue 
framing and citing examples such as the Gulf War and Yugosla\;a tragedy). 
63 A further step in this type of critique, but beyond the scope of this article, would be to 
examine the ways the legal discipline itself has constituted the IR realist ontologies, such as by 
institutionalizing the construct of unified sO\'ereign state-as-subject. 
64 My notion of "precedent as genealogy," though inspired by Foucault, differs in significant 
ways from his conception of genealogy as antipositivist historical method. For Foucault, genealogy 
"entertain [s] the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge 
against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in 
the name of some true knowledge .... Genealogies are therefore not posith'istic returns to a 
more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-sciences." Michel Foucault, Two 
Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITING 1972-1977, at 78, 
83 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980). Thus, Foucault's genealogy marked a commitment to retrieving 
lost "histories," such as resistances, that are suppressed and deselected in the writing of main-
stream history. See id. 
Precedent as genealogy is actually more in keeping with Foucault's project of understanding 
the way discourses and social practices intelTeiate. Se!' HUNT & \\'ICKHAM, supra note 18, at 5-10 
(providing a brief introduction to Foucauldian thought and describing the project of placing 
discourse within the social field of nondiscursive practices). The discourse of foreign affairs law 
needs to be understood in the way it articulates with the social practices of racial domination 
such as those operative in the internment. In this sense, the internment is "precedent" because 
it contributes to a "genealogy" of this articulation. 
65 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
66323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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1. A Tale of Two Precedents: Foreign Mfairs Constitutionalism 
It is generally taken for granted that foreign affairs and its subset, 
national security law, developed in the postwar period under the new 
requisites of Cold War international relations. The great ideological 
struggle between capitalism and communism, together with the per-
manent threat of mutual annihilation, seem to have precipitated a 
change in the way the government and courts construed law's role in 
mediating the relationship between the internal world of domestic 
affairs and the external world of international politics. Against this 
background, and operating within a liberal legal paradigm, the disci-
pline of foreign affairs law has taken as its task the distribution and, 
less so, the circumscribing of crisis-driven foreign affairs power under a 
constitutional system of enumerated and balanced governmental pow-
ers, federalism, and individual rights and liberty guarantees. Broadly 
speaking, two different models offoreign affairs constitutionalism have 
emerged. 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown are the discursive cornerstones of 
these respective models through which scholars have argued the legal 
and political controversies of the postwar period.67 Both cases raised 
constitutional questions and became the occasion for members of the 
Court to register broad and provocative commentary on the constitu-
tionalism of foreign affairs.68 In the disciplinary tale of two precedents, 
Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright plays the role of absolut-
ist protagonist, asserting that foreign affairs is an area of governance 
literally and legally outside the Constitution69 and favoring the Presi-
67 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304; Yvungstown, 343 U.S. 579. The tale of two precedents 
recurs, sometimes in muted form, throughout the canon of foreign affairs law scholarship. See, 
e.g., HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990); MICHAEL]' GLENNON, CON-
STITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); see general(y Robert C. Kaufman, The National Security Consti-
tution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra AJfail; 8 CONST. COMMENT 321 (1991); Nathan ]. 
Diament, Foreign Relations and Ou)' Domestic Constitution: Broadening the Discourse, 30 CONN. L. 
REV. 911, 911-12 (1998) (characterizing the approaches of Koh and Glennon as examples of the 
current orthodoxy in the field and citing Kaufman). 
68 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37. It should be noted, as Henkin points out, that 
Youngstown did not directly involve foreign affairs powers, at least as it was understood by the 
justices. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 95, 378 n.24. Nevertheless, jackson 's opinion has become one 
of the two main models in the field. 
69 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. justice Sutherland argued that: 
investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did 
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare 
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations 
with other sovereignties ir'they had ne\'er been mentioned in the Constitution, 
,,'ould have been \'ested in the federal govenuuent as necessary concomitants of 
nationality. 
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Koh's focus here is on competition in national security and foreign 
affairs between the President and Congress,7D but the broader mean-
ings of the narrative are implicit in his usage. The tale conveys a 
choice between two apparently competing constitutionalisms. The 
absolutist, sovereignty-derived, and relatively unconstrained vision 
of governmental power to conduct foreign affairs and pursue na-
tional security is sustained by the assertion of shared "consensus 
about national ends." The relativized, institutionally balanced, 
power-enumerated and relatively constrained understanding of gov-
ernmental foreign affairs power assumes dissension, allowing the 
Court to step in and set the proper limits and distribution offoreign 
affairs power. Analyses of a variety of constitutional issues, such as 
separation of powers between the branches of government, the 
scope of judicial review, and the applicability of civil rights and 
liberties in foreign affairs, are thought to break different ways de-
pending on which of the two approaches is adopted.sl! 
But a different reading of Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown reveals 
often overlooked similarities.sl Gordon Silverstein argues that both 
strands of the tale share the assumption that the Constitution treats 
foreign affairs differently from domestic affairs.82 Factually, Curtiss-
Wright involved joint congressional and presidential action and is 
therefore not, strictly speaking, about the President's power relative to 
Congress, as quick comparisons to Youngstown might suggest.83 Rather, 
79 See id. at 6i-lOO. Throughout the book, Koh argues that the "National Security Constitu-
tion" has developed in uneven fashion since the time of the nation's founding. Koh believes 
national security law as it now exists is a product of the relative political will of the three branches 
of government and has deviated significantly from the framers' original intent. Koh chronicles 
how the political branches have tussled over ascendancy in the realm of foreign affairs with each 
acquiring the upper hand at different times. See id. The courts, meanwhile, have tended toward 
abdicating their role as effective participants-referees as it were-in the creation of a national 
security regime under the legal constitutional framework. See id. at 134-49. 
80 Generally, relative to the Youngstown approach, application of the Curtiss-1Vlight model 
favors the President over Congress, a less robust judicial review function, and state interests oyer 
individual rights. See infra Parts II.B.2.a-c. 
Rl See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 21, at 11. 
82 See id. ("If Curtiss-Wright definith'ely resolved anything, it was that the national gOl/ern-
ment-the president and Congress, acting together-faced fell' constitutional constraints in for-
eign policy .... Reading Curtiss-Wright and the steel case [Youngstown] as opposites has led to 
flawed prescriptions and misunderstood signals from the Court to the elected branches of 
govern men t. ") . 
83 In Curtiss-Wright, President Franklin Roosevelt had acted consistently with a pre-existing 
congressional joint resolution empowering the President to ban the sale of arms and munitions 
to countries fighting in the Chaco region of South America. See Curtiss-H1ight, 299 U.S. at 312. 
In Youngstown, President Truman had acted in contravention of congressional \\ishes, embodied 
in the Taft-Hartley Act, in attempting to seize steel mills to insure that labor disputes would not 
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the case is a statement about the absolute nature of foreign affairs 
power in general. Moreover, as Silverstein points out, the Youngstown 
formula is easily used by later courts to support broad presidential 
prerogative, which suggests that it is not primarily a case about balanc-
ing power between the branches.84 Silverstein's concern therefore is 
not that the "President is winning" the fight with Congress over foreign 
affairs power, but rather that the courts, even when applying the 
Youngstown formula, simply view foreign affairs as an area that is out-
side the ambit of normal constitutional analysis. 85 The question of how 
the political branches should exercise foreign affairs power is secon-
dary to the assumption that, constitutionally, foreign affairs powers are 
"prerogative" and subject to a diminished set of constitutional limita-
tions.86 Silverstein concludes that both the Curtiss-Wright and Young-
stown models create an exceptional status for foreign affairs law under 
the Constitution.87 
interfere with continued production for purposes of waging the war in Korea. See Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 586. Thus, the two cases deviate factually on a key aspect of the institutional balancing 
issue-the presence or absence of congresssional support for the President's action. The different 
fact patterns in the cases may better explain the divergent outcomes-presidential triumph in 
Curtiss-Wright and defeat in }flungstown-than the application of mutually exclusive models of 
foreign affairs constitutionalism. 
84 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 21, at 176-81; see generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981). The Court in Dames upheld the constitutionality of the President's unilateral tenni-
nation of private claims that were being pursued in U.S. courts against the Iranian Government 
and related entities, despite the presence of congressional authorization of such suits. The case 
illustrates the extent to which the Youngstown formula has led to results that one might expect 
from application of the Curtiss-Wright model. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist 
substantially altered Jackson's formula by shifting metaphors, from "pigeonholes" to "spectrum": 
Although we have in the past found and do today find Justice Jackson's classification 
of executive actions into three general categories analytically useful, we should be 
mindful of Justice Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Young-
stOlon (concurring opinion), that' [tlhe great ordinances of the Constitution do 
not establish and divide fields of 'black and white.' Justice Jackson himself recog-
nized that his three categories represented 'a somewhat over-simplified grouping,' 
and it is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not 
neatly in one of three pigeonholes [referring to Jackson's three-tiered formula], 
but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional 
authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as re-
spects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to international crises 
the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any 
detail. 
453 U.S. at 669 (citation omitted). See also, Lobel, Emergency Power; supra note 54, at 1411-12. 
"" See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 21, at 223. 
86 See id. ("The prerogative interpretation represents a significant change in constitutional 
interpretation; it created and accepted an artificial distinction between foreign and domestic 
policy powers that has no clear basis in the Constitution itself, and it has the potential fundamen-
tally to undermine the whole structure of government."). Silverstein argues that the traditional 
interpretation, from the framers onward, has been that foreign affairs is not different from 
domestic affairs as far as the Constitution is concerned. See id. at 26-36. 
8i But arguably each does so according to a different logic. See Lobel, Emergency Power, supra 
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dent as "sole organ of foreign affairs."70 Justice Jackson's more prag-
matic, flexible and balancing approach in his Youngstown concurrence 
asserted a constitutional basis of foreign affairs authority that would 
address foreign affairs questions by applying a kind of sliding scale 
formula to such concurrently held constitutional powers,71 reflecting 
the modern jurisprudential aversion to bright-line distinction.i2 
On the one hand, "political realists," often political conservatives, 
have favored the Curtiss-Wright vision, arguing that the permanent 
security crisis73 of the postwar world necessitates a centralization of 
broad foreign affairs authority, preferably in the hands of a strong 
executive.74 Under this view, the dangers of the modern world with its 
[d. Sutherland read colonial history as a continuous passing of external sovereignty-not internal 
sovereignty-from the British Crown to the Federal Government upon independence despite the 
Constitution's silence on the matter. See id. at 316-18. Internal sO\'ereignty passed to the individ-
ual states which then selectively and deliberately deposited or retained certain pO"'ers flowing 
therefrom to the Federal GO\'ernment, first under the Articles of Confederation and later under 
the Constitution. See id. Sutherland listed the po,,"ers of external sO\'ereigntv that were, in this 
extraconstitutional manner, vested in the Federal GO\"ernment. See id. These foreign affairs 
powers included: acquisition of territory by discovery and occupation, expulsion of undesirable 
aliens, and entering into international agreements besides formal Art. II treaties. See id. at 318. 
Since Curtiss-Wright, sovereignty has been inmked, for example, as the basis for the federal pO\\"er 
to register aliens and to regulate citizens' overseas travel and activities. See HENKIN, sllpra note 
14, at 21. 
70 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
71 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., conCllrring). Justice Jackson developed a 
three-tiered formula for determining the constitutionality of presidential actions in situations 
involving concurrently held powers. Generally, the formula depended on whether or not the 
President acted with or without the express or implied authorization of Congress, or against the 
express or implied will of Congress. Presidential powers flowed and ebbed accordingly. See id. 
The institutional balancing discourse in foreign affairs has a lengthy tradition, dating back to 
before the exchange of letters between Alexander Hamilton (Pacificus) and James r-,fadison 
(Helvidius). The Hamilton-Madison letters debated President George Washington's Neutrality 
Proclamation of 1793, wherein \Vashington unilaterally proclaimed United States' neutrality after 
France had declared war on England. \\'ashington's proclamation was subsequently approved by 
both houses of Congress. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIG!'I AFFAIRS AI\"D COXSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: THE ORIGINS 111-16 (1976); KOH, slll)ra note 67, at 79-80. 
72 See T. Alexander A1einikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 
943-44 (1987) (referring to the pos!\\"ar era as the "age of balancing"); Elizabeth Mensch, The 
History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in POLITICS OF L.m", supra note 26, at 23, 32-36 (describing 
the modern ~rend and linking it to the legal realist school of thought); Jeffrey M. Shaman, 
Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Realit)', 41 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 152-56 (1994) (disCllssing 
balancing approach). 
73 See DAVID CAMPBELL, \\'RITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY 23-31 (1992) (citing and discussing numerous documents of national security from 
the early postwar years which scripted the perpetual state of crisis); Lobel, Ellie/gene)" Pown; supra 
note 54, at 1400-04 (outlining the state of constant security crisis in the pos!\\"ar period); see also 
ARTHUR M. Cox, THE MYTHS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1-31 (1975) (describing the national 
security mythology of the pos!\\'ar period). 
74 See David Cole, Yotmgsto\\11 v. Curtiss-Wright, 99 YALE LJ. 2063, 2063-66 nn.2-3 (1990) 
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weapons of mass destruction and intractable ideological differences 
call for a kind of "constitutional dictator. "75 The threatened survival of 
the nation legitimates near absolute freedom for those who safeguard 
national security from constitutional constraint. On the other hand, 
liberal critics of Cold War foreign policy have often advocated the 
balancing approach offered by the Youngstown vision, recoiling at the 
increasingly "imperial presidency"76 and the extraconstitutional model 
of foreign affairs powers.77 
Harold Koh deploys the disciplinary tale, as it is constructed 
around the two leading cases, in his critique of national security law 
and practice after the Iran-Contra scandal: 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown sketched dramatically differ-
ent visions of the National Security Constitution. Curtiss-
Wright was decided during the rise of the imperial presidency 
and the American empire. By giving constitutional legitimacy 
to the concept of presidential dominance in foreign affairs, 
it contributed forcefully to the model of activist presidency 
fostered by Franklin Roosevelt. The vision of Curtiss-Wright 
carried the nation through World ''''ar II, a time when the 
nation drew together of necessity and Congress and the presi-
dent shared a consensus about national ends. The president 
and Congress then designed the national security system in 
1947 to sustain that national consensus in the cold war years 
through a model of management by an institutional and 
plebiscitary presidency. But when President Truman used 
that system to extend the national security state and to lead 
the nation into the unpopular, undeclared Korean war, the 
Youngstown Court reaffirmed the limits that National Security 
Constitution placed upon his authority.78 
(book review) (citing numerous recent commentaries by political conservatives defending execu-
tive prerogative over foreign affairs). 
75 See generally CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP; CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN 
THE l\!ODERN DDJOCRACIES (1948) (making the case for an expanded executive power under 
conditions threatening the nation's survival). 
76 See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (tracking 
eV'olution of the overweening executive and suggesting need to control, without weakening, the 
President) . 
77 See KOH, supra note 67, at 212 (arguing that Youngstown is the "controlling vision behind 
the National Security Constitution" and rejecting the Curtiss-Wright model as inappropriate in 
the post-Cold War era of democratic promise in foreign affairs). 
78Id. at 135-36 . 
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I would extend Silverstein's point even further. Consider how 
Jackson's Youngstown opinion adheres to an ontological paradigm simi-
lar to that suggested by Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright.88 In Youngstown, 
Jackson wrote: 
We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less 
to contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation 
to sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments 
of national force, at least when turned against the outside world 
for security of our society. But, when it is turned inward, not 
because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic strug-
gle between industry and labor, it should have no such indul-
gence.89 
Jackson traffics in the realist ontology that pervades interwar and 
Cold War intellectual history. The "outside world," poised as a 
threat to security, is juxtaposed to the "inward" sphere of "our 
society." Jackson prescribes "indulgence" of executive action in the 
implicitly unlawful external realm as contrasted to the "lawful" in-
ternal realm wherein such indulgence is withheld. Interestingly, 
however, in cases of "rebellion," recognized in the Constitution with 
regard to congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,90 
Jackson would collapse the external/internal dichotomy for pur-
poses of evaluating executive authority. This collapsing of the two 
spheres, through the imagined rebellion scenario, into one large 
external realm reveals the extent to which the logic of necessity-
structured in a manner that is homologous with the anarchic imagi-
nary of IR realist ontology-drove Jackson's constitutional analysis. 
It would seem a stretch to extrapolate from the limited suspension 
of the habeas clause91 such a broad indulgence of executive discre-
tion in cases of internal unrest. This extrusion of the external into 
the internal is evident in opinions Jackson authored in other cases 
note 54, at 1399-1412. Lobel's analysis of emergency powers identifies three models that ha\'e 
operated at different times in U.S. history: absolutist, relativist, and classical liberal. See id. at 
1386-92. Lobel characterizes both Youngstown and Curtiss-nhghtas relativist, but sees Youngstown 
as following a legal realist logic, and Curtiss-Wright as forwarding an inherent power logic. See id. 
at 1406-12. Lobel's characterization essentially supports Sih-erstein's position by placing the 
supposed polar opposite precedents within the same relatidst grouping. See id. 
88 See supra discussion accompanying notes 69-77. 
R9343 U.s. at 645 (Jackson, j., concurring) (emphasis added). 
90 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2. Congress is also authorized to use the militia to suppress 
insurrections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 15. 
91 For an authoritative analysis of the suspension clause, see Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas 
C01PUS, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961 (1998). 
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involving imagined national security "threats" where his IR realist-
informed fear of "totalitarianism" led him to adopt repressive posi-
tions."2 
jackson's tripartite formula, though legal realist in its balancing 
approach and liberal in its commitment to separation of powers, nev-
ertheless does not escape the IR realist conceptual framework. While 
Sutherland's invocation of the "vast external realm" of foreign affairs 
in Curtiss-Wright 93 is the clearest importation of IR realist thinking into 
foreign affairs legal discourse, both constitutionalisms housed in the 
tale of two precedents are consistent with the IR realist ontological 
privileging of the survivalist state-as-subject acting in an anarchic inter-
national realmY4 
In standard legal liberalism (domestic contexts)U5 the state and 
its appurtenances are ontologically subordinated to law, in particular 
the fundamental law of the land, which is the depository of "popular 
sovereignty." &oth temporally and hierarchically, law precedes the 
state. In foreign affairs (external contexts)96 the law is the product of, 
and secondary to, the state; the law is subjected to raison d'etat. Placing 
the state and the rule of law on a kind of continuum and deciding 
where on the continuum we wish to place ourselves based on the 
significance afforded an exogenous determination (external versus 
internal) is to imagine the state on a par with the subjectivity of the 
body politic, with "we the people." It is to imagine the state-as-subject 
and place beyond significant scrutiny claims made in its behalf. The 
stakes in such an understanding of the state are evident in the intern-
92 See, e.g., Tenniniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13, 23-25 (1949) (jackson, j., dissenting) 
(favoring limitation of free speech rights when state "mastery of the streets" was at stake); Dennis 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568-70, 572 (1951) (jackson, j., concurring) (favoring broad 
application of Smith Act's conspiracy provision that would not protect Communist plotting in "its 
period of incubation"). See generally jeffrey D. Hockett, justice Robert H. jackson, The Sup'rerne 
Court, and the Nurembelg TTial, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 257 (arguing that jackson's experience as 
Chief Counsel at Nuremberg might have affected his constitutional jurisprudence, at times 
leading to a narrowing of constitutional liberties in the face of perceived threats to security). 
93 299 U.S. at 319. 
!H Another way in which the choice of constitutionalisms contained in the tale has been 
presented has been to ask whether the rule of law stops "at the water's edge?" See THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS? 156 (1992) [hereinafter FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS]. If it does not, does the rule 
of law operate in the same manner in the external as it does in the internal realm? The outcome 
of this framing, however, may also be prefigured by the underlying ontological structure it implies. 
Positing as givens the mutually exclusive (and mutually defining) realms of inside and outside, 
even for purposes of liberal legal analysis, risks reification of IR realist-defined political and legal 
parameters. For a critique of the spatial ontology of IR realism, see infra Part 1I1.A. 
95 See Figure (1) in Appendix. 
96 See Figure (2) in Appendix. 
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ment context. Perhaps the most telling IR realist moment in the Su-
preme Court's internment opinions was the invocation of Charles 
Evans Hughes' "truism" that the power to wage war is the power to do 
so successfully.97 To think otherwise would be to ignore the fact that 
the "national survival [was] at stake. "'18 Once the appeal to IR realist-
driven subjectirying survival logic is made, the legal consequences seem 
to follow quite automatically. 
In moving toward an understanding of the significance of the 
internment as a model of foreign affairs constitutionalism in its own 
right, it bears noting that the internment Court did not rely on Cur-
tiss-Wrightin upholding the Government's actions.99 This omission may 
of course have been inadvertent, but it may suggest a greater salience 
for the internment as precedential instantiation of IR realist-informed 
foreign affairs constitutionalism. And in one sense the internment was 
even "truer" to the IR realist vision than Curtiss-Wright, as the Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu Court followed the IR realist vision to its logical 
extremes despite glaring contradictions. For example, the asserted 
absolute value of successful war-making, though it obscured the fact 
that the "war" being waged in the internment was actually an internal 
one directed against an innocent racial minority group, prO\'ed disposi-
tive of all related legal questions. The "nation's" sunh'al struggle, 
though indeed compromised in a serious way when "state interests" 
were deemed synonymous with white interests on the West Coast, took 
unchallenged precedence over the Japanese American residents' well-
being. 100 
Ironically, of course, the supposed anarchy of the "external" was 
set loose internally, having grown from conditions uniquely domestic 
and American. Again, rhetorically, lawless state action was charac-
terized as necessary in light of the external threat, the chaos of the 
international realm. But an inversion of this relationship may better 
describe the state of events: internal conditions of raw racial domina-
tion and white supremacy conditioned the state's conduct in its war 
effort. Indeed, the mass killings by nuclear bombs dropped on civilian 
97 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
98 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 106 (Douglas,]., concurring). 
99 None of the opinions filed in either Hiraba)'ashi or Korematsll cites to Curtiss-H'light. See 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 V.S. 214 (1944). 
lOoHow could the "nation," defined hy the assertion of particularist, racially-<:ontingent 
(white) interests, albeit rhetorically in the name of universalist, national survival, maintain a claim 
of unified national subjecthood? Revealed was the racial specificilY of the nation and the absorp-
tion by the state of that racialized identity. 
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centers in Japan were directly conditioned by the racist dehumaniza-
tion of Asian peoples generally, a product of domestic race "relations" 
in the United States. lUI ' 
If we seek to construct a genealogy of foreign affairs law and its 
articulation with modes of social domination, it is necessary to include 
in our tale of precedents instances, such as the internment, where the 
IR realist framework, operating in full force, wears its contradictions 
on its sleeve. By moving beyond the Curtiss-Wright/ Youngstown tale we 
may get a more complete picture of the operative constitutionalism of 
foreign affairs law. In Part IV, I will return to the question of construct-
ing a model offoreign affairs constitutionalism based upon the insights 
of the internment and a rejection of IR realist ontology that obscures 
such untoward aspects of foreign affairs legalism. 
2. Constitutional Diaiectics102 of Foreign Mfairs 
Beyond the meta-level of constitutionalism and its "great dialectic" 
of Curtiss-Wright/ Youngstown, IR realist ontology has infused the disci-
pline's framing of smaller constitutional questions. Along with the 
struggle between the President and Congress for primacy in setting 
foreign policy and directing the national security apparatus, two other 
areas receive substantial attention in foreign affairs literature: 103 the 
weight to be afforded individual rights and liberties104 and the scope of 
judicial review.1IJ5 Analysis of these and other questions typically has 
meant puzzling through dispersed and ambiguous constitutional 
grants of power, competing historical precedents and political philoso-
phies, and then weighing these against modern policy imperatives. 
However, the particular ontology that animates these constitutional 
problematiques in foreign affairs discourse is seldom explored. 
I will argue that a common thread connecting each of these 
smaller constitutional dialectics is the way in which the IR realist 
lOl See gmerall)' RONALD T. TAKAKI, HIROSHIMA: WHY AMERICA DROPPED THE ATOMIC BOMB 
(1995). 
1O~ Dialectic here is not used in the Hegelian sense, but merely to refer to a series of 
oppositions staked out in the disciplinary and jurisprudential discources of foreign affairs law. 
](13 The list is not exhaustive. Other questions that have received significant attention include 
the role of international law and federalism in foreign affairs matters. The authoritative source 
on the various constitutional questions in the field is HENKIN, supra note 14. 
104 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 14, at 283-310; Arthur S. Miller, Pretense and Our Two 
Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375 (1986). 
105 See, e.g., FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 94; THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL 
J. GLE:-.iNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMU-
LATIONS 849-1064 (2nd ed. 1993); HENKIN, supra note 14, at 131-48; CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN 
THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND WAR POWERS SINCE 1918 (1989). 
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conceptualizations of the state and its "flesh-and-bones" complement-
the nation 106-condition legal discourse. The constitutional dialectics 
of foreign affairs law reflect familiar categories of analysis-separation 
of powers, rights jurisprudence, judicial re,iew-but in the case of 
foreign affairs the conceptual framework shifts, along with the move-
ment from "internal" to "external" ontologies. IR realist-inflected con-
cepts of the state-as-subject, national interest, and politics/relations 
become the ontological engine behind the legal imagination. 
Liberal reformist thinking of the postwar period has struggled on 
several fronts toward: correction of a perceived institutional imbalance 
created by the increasingly "imperial presidency" and a decreasingly as-
sertive Congress attributed to the Cold War climate of perceived per-
petual and ubiquitous threat;I07 reduction of governmental incursions 
in the name of national security into the private sphere of individual 
rights and liberties;108 maximization of judicial review of governmental 
action and the interbranch struggle over power. 109 In succession, I will 
briefly sketch the ontological structure of the constitutional "little 
dialectics" that have sited these reform and corresponding mainstream 
discourses in the discipline, while also suggesting how the intern-
ment provides an alternative understanding of each dialectic.lIO Under-
106 In modern political and legal theory, the concept of "nation-state" neatly conflates two 
arguably incommensurable categories, the political and the cultural. Cf Da\'id Kennedy, New 
Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 
545,554 (1997) ("For the internationalist, cultural differences are best when they remain differ-
ences between or within nations and when states can be brought into relationship with one 
another in a regime of global governance which floats abm'e culture."). Kennedy describes how 
cultural difference and identity threaten the modern internationalist liberal paradigm by re\'eal-
ing the imaginary nature of the order it seeks to constntct-"an agnostic order, selfless, objecth'e, 
faithful to all sovereign desires, respectful of all sovereign prerogath·es." Id. I would argue that 
such an imagined acultural understanding also animates the foreign affairs legal paradigm, thus 
creating resistance to recognition of the social constntctedness and cultural specificity of legal 
forms such as those discussed in this article. 
107 See, e.g., KOH, supra note 67; SCHLESINGER, supra note 76 (u'acing the evolution of the 
imperial presidency back to its central point of origin in foreign affairs and particularly the 
usurpation of Congress' powel' under the Constitution to declare war). 
108 See, e.g., Lobel, Emergency POWI!!; supra note 54; Millel; supra note 104. 
109 This has not been a universally agreed upon liberal reform strategy. Some \\~'iters favoring 
reform have questioned whether judicial inten'ention is wise since it may lead to the creation of 
bad precedent in cases where the judical branch, like the populace at large, may fall \;ctim to 
the type of hysteria that often accompanies "security crises." See MAY, supra note 105, at 256-68 
("Such rulings weaken respect for the Court and the Constitution, which, instead of protecting 
rights, become apologists for their \;olation. "); Woods, Housing Expediter v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 
333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) Uackson,J., concurring) (observing that judges were likely to fall victim 
to the same "passions and pressures" as the populace at large). 
110 Each of these little dialectics warrants much more exploration than I am able to undertake 
in this article. For now, it should suffice to suggest the general contours of my thinking on this 
way of tracing the effects of IR realism in the discipline's foundational face-offs. 
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standing and critiquing cases of governmental abuse, such as the in-
ternment, through these constitutional dialectics may be an advisable 
strategy since it appropriates "legitimate" legal discourse and produces 
a viable reform agenda that may gain a degree of acceptance within 
legal institutions. However, insofar as the constitutional dialectics are 
rooted in IR realist ontology, they make it difficult to grasp with spe-
cificity the racial and xenophobic content of the internmentjurispru-
dence or that of foreign affairs law generally, suggesting the need for 
a more fundamen tal structural and poststructural critique as well. 
a. President v. Congress 
The literature lamenting or celebrating the President's postwar 
ascendancy in foreign affairs is vast. lll Critics of the "imperial presi-
dency" point to clear abuses such as Johnson's and Nixon's escalation 
of war in Southeast Asia, 112 or the Reagan administration's illegal policy 
of covert subversion in Central America and the Iran-Contra affair.113 
Generally, a disturbing imbalance is perceived in the executive's mo-
nopolization of power at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed 
role of the legislative branch. IH Supporters of greater presidential 
prerogative appeal to pragmatism and the increased efficiency result-
ing from consolidating foreign affairs and security powers in a strong 
executive, to a greater or lesser extent immune from either congres-
III See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984 (Ran-
dall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); KOH, supra note 67; ROSSITER, supra note 75; SCHLESIN-
GER, supra note 76; SOFAER, supra note 71. But cf Peter Spiro, Old Wan/New Wars, 37 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 723, 723 (1996) (book review) ("With the end of the Cold War. Congress has 
become increasingly asserth'e on the foreign policy stage."). 
112 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 127-207 (giving the history of the President's ascen-
dancy in foreign affairs in the postwar period through the Vietnam war). 
113 See, e.g., Michael]. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign AjJain Powers: Little v. 
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE]. INT'L L. 5 (J 988); KOH, supra note 67, at 11-37; Anthony 
Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 4lJ, 423-24 (1996). 
IH See KOH, supra note 67, at 153-56. The power' to declare war; for example, clearly and 
exclush'ely granted to Congress in the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, increasingly 
has fallen within the scope of presidential prerogative. Even direct congressional action to reclaim 
rhis important war power-the War Powers Resolution-failed to give effect to apparent consti-
tutional intent. See id. at 126-28. A partial listing of instances of the expanding executive war 
power would include actions related to the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, warlike aggression 
authorized by the President in invasions at the Bay of Pigs, Grenada, and Panama, as well as covert 
activities conducted against Allende, Castro, the Sandanista regime, and Khaddafi. By the time 
of the Iran-Contra scandal under President Reagan, the executive's nearly unlimited authority to 
conduct subversive military activities around the globe had been well established. Simones points 
out that, more recently, courts have begun using the Curtiss-Wright authorization to underwrite 
the President's pm\'er to unilaterally interpret congressional intent behind foreign affairs legisla-
tion. See Simones, supra note 113, at 421-27. 
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sional or judicial intervention. lI5 It is argued that the executive is 
uniquely situated to function in the "vast external realm with its im-
portant, complicated, delicate and manifold problems. "116 
While recent history has indeed suggested that "the President 
(almost) always wins in foreign affairs, "117 a longer view of history does 
not consistently support this dew.ll8 Nor does the text of the Constitu-
tion, which lays out in a rather dispersed and unsystematic fashion the 
primary sources of executive authority over foreign affairs issues, guar-
antee a presidential victory in foreign affairs. I 19 The executive powers 
are counterbalanced by enumerated powers of Congress, which seem 
on their face to be as substantial as those of the executive. 120 Neverthe-
115The qualities deemed necessary for efficient handling of foreign affairs usually include: 
decisiveness, dispatch, secrecy, and unity. See, e.g., Theodore C. Sorenson, Political Perspective: 
Who Speaks for the Nation, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY 3, 12 (Thomas 1\1. Franck ed., 1981) 
("Members of Congress, by definition and nature, are far more likely to take a parochial \-iew 
instead of the national view that an effectiv-e foreign policy requires. They are, by duty and 
inclination, less likely than the president to display such executi\-e traits as decisi\'eness, dispatch, 
unity, and secrecy-all of which are required for the conduct of foreign affairs in a dangerous, 
complex, and fast-changing world .... "); Spiro, sujnG note Ill, at 725 (listing the ingredients 
of a successful foreign policy process as precision, flexibility, dispatch, secrecy, and leadership). 
See also Theodore J. Lowi, Presidential POlller and the Ideological Struggle over its Intnpretation, in 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 227, 238-39 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank 
eds., 1991) (describing a growing "fast track" of powers that are better exercised by the executi\'e 
where "secrecy, unilateral action, energy, commitment, decisiv-eness" are important and time is 
of the essence). 
116 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Regan \'. Wald, 
468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984). 
117Harold Koh, lMly the President (Almost) Always "Fins ill Foreign iiffairs: Lessons of the 
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ. ]255, 1258 (1988). 
118 Prior to this more recent period it would not be incorrect to say that presidents rather 
consistently pressed the apparent constitutional limits of their foreign affairs powers. From Polk's 
initiation of a war of conquest with Mexico, and Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and 
issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation under a broad reading of commander-in-chief pow-
ers, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 41-43, to Theodore Roose\'elt's imperial campaigns in 
the Caribbean and the Pacific under his theory of the president as "a steward of the people," see 
KOH, supra note 67, at 89, foreign affairs has been distinctly fruitful grounds for the assertion of 
executive prerogati\'e. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 35-99. Ne\,ertheless, rhetmicall)', presi-
dents prior to the Cold War era adhered to the traditional interpretation of institutional balance 
in the conduct of foreign affairs under the Constitution. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2], at 62. 
The resulting tension between action and rhetoric was actually coherent within the classical liberal 
logic of formally distinct realms of legitimate and illegitimate exercises of go\,ernmental power, 
wherein illegitimate actions under conditions of exigency were foreseeable and quasi-systematic. 
See Lobel, EmergenC)' Pown-, supra note 54, at ]392; SIL\'ERSTEIK, sllj)ra note 2], at 62. 
119 Relevant constitutional clallSes involving grants of power to the executiye that may apply 
in the area of foreign affairs are: commander-in-chief, U.S. CO:-';ST. art. II, § ], d. ]; treaty-making, 
U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; naming ambassadors, U.S. CONST. an. II, § 2, cl. 2; reeei\'ing 
ambassadors, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; executi\,e-power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § ], cl. ]; take-care, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
120 Grants of congressional power in the area of foreign affairs occur in the follovdng clauses: 
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less, "talismanic" references121 to national security and the logic of 
Curtiss-Wright by government attorneys defending presidential actions 
in foreign affairs122 have become such mindless commonplace that 
Professor Koh describes the practice as the "Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right 
cite. "123 
The alternative offered by Jackson's Youngstown concurrence, 
praised by some as presenting the most cogent assessment of the 
constitutional distribution of foreign affairs powers between the politi-
cal branches,l24 views the President and Congress as partners in the 
conduct of foreign affairs and maintenance of national security. 125 The 
President holds certain appreciable powers, but always under the rule 
of law "made by parliamentary deliberations."12fi 
prm'iding for the common defense, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. I; regulating commerce with foreign 
nations and Indian tribes, U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, d. 3; establishing a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion, U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, c1. 4; defining and punishing offences against the law of nations, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 10; declaring war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. II; raising and supporting 
armies, U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, c1. 12; providing and maintaining a na,y, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cI. 13; (held only by the Senate) advising and consenting to treaties and naming of ambassadors, 
U,S. CO:-;ST. art. II, § 2, d. 2. 
121 See KOH, supra note 67, at 148; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(referring to the Government's use of national security as a "talisman" and war power as a 
"talismanic incantation "). 
122 Of particular importance is Justice Sutherland's suggestion that the President is the "sole 
organ" in foreign affairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936). Sutherland was in effect interpreting a speech made in 1800 by then Congressperson 
John Marshall from the House floor. While Marshall apparently did use the quoted language, 
Professor Koh points out that Marshall's quote has been taken out of its original context. See 
KOH, supra note 67, at 268 n.61. Koh argues that it would probably be more accurate to 
understand :.\Iarshall as meaning that the President is the main conduit of communication for the 
United States in its international relations. See id.; cf. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1,25 (1973) (pointing 
out that Sutherland failed to note that, in the same speech, Marshall had also acknowledged a 
substantial role for Congress). 
123 KOH, supra note 67, at 94. In its entirety, Sutherland's vision in Ctlrtiss~Wl'ight leaves many 
difficulties for analysis of po\\'er distribution between the political branches. For example, the 
extraconstitutional origin of a source of federal authority in foreign affairs cannot provide 
definiti\'e guidance as to delicate separation of powers questions. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 
22. "'11ile practicallv any act of the Federal Government in foreign affairs could be legitimated 
under sovereignty doctrine, which of the political branches should actually exercise the power in 
a ghen situation remains undetermined. See id. 
1:!4 See, e.g., KOH, supra note 67, at 107-08. Henkin finds Jackson'S Youngstown concurrence 
less praise\\'orthy. Henkin argues that it lea\'es unanswered questions of how exactly to divide up 
concurrently held presidential and congressional powers and that it was written from the per-
specti\'e of the President. See HENKDI, supra note 14, at 95. 
125 Howe\'er, Jackson's analysis hinged on such slippery concepts as a "zone of twilight," in 
which constitutional allocation was unclear and probably defaulted to the President, and "implied 
will" in cases where congressional inaction might be viewed as tantamount to acquiescence. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,]., concurring); 
HENKIN, supra note 14, at 94-95. 
I:!G See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson,]., conclll'ring) ("With all its defects, delays and 
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In the end, the constitutional President/Congress debate has de-
volved into a non-legal utilitarian choice between necessity and bal-
ance, and the courts have become increasingly content to let the 
President and Congress fight it OUt. 127 The literature treats the conflict 
between the two political branches as a kind of inter-branch Hobbesian 
struggle. Edward Corwin states the position well: 
What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer 
on the President certain powers capable of affecting our 
foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same gen-
eral kind on the Senate, and still other powers on Congress; 
but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final 
voice in determining the course of the American nation is left 
for events to resolve. 
All of which amounts to saying that the Constitution, con-
sidered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of 
affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy.128 
Corwin's "invitation to [a] struggle" that shall be "left for events to 
resolve" reflects the tone of much of the discourse around the 
President/Congress debate. 
Ironically, however, in an area where the dominant discourse has 
itself deconstructed the presumed dichotomy of law and politics-ad-
mitting that the separation question in foreign affairs is mostly political 
after all-there has been an "enervation of the constitutional foreign 
policy debate. "129 In other words, while foreign affairs have been the 
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free gm'ernment except 
that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations."); 
see also JORDAN]' PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 469-72 (1996) 
(citing and discussing cases establishing that the President is under the rule of law). 
127 See MAY, supra note IDS, at 261-68 (characterizing judicial intervention as caught between 
the Scylla of "ritualistic approval" and the Charybdis of the political question doctrine, both of 
which undermine the concept of judicial re,lew). 
128CORWIN, supra note 111, at 201 (first emphasis in original; other emphases added); see 
also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson,]., concurring). Jackson stated: 
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of 
Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems .... We mar say that 
power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only 
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers. 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson,]., concurring). 
129 See Diament, supra note 67, at 912. A recent illustration of this point is provided by the 
bombing of "terrorist positions" in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan. The 
bombings received immediate, almost unh'ersal bipartisan support, e\'en though Congress was 
deeply. split by the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and many belie\'ed the President had ordered the 
bombings to distract the public's attention. See Todd S. Purdum, U.S. F1I1)' 011 2 Continents: 
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main area excepted from standard review by courts because it is emi-
nently political, it has also been the realm of degraded political delib-
eration.!'lU The explanation for this paradox lies in the nature of the 
national interest that drives the "political" process regarding external 
matters. This national interest is not the product of dialogic delibera-
tion as envisioned by, for example, neorepublicanists.!3! Rather, it is the 
untroubled unitary national interest of IR realism. Both Congress and 
the President are presumed to have proper and transparent linkages 
to this preformed national interest. The President/Congress face-off 
is merely a dispute over which branch will metonymically represent 
that uncomplicated interest and its uncompromising pursuit. 
Another way of understanding my point is to view the dialectic of 
President versus Congress, which consumes so much of the critical 
discourse in the field, as actually constituting one side of a broader 
unstated dialectic. Regardless of which branch of government should 
be, or is, empowered to act in foreign affairs contexts, we could ask 
from what source flows the power to act imperiously. The President! 
Congress dialectic begs this question, assuming that the nation, en-
dowed in a bootstrap manner with the characteristics of sovereignty, 
must possess this imperialist power as a right. Writers such as Jules 
Lobel, to the contrary, would have us challenge the imperialist impulse 
and content behind the legal process of foreign affairs and, in particu-
lar, national security law. 132 Moreover, the actual non-unitariness of the 
Congress; Citics of Clinton Support Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at AI, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT file. 
Ull See Andrew M. Lichterman, Social iHovements and Legal Elites: Some Notes from the Margin 
011 The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 1984 WIS. L. REv. 1035, 1053 (book review) (1984) 
("The ''''ational Security State' and the industrial apparatus that supports it exist largely outside 
both the conventional market and the arena of political debate."); see also DANIEL PATRICK 
MOYNIHAN, SECRECY; THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 154-·227 (1998) (describing the onset of a 
"culture of secrecy" after World War II that precluded public debate of most foreign affairs issues; 
and arguing for a new "culture of openness" where public analysis of foreign affairs issues replaces 
secrecy). 
131 See Diament, supra note 67, at 945-50 (discussing the possibility of a neorepublicanist 
foreign policy that would be pluralistic, dialogic, and deliberative). I would further trouble the 
national interest concept, even beyond its neorepublican variant, in order to combat the episte-
mological straightiacket national interest discourse imposes. Other criticisms of the national 
interest concept take issue with the moral framework it implies, wherein the state is the proper 
unit of moral analysis in foreign affairs, and the well-being of those outside the unit is given little 
or no moral weight in setting policy. See generally W. DAVID CLINTON, THE Two FACES OF 
NATIONAL INTEREST 35-46 (1994) (citing various critics and critiques of national interest con-
cept). 
l:l2 See Lobel, Emergency Power, supra note 54, at 1426 ("Revitalizing the liberal legal paradigm 
requires a substantive redefinition of United States national security that does not necessitate the 
present imperial responsibility which inevitably leads to continued crisis. "); see also Elizabeth M. 
Iglesias, Stl'llctltres of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and NLRA. Not!, 
28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 395, 502 (1993) (,To be relevant as a liberation practice, legal theory 
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national interest, asserted by anti-IR realist theorists,133 renders the 
fixation on the President/Congress dialectic problematic, indeed, de-
politicizing in the way it masks the often chasmic divergences between 
groups' perceptions of the national interest. 134 
The limitations of the President/Congress dialectic are illustrated 
in the internment context through the Court's handling of the dele-
gation doctrine, an area of constitutional law that has since lost cur-
rency but which was viewed as decisi\'e in cases of the period.13s Dele-
gation doctrine regulated Congress' ability to delegate essential parts 
of the legislative function to other governmental organs and actors. I:16 
The delegation question sited the President/Congress dialectic in the 
internment cases because if it could be determined that Congress had 
appropriately delegated authority to regulate civilian activities to the 
military, then the Court would have avoided having to address the 
more difficult question of whether the President, acting alone, could 
have authorized the internment program. 
Congress had approved the internment, but only in the broadest 
of terms.137 Indeed, Justice Reed, considered a delegation doctrine 
expert, insisted that the Court's opinion in Hirabayashi not contain any 
false implication that Congress had acted directly to approve the cur-
few orders that were litigated in the case .13R Further, any congressional 
delegation to the military command of regulatory power over civilians 
occurred in a highly atypical manner. Virtually no open political delib-
eration of the program took place. The decision was taken by the 
military upon its own determinations, which Congress neither pre-
scribed nor reviewed. 13<1 Yet, the Court apprm'ed the military's program 
despite clear indications that the legislative function had not been 
effectively performed. 140 
must help us understand in some detail the "'ays in which the symbolic/analytical structure of 
law as a system of meanings-of practical reason and reasoned justification-participates in 
maintaining the material structures of power."). 
1 ~3 See infiCl Part lILA 
134 See infra Part IV for a discussion of African Americans' unique positionality vis-a.-vis U,S. 
foreign affairs, 
135 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U,S. 388, 433 (1935) (imalidating part of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. \'. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 
(1935) (invalidating entire National Industrial Recovery Act); see genemllJ Donald A Dripps, 
Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE LJ. 65i (1988). 
136 See Dripps, supra note 135, at 65i-58. 
137 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 C.S. 81, 91 (1943). 
138 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE A~IERICA1\' INTERNMENT 
CASES 236 (1983) [hereinafter IRONS,jl'STICE AT WARl. 
139 See Himba)'ashi, 320 U.S. at 103-04. 
140 See id. at 104 (asserting that "[tlhe Constitution ... does not demand the impossible or 
the impractical"). 
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The Court thus ignored the potentially dispositive question of 
power separation and enumeration and acquiesced in the haphazard 
handing over of legislative and enforcement powers to the military.141 
In effect, the Court worked backwards from the assumption of the 
absolute nature of the war power,142 not forward from the actual actions 
of the political branches and the requisites of constitutional separation 
doctrine. As a result, the Court placed the fate of the Japanese AIneri-
cans in the hands of a small group of military functionaries and a racist 
General, in clear circumvention of the political process and any pro-
tections it might have afforded the targeted minority group.143 The 
assumption by the Court of an absolute power to act against a racialized 
civilian minority in the name of war, implicit in its avoidance of the 
delegation question, and the highly particular, distinctly non-unitary 
nature of the "national interest" pursued in the internment, point up 
the imperial potential that inheres in an IR realist-informed Presi-
dent/Congress dialectic which is allowed to frustrate critical discourse. 
b. The Individual v. State Interest 
Liberal reformers look to the individual protections of the Bill of 
Rights for a constraining logic to use against the government's excep-
tional foreign affairs powers. The individual versus state interestl44 
dialectic would thus become the focal point of a liberal legal campaign 
to revive the rule of law when the government claims to be acting in 
relation to the external realm. 145 Neither Curtiss-Wright nor Youngstown 
involved a classic confrontation pitting individual political and civil 
rights and liberties against state foreign affairs or security interests, and 
HI See Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsll Revisted-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Gov-
ernment Excess and Lax Judicial Review, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 22-23, 22 n.80 (1986) 
(pointing out the exceptional handling of the delegation question in Hirabayashiwhen compared 
wi th then recen t preceden t) . 
H~ See Hiraba.l'ashi, 320 U.S. at 93. 
143 See i IIfra Part II. 
IH The actual rhetorical form most often used is "national interest." For reasons of consis-
tency and simplicity I will refer to state interest, but references to the "nation" are precisely the 
point in an important way. Nation signifies the cultural, organic unity or body over against which 
the indhidual is placed. Especially prevalent in foreign affairs contexts, this slurring of the 
political and cultural/organic underwrites the doubling process (described in the text) by 
departing from the standard liberal stl'llcture of the (political) state versus the individualized 
modern subject. 
H" In Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution applied extraterritorially 
in the criminal trial of a U.S. civilian. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). However, more recently the Court has 
limited the Reid doctrine in a case involving extraterritorial searches and seizures. See United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding the Fourth Amendment did not apply 
to search and seizure conducted by U.S. officials at a residence in Mexico). 
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the tale is not understood primarily in those terms. 146 Instead, both 
cases involved a conflict between state power and the commercial inter-
ests of individuals and companies. 147 Nevertheless, examples abound in 
the postwar period of courts adjudicating the collision between indi-
vidual civil rights and liberties and the state's interest. 14s I will briefly 
outline the nature of this dialectic, as constructed and gi\'en meaning 
in resonance with IR realist ontology. 
Postwar erosions of personal liberties, undertaken in the name of 
state interest, are legion and well known. In a series of Supreme Court 
cases of the early Cold War era, communism-functionally the internal 
ideological equivalent of the external Soviet threat-assumed constitu-
tionally taboo status as the Court began authorizing a regime of guilt 
by association: free speech 149 and association 13() restrictions, ideological 
grounds for deportation,l;,l and loyalty oathsl;,~ were appro\'ed by the 
Court. Even a New Deal liberal like Justice Jackson underwent meta-
morphosis as shown by his opinions in American Communications Ass'n 
v. Douds153 and Dennis v. United States,154 classic examples of the repres-
sive adjudicatory style of the period. In Douds, Jackson implicitly en-
dorsed the guilt-by-association principle for Communists,155 and in his 
Dennis opinion the Justice suggested going so far as to sanction, ipso 
jacto, restriction of any Communist speech, whether or not it met the 
established "clear and present danger" standard. 156 Thus, e\'en the most 
1460f course, the internment did im'oh'e individual rights and liberties, and scholars have 
analyzed it from that perspecth'e. See, e.g., Eugene \'. Rosto,,', The Japanese Anll'rican Cases-A 
Disastl'l", 54 YALE LJ. 489, 490 (1945) ("All in all, the internment of the West Coast Japanese is 
the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years."). 
147 See supra notes 14-15. 
148 See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 283-310. 
149See Dennisv. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
150 See Conununist Partyv. Subversh'e Activities Control Bd. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
10l See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 343 U.S. 580 (1952). 
152 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
153 See id. at 422 (Jackson, j., concurring and dissenting, each in part). 
154 341 U.S. at 561 (Jackson, j., concurring). 
155 See Douds, 339 U.S. at 423 ("[T]he Communist party is something different in fact from 
any other substantial party we have knO\\11 , and hence may constitutionally be treated as some-
thing different in law."). 
/d. 
156 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 570 (Jackson,j., concurring). Jackson stated: 
The authors of the clear and present danger test ne\'er applied it to a case like this, 
nor would I. If applied as it is proposed here, it means that the Communist plotting 
is protected during its period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organization 
and preparation are immune from the law; the Government can move only after 
imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late. 
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revered of individual rights, such as First Amendment freedoms, were 
truncated by the Court in light of national security demands. 
To be sure, there were counterexamples from the postwar years 
where the Court seemingly upheld civil liberties against the govern-
ment's assertion of superior state security or foreign affairs interests. 157 
One of the most celebrated and critiqued cases in this line was the 
Pentagon Papers case where the Court refused to enjoin publication of 
defense-related documents during the Vietnam War.15S However, the 
Court subsequently returned to its earlier posturel59 in cases which 
restricted, on ideological grounds, entry into the country by non-citi-
zenslliU and the travel rights of citizens;16l limited the effectiveness of 
the Freedom of Information Act in favor of governmental secrecy;\(;2 
authorized prior restraint by the CIA of a former employee's publica-
tions;16~ and, in a case' similar to Pentagon Papers, enjoined publication 
of a magazine artic1e. llQ Recently, the military'S homophobic "don't ask, 
don't tell" policy and its enforcement through the so-called Solomon 
Amendments have been rationalized through the same individual 
rights versus state security interest schema. l65 
l'>i See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a 
statutory prmision prohibiting members of Communist organizations from obtaining or using 
passports); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,6 (1957) (asserting that the U.S. Government may only act 
abroad in a manner consistent with the limits of the Constitution). 
158 See New \ark Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
159 See Miller, Sltpra note 104, at 400 ("But [precedent shows] that the Supreme Court will 
interpose no barrier to realization of the goals of the National Security State. One is hard pressed 
to find, at any time in the Supreme Court's history, any decision upholding civil rights and 
liberties when important societal matters are at stake."). But see HENKIN, supra note 14, at 
277-310, 280 (asserting the general applicability of individual rights to foreign affairs, but ack-
nowledging that national interest may "weigh importantly in the balance"). See also jules Lobel, 
Foreign Policy and the Courts, 3 U.C. DAVIS]' INT'L L. & POL'y 171, 176-78, 177 n.35 (1997) (citing 
cases and disClissing the judiciary's positive disposition to individual rights claims against govern- . 
ment action in foreign affairs cases and the judiciary'S general disinclination to apply political 
question doctrine in such cases). For a discussion of the history of legalized political repression 
in the context of recent changes in the immigration and asylum laws, see Kevin johnson, The 
AntiterrOlism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: 
Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ. 833, 841-69 (1997). 
ltj(l See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
161 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
162 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Pmject, 454 U.S. 139 
(1981). 
163 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
llH See United States v. Pmgressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wis. 1979) (granting injunc-
tion against publication of article on how to build a hydrogen bomb); john Cary Sims, Triangu-
lating the Boundmies of Pentagon Papers, 2 Wl\I. & MARY BILL RTS.]. 341,421-26 (1993) (con-
cluding that the courts have subsequently limited the less restrictive precedent of the Pentagon 
PapPrs case) . 
. 1G5For analysis of the Solomon Amendments, see Section Newsletter, Spring 1997 (Section on 
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As was the case for he President/Congress dialectic, the con-
straints of the individual/state interest dialectic are revealed in the 
broader dialectic it obscures. 166 In the foreign affairs law context, the 
individual takes on a meaning that is significantly different from the 
one it has in the domestic context. Domestically, individual rights are 
appurtenant to the liberal legal subject-a rights-bearing, illterest-
maximizing, ontologically unproblematized entity. In addition, the Iib-
erallegal subject has, under circumstances, been imbued with "group-
ness,"IG7 in the sense of the insular minority that may not be protected 
in the political process. 1GS ''They''-insular minorities-are placed over 
against the "we" whose interests and ,'alues are absorbed and furthered 
by dominant societal and political institutions.I'i(' In either the hyper-
individualized, or groupness-imbued form, the liberal legal subject is 
constituted relation ally as the state's Other. Indeed, defil?ing the indi-
vidual subject over against the state is the liberal vision par excellence. 170 
Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues-American Association of Law Schools [SGLLI-AALS]); "Solomon 
II"-Amelioration Report and Recommendati011S, Sept. 15, 1998 (SGLLI-AALS). For online text of 
these and related documents, see <http://lI'\\'W.clI"sl.edu/aalsqueer>. See generally Kurt D. Her-
manson, Analyzing the Alilitmy's Justifications for its ExclusiolJaI), Poli0': Fifty Years H'ithout a 
Rational Basis, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1992). 
miThe individual rights focus of liberal reformist ,,'ork in the field could also be challenged 
in the way "rights talk" has been in the domestic context. In short, the occasional chil liberties 
victories may effect the hegemonic absorption of political dissent. Alternath'ely, rights discourse 
may also constitute a valuable tool in the hands of oppressed groups struggling for empowerment. 
See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformatioll alld Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HAR\'. L. REv. 1331 (1988). This debate may have as much salience 
in the foreign affairs area as it does in its purely domestic context. Here, howe\'er, I focus on the 
divergent operation in the domestic versus the foreign affairs context of the individual and the 
state as underlying concepts. 
167 Of course, the groupness element in the ontology of the liberal legal subject has become 
a main target of post-Civil Rights conservative jurisprudence. See Charles R. La",.ence III, Race 
and Affirmative Action: A Critical Race Perspective, ill POLITICS OF LAW, mpra note 26, at 312, 
318-26; see generally ALAN GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
168 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S, 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the 
possibility of "more searching judicial inquiry" when "prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities" might "curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect" them). 
lfi9Judge Guido Calabresi has discussed how the United States Constitution may be attuned 
to the we/they dichotomy and may contain a fundamental commitment that "they," by which he 
means various types of outsider minorities, will be protected against the excesses of the "we." In 
this perspective, the symmetry proposed by so-called colorblind jurisprudence, "'hid] rejects both 
racial remediation and the discrimination against minorities referred to in Carolene Products 
footnote 4, is not a symmetry that must be seen as a necessary part of the United States 
constitutional tradition. Judge Guido Calebresi, Comments at DePaul University College of Law 
Endlund Scholar Reception (February 19, 1998). 
170 But if. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding state anti-gay legislation). 
The refusal of courts to protect gay and lesbian rights reflects the limited horizon of "Others" 
whom legal liberalism will protect. In Bowers Chief Justice Burger imoked the religious and 
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In contrast, in foreign affairs contexts the individual subject can-
not be thought of as the state's Other, even when individual rights are 
allowed to triumph over state interests. The ontology of the state 
operating in foreign affairs contexts changes the construction of the 
individual legal subject. In its IR realist unitary form, the state-as-sub-
ject does not admit of an internal Other. Rather, we might think of the 
individual subject in the foreign affairs rights-versus-state interest con-
text as functioning as the state's double. 171 The practical effect of this 
ontological doubling will usually be the automatic aligning of that 
which is considered to be the individual's interest with that which is 
considered to be the state's interest. 
A different significance results from the assertion and protection 
of rights in each context. On the one hand, a victory (or loss) for the 
individual in the foreign affairs context reflects that a point has been 
reached at which the state interest is deemed to have suffered (or not) 
through the injury that is inflicted on the individual-the individual 
as bearer of the state's subjectivity. 172 The individual competes momen-
tarily against the state, but both figures operate simultaneously as the 
bearer of sovereignty. The assumption of a discursive, political, and 
legal unity-a sovereign-cum-organic state subjectivity-remains the 
operative principle. 
In contrast, consider Professor Henkin's observation that the clas-
sical constitutional scheme for protecting individuals depended on the 
separation of powers system and federalist sharing of power between 
the states and the Federal Government. 173 The separation-of-powers 
based system of individual rights protection works from, and toward, 
an understanding of the individual as the state's Other, in danger of 
"moral" identity of the state to rationalize the Court's decision to exclude sexual minorities from 
consideration as sanctioned "Others" within liberal political culture. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, 
CJ" concurring). 
171 In international law this doubling has been explicit in the doctrine of state responsibility 
for injuries to aliens. Traditional doctrine has held that injuries to an individual alien, attributable 
to a host state, are deemed to have been suffered by the alien's home state. Redress is owed to 
the state, not the individual. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 (7th rev. ed. 1997). 
In For example, compare cases of alleged "takings" in the foreign affairs context where 
individual property interests have not been deemed sufficient to override state interest (no 
doubling), see HENKIN, supra note 14, at 297-303, with the free speech cases where the courts 
have been more open to individual claims (limited doubling), see id. at 288. In the Pentagon 
Papers case, 403 U.S. 713, it is likely the Court would have el~oined publication of the documents 
if Congress had sided with the President in authorizing the injunction. See HENKIN, supra note 
14, at 288. The combined effect of executh'e and congressional action would have defeated the 
doubling of individual and state interest that favored publication because state interest could only 
very seldom be presumed to directly contradict both political branches. 
173 See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 278. 
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falling victim to the sovereign's potential tyranny and absolutism. This 
system attempts to fragment state power to protect individual subjects 
from government abuses. This structure continues to operate into the 
twentieth century, even after separation of powers has receded in 
importance in the civil rights context, as courts have made the Bill of 
Rights and later amendments the "bulwark for the individual against 
excesses by either federal or state authorities."li4 
Thus, Brown v. Board of Education, for example, involved opposing 
the individual interests of Mrican Americans to white interests in 
American apartheid that had been absorbed into the fabric of the state. 
As Other of the state, the Court could move to protect a racial minor-
ity's interests while essentially remaining within the established liberal 
ontological framework. The individual/state relationship in foreign 
affairs contexts cannot operate in this way, in part due to the underly-
ing IR realist ontological structure that generates a fictional unity of 
state interest. A paradox results, of course, because this structure allows 
particular interests, which have been absorbed into the state's opera-
tional mode (homophobic, racist, corporate, military-industrialist, pa-
triarchal), to triumph over other (subordinated) interests in the name 
of the unitary state interest. The particular interests disappear behind 
the fiction of a unitary community of interest. This paradox notwith-
standing, the individual-as-double of this sovereign unity175 is the only 
possible form "individual" rights can take in the foreign affairs realm.176 
174 See id. at 278-79. 
175 Chief Justice Earl Warren tapped this same doubling structure in his defense of individual 
rights in national security contexts: "If balance we must, I wonder whether on the individual's 
side we might not also place the importance of our sun-ivai as a free nation. The issue, as I see 
it, is not the individual against society .... " Warren, supra note 12, at 200. Note, however, that 
Warren's doubling of individual and nation did not require a rejection of the internment. See id. 
at 192-93. 
1760ne might further argue that the more recent domestic civil rights setbacks in discrimi-
nation, affirmative action, and voting rights law actually signal a change toward the indh'idual-as-
double model and a more regressh-e racial legalism domestically. Individuals and groups who 
challenge their exclusions must clear ever higher hurdles (requirement of im-idious intent, 
particularized findings of past discrimination, disregard of systemic definitions of racism) before 
their injuries will be deemed sufficient to place at risk a monolithically imagined "state interest" 
as required to give rise to legal remediability. This standard monumentalizes, and places beyond 
challenge, the absorption by the state of particularistic interest content (whiteness, for example). 
The rhetoric of racial conservatives indicates a project to recapture the domestic legal and 
political imagination through deployment of the type of monolithic/particularist construct de-
scribed in the text. Consider, for example, intensifying calls for Americanization of immigrant 
groups, warnings against "balkanization," and nostalgia for the imagined past where, at the 
vanishing point, "national" (read "racial") unity abounds. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESIl\'GER, THE 
DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTLTRAL SOCIETY (2nd ed. 1998). For a 
liberal variant of the same phenomenon, see TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: 
WHY AMERICA Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995). 
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The ontology of rights in foreign affairs contexts can be viewed in 
both its assumptions and contradictions in the internment history. 
There the individual due process rights of Japanese Americans were 
deemed insufficient to give rise to their consideration as state-interest 
related. Indeed, the majority in Korematsu rejected the possibility that 
the interests of Japanese Americans could have risen to the level of 
state concern in the internment context by posing it as a structural 
impossibility: "To talk about a military order that expresses an allow-
able judgment of war needs ... as 'an unconstitutional order' is to 
suffuse a part of the Constitution with an atmosphere of unconstitu-
tionality."177 Clearly, the individual Japanese American subjects who 
were deprived of their liberty and property were never to be considered 
as the state's double, and as the state's Other their interests could not 
be protected within the foreign affairs framework. As well, the presum-
edly monolithic nature of the unitary state is belied in the internment's 
historical record. The racial and economic particularism at work under 
the guise of state interest reveals the social and cultural constructed-
ness of the state and its fragmentary nature. 178 
In sum, the IR realist ontology is evident in the individual-versus-
state interest dialectic, even in the case of individual rights victories, 
and generates the figure of the individual as double of the state. Calls 
for reform, which often favor placing more weight on individual rights, 
may be insufficient because the individual's interest and the state's 
interest, supposedly weighed against each other, become ontologi-
cally indistinguishable through the doubling structure of IR realist-in-
formed foreign affairs lawY~ Commentators who favor more civil lib-
erties in the foreign affairs context may sense the ontological-structural 
constraints and, thus, also advocate heightened judicial scrutiny of 
governmental action in foreign affairs contexts when individual rights 
and liberty interests are involved. ISO The next section discusses how the 
J77 323 U.S. at 224-25. 
178 See infra Part II. 
li9This relationship of doubling between the individual and the state is turned to critical 
advantage in the observation of Professor Eric Yamamoto that overemphasizing the government's 
need for discretion in handling national emergencies "means that the very liberties the country 
is attempting to defend against external threat are lost." Yamamoto, supra note 141, at 43. Note 
I am not arguing that rights are indeterminate or that rights necessarily legitimate hegemonic 
social orders. Rather, I am saying that rights in foreign affairs contexts reflect the instantiation 
of a particular ontological structure that resists progressive transformation by precluding analysis 
of how particular interests may be forwarded and others subordinated through the imagined 
unity of state interest, an imaginary that operates even in instances where individual rights are 
protected in foreign affairs contexts. Rights per se are not the problem. 
181) See Yamamoto, supra note 141, at 62 ("[E]specially in an era of expanding government 
control over its 0\\,1 citizens in response to perceived threats to national security, a constitutional 
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IR realist ontological framework also creates obstacles to the realization 
of progressive reform through enhanced judicial review. 
c. Judicial Review v. Political Branch Autonomy 
Based on the historical record, the judiciary's role in foreign 
affairs is, to say the least, ambiguous. I8I For the past two hundred years, 
through the application of various adjudicatory devices such as the 
political question doctrine,I82 standing, ripeness, and withholding of 
certiorari, courts have effectively diminished their role in foreign af-
fairs. I83 Recently, the Court has re-embraced the view that the "vast 
external realm" of foreign affairs is not the appropriate place for 
judicial intervention. I84 In some cases, the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned its reasoning "on the merits" to similar effect. I85 The exact pa-
rameters of judicial abdication are unclear, and there are examples of 
the courts asserting various forms of judicial review in foreign affairs 
cases. I8G 
democracy cannot afford to have its courts withdraw from their historically watchful role m'er the 
most cherished liberties of its people."). 
IBI See FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 8 (desc .. ibing the va .. ied app .. oaches 
to judical role in foreign affairs as "doctrinal cacophony"). 
IB2See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962) (whe .. e the political question doctrine was 
viewed by Justice Brennan as being most applicable to fo .. eign affairs contexts); FRANCK, POLITI-
CAL QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 19 ("[T]he political-question doctrine's domestic use has been 
virtually eradicated in .. ecent yea .. s even as its applicability to fo .. eign affairs has been reinforced 
by the courts."). 
IB3 See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 141-48. The stronge .. fo .. ms of judicial abdication in the 
area of fo .. eign affai .. s rely on a fo .. mal .. eading of the Constitution, as in the case of Detjen TI. 
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), whe .. e the Court pronounced: "The conduct offo .. eign 
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the [President and Cong .. ess]." 
Id. at 302. 
IB4 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Regan \'. '''''ald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984). 
IB5 See Justice Blackmun's stinging dissent in Sale 11. Haitian Centers Council Inc., 509 U.S. 
155, 188-89 (1993) (Biackmun,J., dissenting), accusing the majority of straining to sanction the 
President's "dis .. egard of the law." Compare United States v. Ah-a .. ez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) 
(validating U.S. Government's abduction of a Mexican national in Mexico fo .. pu .. poses of 
transport to United States to stand trial), with Ha .... y A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the 
Lalli of Nations, 104 YALE. LJ. 39, 40 (1994) (accusing the Court of lacking a "decent respect for 
the opinions of mankind"). 
IB6 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-12. The Court analytically su .. veyed the field to suppo .. t its 
position: 
Yet it is error to suppose that eve .. y case 0 .. controve .. sy which touches foreign 
.. elations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem inva .. iably to 
show a discriminating analysis of the pa .. ticula .. question posed, in te .. ms of the 
history of its management by the political b .. anches, of its susceptibility to judicial 
handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the 
possible consequences of judicial action. 
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Nevertheless, as Thomas Franck has argued, there is an overall 
trend toward judicial abdication in foreign affairs resulting fromJustice 
Marshall's "Faustian bargain" in Marbury v. Madisonl87 which "gave 
back" the judiciary's involvement in foreign affairs conflicts for a more 
prominent role in domestic affairs. IRS Franck identifies two types of 
rationalization for judicial abdication: one based on constitutional 
principle and a second based on prudential concerns. Put simply, ab-
dicationist arguments based on constitutional principle assert that the 
Constitution grants unreviewable authority to the political branches in 
the area of foreign affairs. 189 Alternatively, arguments based on pruden-
tial concerns have identified four areas of tension that support the 
abdicationist position: foreign affairs are factually beyond the ability of 
courts to construe; the issues raised in foreign affairs contexts are 
policy-oriented, not legal; the stakes are too high, involving the survival 
of the nation; and the political branches are likely to ignore the courts 
and therein undermine the status of the judiciary. 190 
In contrast, arguments against a robust judicial review function in 
domestic affairs focus attention on the so-called countermajoritarian 
probleml~n and oppose supposedly undemocratic '~udicial activism." 
These attacks seem to have proliferated in the period after Brown v. 
Board of Education. 192 The countermajoritarian problem refers gener-
/d. at 212. 
187 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803). 
188 See FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 10-20. 
18'1 See id. at 31. 
190 See id. at 45. The Comt adopts such prudential concerns in its 1948 Waterman opinion: 
[Foreign policy decisions] are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of 
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to 
the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for 
,dlich the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nOr responsibility and which has 
long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry. 
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 5.5. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, III (1948). 
l~lJ The countermajoritarian problem was first discussed as such by Alexander Bickel in 1962. 
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16 (1962) ("The root difficulty is that judicial review is a cOllnter-majoritarian force 
in our system."). The attention given to the countermajoritarian nature of the judicial function 
has been so intense and widespread that Erwin Chemerinsky has described countennajoritarian 
analysis as "the dominant paradigm of constitutional law and scholarship." Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-ForewOId: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43: 61 
(1989); see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme COllrt, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of 
Change: LegalFulldamentality Without Fundamentalislll, 107 HAR\,. L. REv. 30, 63 (1993) (asserting 
that the concern oyer democracy's relation to judicial review has "framed the central debates in 
American constitutional theory (hiring the past fifty years"). 
192 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See William Eskridge,Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: 
l'Hoderation as a Postillodem Cultural FOI'III, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 734-35 (1991) (discussing 
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ally to the relative democratic representativity of the political and 
judicial branches. Since the judiciary is the branch least affected by the 
electoral process, it is argued, the courts are also the least democratic 
branch of governmentl93 and thus least fit to set or challenge policy in 
a democratic system of governance. 194 
The general dynamic at work in the domestic context is a kind of 
"othering" process, whereby the political branches, by dint of their 
subjection to the regular electoral process, are assumed to stand in a 
relationship of fluid correspondence with the admittedly fragmented 
but majority-led body politic. The judiciary, defined over against this 
presumed correspondence between political organs and majority body 
politic, is at best an unwanted interlocutor, at worst an anti-democratic 
obstruction. In the foreign affairs area an othering process is also in 
effect, but it draws force from a different reference point, the imagined 
unitary state interest. In order to illustrate the contrast suggested here 
between the dominance of the majoritarian paradigm in the domestic 
context and the unitary state interest paradigm in the foreign affairs 
context, it is instructive to compare responses to antijudicial review 
attacks in each domain. 
Domestically, various theories have been devised to defend a ro-
bust judicial review function within standard liberal legal discourse. 195 
John Hart Ely, in one ofthe more widely discussed variants, has argued 
that the judiciary can function effectively as reinforcer of the demo-
cratic process under consensually determined principles of the Consti-
tution. l96 Notwithstanding his argument that judicial review is actually 
theories of judicial review in the shadow of Brown). For articles debating judicial re\:iew in the 
post-Brown context, see Alexander Bickel, The Oliginal Unde1ltanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955); Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Intef51ity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutml Plinciples of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
193 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REnE\\, 73-75, 
77-88 (1980) (arguing that the judiciary, as the least democratic branch, should limit itself to 
correcting manifest vagaries of the political process occurring among the more democratic 
branches) , 
194 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 169-70 (1980) (arguing 
for limiting the role of the judiciary to the protection of indiddual rights since the political 
process is sufficient to resolve issues of federalism and separation of powers). 
195 Alexander Hamilton articulates the general liberal defense of the judiciary in Federalist 
No. 78. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), In addition to his characterization of 
the judiciary as the "least dangerous branch," Hamilton saw it as the ultimate people's organ, 
which would serve as "an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order to 
... keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." ld. 
196 See ELY, supra note 193, at 181. 
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a consent-based function, potentially a process-oriented representation 
reinforcer,197 Ely absorbs the general vision of the courts' outsider 
status vis-a-vis the majority even as he responds to it: "Appointed judges, 
however, are comparative outsiders in our governmental system . ... This 
does not give them some special pipeline to the genuine values of the 
American people: in fact it goes far to ensure that they won't have 
one."198 
A second category of responses to the countermajoritarian cri-
tique is civic republican in nature. Frank Michelman, for example, 
favors a less process-based defense, presumably to insure the reten-
tion of progressive substance in any post-countermajoritarian under-
standing of the judicial function. 199 Civic republicanism in general 
would read a normative agenda ("civic virtue") into the foundation of 
U.S. democracy. Michelman, aware that unconstrained forms of com-
munitarianism could well lead to repression of minority groups and 
views, constructs a judicial review function that retains a foundational 
commitment to the "virtue of plurality."~uu Moving from a notion of 
inclusionary plurality as foundational norm, Michelman carves out a 
(progressiye) role for an independent judiciary in terms of insuring a 
legitimate norm-validating political process.~UJ 
Both defenses of the judicial function-Ely'S liberal-pluralist, proc-
ess-based defense and Michelman's civic republican, value-based de-
fense-respond directly to the countermajoritarian discourse, and, to 
an extent, make no attempt to transcend it. Both make an appeal 
within the basic framework of domestic liberal political theory. Ely does 
so by problematizing the democratic validity of the imperfect, minor-
ity-silencing political process and offering the judicial function as rep-
resentation reinforcer. Michelman does so by inserting inclusionary 
pluralism into the primary republican value-canon and setting up the 
judiciary as the logical political organ for maintenance of that value. 
In neither case does the author attempt to challenge directly the two 
basic premises of countermajoritarian discourse: first, that the domes-
tic body politic is fragmented into identifiable, legally relevant "major-
ity" and "minority" groups and positions and, second, that the judicial 
function should somehow be testable by the maxim of governance "by 
197 See id. at 87. 
19" Id. at 103 (emphasis added). 
199 See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1524-26 (1988). 
~"o See id. at 1528. 
~()1 See id. at 1526-27. l\Iichelman's "stipulation (ii)" would protect minority groups and 
positions by insuring that the social and constitutional dialogue "is not considered or experienced 
as coerche, or inYasiYe, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom .... " Id. 
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the people." The liberal and civic republican defenses of the judiciary 
merely provide a more nuanced rendering of the maxim in its full 
complexity. 
In contrast, Franck's defense of judicial review in the foreign 
affairs contexts rebuts the arguments from constitutional principle and 
prudential concern, but not primarily by invoking liberal democracy-
based rationales. His major concern is not the asserted problematic 
relationship of the judiciary to the majority-identified body politic. 
Rather, Franck must respond to concerns that depend on a unitary 
understanding of state interest in the realm of international relations. 
Consider how Franck summarizes his defense of the judicial function 
in foreign affairs:202 
[W] hen courts do take jurisdiction over foreign-affairs cases, 
the costs to national policy in terests are generally far less than 
the government may have imagined .... More to the point, 
however, when judges do decide the cases brought to chal-
lenge a foreign policy, it may safely be assumed ... that they 
would reach out in an effort to agree with the story told by 
the president's experts. In all but the most egregious in-
stances, they would find a challenged presidential action con-
stitutional and legal. 
Thus no reasonable foreign-policy manager ought to fear 
the U.S. courts .... The costs of judicial review of such cases 
to presidential discretion has [sic] been vastly overstated, not 
least by the judges themselves. 
On the other hand, not to [allow judicial re\;iew] has heavy 
costs, precisely in the area of foreign policy. America's prin-
ciple shield and sword is not the nuclear bomb but the most 
powerful idea in today's political marketplace. That idea is 
the rule of law. To make the law's writ inoperable at the 
water's edge is nothing less than an exercise in unilateral 
moral disarmament. It is a strategy urgently in need of judicial 
review.2U3 
202 The argument from constitutional principle, i.e., that the courts are not empowered under 
the Constitution to review foreign affairs decisions, is not widely accepted analytically, although 
rhetorically it may be deployed to achieve abdication. See FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, slipm 
note 94, at 43-44. For analysis of the extraconstitutional model-akin to the constitutional 
principle argument against judicial re\;ew in foreign affairs discussed in the p,'esent section-as 
IR realist construct, see supra discussion in Part LB. 1. 
203FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 159. 
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In making his case for judicial review under conditions imposed by 
the IR realist-informed paradigm of foreign affairs, i.e., the assump-
tion of a unitary state interest, Franck must argue that exercise of 
the judicial function in foreign affairs contexts will not endanger 
the national well-being. He seeks to assuage the fears of abdication-
ists by allowing that the courts would almost never question the 
presidential prerogative in foreign affairs, certainly never in a way 
that would be costly, i.e., that would jeopardize the national interest. 
Ultimately, he appeals to realpolitik, claiming a strategic significance 
akin to the maintenance of nuclear superiority as his defense of 
judicial review. 
At each step, Franck's response is conditioned by the IR realist-in-
formed paradigm that takes for granted the existence of a unitary 
state interest that could be threatened by an independent judiciary 
reviewing foreign affairs decisions. The othering process by which the 
judiciary is removed from foreign affairs is not primarily politico-theo-
retical (denying correspondence between the judiciary and the majori-
tarian political process), it is ontological and IR realist (denying cor-
respondence between the judiciary and the unitary state interest). 
Indeed, the mere appearance of a lack of unity in the conduct of 
foreign affairs, which might be inferred from judicial intervention, is 
understood by critics to constitute a threat to the state interest.204 
The obvious problem with the IR realist-bounded judicial review/ 
political branch dialectic as inscribed in the disciplinary discourse (and 
rendered up through the tale of two precedents)21J5 is that it resolves, 
rather automatically, in favor of the political branches in most in-
stances. A second defect lies in the way the paradigm of unitary state 
204 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. IS6, 2S1 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting) (arguing "the 
necessity of the country's speaking with one voice" in foreign affairs contexts). 
205 Curtiss-lVright. with its "sole organ" and extraconstitutional commitments. would seem to 
preclude courts from exercising a robust review function. Youngstown. with its separation/balanc-
ing logic would afford courts more or less the usual role in reviewing and interpreting govern-
ment actions. at times perhaps sidestepping particularly intractable law versus politics standoffs 
through the use of judicial case management techniques. However, the antagonistic roles ascribed 
to the two cases in this dialectic are somewhat difficult to square with the actual precedent 
established in each case. 
In effect. both cases constitute clear examples of the Court exercising its review function. In 
Curtiss-H',ight, e\'en as Sutherland "~'ote about the "marked difference between foreign affairs 
and domestic affairs." 299 U.S. at 321, and about extraconstitutional grants to the Federal 
GO\'ernment of the powers of external sovereignty. see id. at 31S. he was effectively exercising the 
Court's pO\\'er of judicial review. The opinion includes pages of careful analysis of the history of 
joint congressional resolutions as sources of legislative delegation. See id. at 322-2S. Sutherland 
thus assessed whether precedent authorized the type of combined legislative and executive action 
present in the case. See id. 
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interest limits a progressive or liberal response. It is difficult to mount 
a strong defense of judicial review in foreign affairs akin to that of Ely's 
or Michelman's because the paradigm of unitary state interest tends 
toward political absolutism. 206 Even Franck's unflinching defense of the 
judiciary's role resorts to a claim of strategic value for judicial review, 
and thus makes its appeal within an imperial and nationalist value 
structure, no doubt in contravention of Franck's own political commit-
ments. 
The in ternmen t experience reveals the essentially con tradictory 
nature of the IR realist-driven judicial review/political branch dialectic. 
As will be explained in Part II, many of the Court's members were 
reticent to judge the government's and the military's actions against 
the Japanese American community.207 Even Justice Jackson, in his oft-
quoted Korematsu dissent, ultimately capitulated to the nonreviewabil-
ity of state in terest: 
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military 
control at all, the paramount consideration is that its meas-
ures be successful, rather than legal. The armed services must 
protect a society, not merely its Constitution .... 
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not 
susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. 
I do not suggest that the courts should have attempted to 
interfere with the Army in carrying out its task. 2l1H 
Although Jackson would not have given ajudicial stamp of approval 
to the deportation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast,21J9 
he bows to the inevitability of unconstitutional governmental action 
in the case. 
Jackson's assessment of the situation, that "the armed services 
must protect a society, not merely its Constitution," assumes a societal 
In Youngstown, both Justice Hugo Black's opinion for the Court and Jackson's concurrence 
left no doubt that the President's, and indeed the entire Federal Government's, exercise of 
foreign affairs power would be tested for constitutional legitimacy by the courts. Jackson, un-
satisfied with existing precedent as a guide to conducting judicial review, attempted to set dOl\11 
once and for all a coherent method for assessing gOl"ernment actions under the Constitution. 
206 But see Yamamoto, supra note 141, at 41 (proposing a standard of judicial review that 
would operate despite governmental claims to military necessity or national security). 
21)7 See infra discussion accompanying notes 326-33. 
208 323 U.S. at 244-45, 248 (Jackson, j., dissenting). 
209 See id. at 247 ("I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which 
violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority."). 
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unity that somehow excludes Japanese Americans from protection. 
The inevitability of this paradoxical outcome results from the IR realist 
understanding at the heart of the judicial review/political branch 
dialectic. Just as President Lincoln's famous rhetorical question-"Is it 
possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?"-
masked the nature of the Civil War as the death of the nation and the 
birth of a new nation based on a different covenant,210 Jackson's valori-
zation of "society's protection" masked the campaign of societal de-
struction that actually occurred through the internment. 
In conclusion, this Part has suggested that the conceptual frame-
work of foreign affairs law-as evident in both its putatively competing 
models of constitutionalism and constitutional dialectics-tracks very 
closely with, and is fundamentally animated by, IR realist ontology. The 
result has been the embedding of a kind of extraconstitutionalism and 
statist-inspired positivism at the core of the discipline. In the next 
section I will use the public history of the internment to place in even 
sharper relief the various inadequacies and contradictions inherent in 
a foreign affairs law based on IR realist ontology. 
II. THE INTERNMENT AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW PRECEDENT 
The internment as policy and jurisprudence involved factors that 
simply do not appear on the radar screen of IR realism: fraud, racism 
(individual and systemic), white nationalism, private economic "rent-
seeking," and bureaucratic dynamisms. Here, I will highlight how these 
factors conditioned the government's policy formation processes, in-
tragovernmental conflict and conspiracy, and the courts' legitimation 
of the internment. These aspects of the internment story show linkages 
between actors within the state-both institutions and individuals-
and the structure of foreign affairs law. Two critical insights will be 
developed. 
First, to the extent foreign affairs law understands the state as a 
unitary subject, it precludes examination of the particularized motiva-
tions of potentially autonomous actors, bureaucracies, and institutions 
within the state. Thus, courts, political processes, media, and scholarly 
discourse are apt to misconstrue the factors and vectors of foreign 
affairs by imagining the "state-level" as the only relevant field of action. 
Second, socially and culturally contingent actions by intra-state actors, 
especially actions that are subordinationist in nature, may become 
~IO See Roben Meister, Sojourners and SUrllivors: Two Logics of Constitutional Protection, 3 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 121,123 (1996) (suggesting the operation ofa new anti-racist survival 
covenant after the Civil War). 
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reified through the legal process as legitimate forms of state action. 
Specifically, the IR realist-informed structure of foreign affairs law 
allows past abuses to frame future action because of its narrow and 
absolute statism. The latter point suggests the need for a theory of the 
state that takes into account how foreign affairs law may contribute to 
particular reifications of the state that naturalize imperial, racist, and 
xenophobic relations. 
A. Inside the State 2 I I 
The actions of various agencies and individuals combined to set 
in motion the "state's campaign" to intern Japanese Americans. It is 
widely understood that Lieutenant GeneralJohn L. DeWitt bore much 
personal responsibility for the internment, hm"ing produced two of the 
key government reports that put into circulation inaccuracies and 
falsehoods concerning the "loyalty" of Japanese Americans living on 
the West Coast of the United States.212 However, DeWitt was part of a 
larger circle of government actors responsible for concocting and 
carrying out the internment.213 The list of players includes, among 
others, local and state politicians from the West Coast region, members 
of the War Department, Justice Department, Congress and various 
branches of the armed forces, as well as the President. I will only 
highlight a few aspects of this intricate history that are useful to the 
analysis pursued here. 214 Fuller versions of the history are available in 
the literature. 215 
211 I am indebted to Kitty Cala\'ita for this section heading. Her book on the Bracero Program 
drew on archh"al materials to paint a detailed picture of the micro-le\"els of state action. Caladta's 
analysis of the institutional histories behind the Bracero Program achie\'es a blending of structural 
critique and close description that was suggestiye of the approach I ha\'e taken, on a more modest 
scale, to the internment. See generally KITTY CA LA\" ITA , INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PRO-
GRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. (1992). 
212 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REpORT OF THE COM~IISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION 
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 6 (Ciyil Liberties Public Education Fund 1997) (1982) [herein-
after PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED or the CWRIC (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Intern-
ment ofCi\'ilians) Report). De'A'itt authorized a memorandum to Secretary of War Henr\' Stimson 
in February 1942. The C'A'RIC report referred to this memorandum as the final recommendation 
on the "E\'llcuation of japanese and Other Subyersiye Persons from the Pacific Coast." See id. at 
82. Apparently, Colonel Carl Bendetson, a War Department staff member, 'I"aS the primary author 
of the memorandum. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 56-60. The second 
source attributable to DeWitt was the so-<:alled Final Report. J.L. DeWitt, Final Report: japanese 
Evacuationjrom the West Coast, 1942 (U.S. Department of War 1943). 
21~ See generally IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, sujJra note 138. 
214 For a concise summary of the historical record focusing on the main areas of gm'ernment 
misconduct in the internment litigation, see \amamoto, supra note 141, at 8-19. 
215 In addition to the C'A'RIC Report, supra note 212, and Irons' book, supra note 138, the 
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In the ten weeks after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, a political 
steamroller gained momentum toward evacuating and imprisoning 
over 100,000 innocent Japanese Americans.216 It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that this result was inevitable. For despite the preva-
lence of strong racial animosity toward Japanese Americans, which had 
historical roots in nineteenth century anti-Asian hate movements that 
continued in place before hostilities with Japan heightened in the 
1930s, initial public opinion among whites after Japan's attack did not 
suggest that concentration camps were imminent.217 Even the Los An-
geles Times, which would later playa key role in fanning the flames of 
racist hatred, initially published editorials that defended the loyalty 
of Japanese Americans, referring to them as "good Americans. "218 Vari-
ous governmental intelligence officials, including hard-liner J. Edgar 
Hoover, thought it made little sense to conduct a mass evacuation and 
detention program of a racial minority community of innocent civil-
ians.219 Lawyers in the War Department, the Justice Department, and 
other governmental agencies openly discussed the constitutional bar-
riers to a mass internment of civilians based on racial classification.220 
Even the overtly racist De"Vitt,221 at first, did not foresee the internment 
he would later conspire to create and, through a series of orders, 
mandate. 222 
following works are among those that also contain important documentation. both from the 
perspecti\<e of governmental history and personal histories of the internees: ROGER DANIELS, 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS: NORTH A"IERICA:j..\PANESE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA DURING 
\\,,\11 (re\<. ed. 1989); RICHARD DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS: DILLON S. MYER 
AND AMERICAN RACISM (l987); YASUKO I\\,AI TAKEZAWA, BREAKING THE SILENCE: REDRESS AND 
JAPANESE AMERICAN ETHNICITY (l995); MICHl WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY (1976); JAPANESE 
AMERICANS: FROM RELOCATION TO REDRESS (Roger Daniels et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1996). 
w; See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at &-7. 
217 See id. 
21~ See id. 
219 See id. at 29. All three major intelligence units involved in investigating the activities of 
"fifth column" espionage, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army's G-2 intelligence unit, and 
the FBI, concluded that any threat had been eliminated after Pearl Harbor (and before 
Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order 9066) with the rounding up of known spies. See id. at 23. 
220 See id. at 33-37. 
221 IRONS,jUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 26 ("[DeWitt] complained, several weeks after 
Pearl Harbor, that the Army has assigned 'too many colored [African American] troops' to the 
West Coast in view of the 'public reaction out here due to the jap situation.' 'I'd rather have a 
white regiment,' DeWitt told the Army's chief of classification and assigment, than one that 
included either Black or japanese American troops."). 
222 See id. at 30 (reporting that DeWitt argued against the mass internment plans initially by 
stating the truism he would later ignore: "An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen"). 
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The concerted efforts of a few members' of the Army's legal corps, 
organized West Coast anti:Japanese hate groups, and a lack of courage 
and leadership both on the part of high-ranking civilian officials and 
the civil liberties establishment conjoined with the individual efforts of 
DeWitt to seal the fate of the internees. Peter Irons' detailed account 
of the internment's legal history re\'eals that Provost Marshal General 
Allen Gullion and his assistant Captain (later Colonel) Karl Bendetson 
convinced a reluctant DeWitt that the evacuation and internment of 
all Japanese Americans from the West Coast was desirable and feasi-
ble.223 Gullion, the Army's highest ranking law enforcement official, 
had wished to impose martial law on the entire West Coast. 224 Meetings 
with West Coast political lobbyists, howe\'er, convinced him that evacu-
ation and internment of all Japanese Americans on the West Coast 
would be a viable alternative to martiallaw.22 'i Bendetson, an ambitious 
young officer in the Army's legal corps and liaison between his boss 
Gullion, the War Department, and DeWitt, "assumed an independent 
and aggressive role"226 in convincing DeWitt to push the War Depart-
ment to back the internment of all Japanese Americans on the West 
Coast. Irons concludes that "[t]he crucial role of [Bendetson] illus-
trates the power exercised by lower-echelon but strategically placed 
officials in affecting the decisions of superiors who are distracted by 
other duties and who are dependent on their subordinates for infor-
mation and advice. "227 
Within the War Department, Assistant Secretary of War John Mc-
Cloy was assigned immediate responsibility for decisions affectingJapa-
nese Americans.22R McCloy, a close friend of Justice Felix Frankfurter 
who later anchored the pro-internment m~ority of the Court, achieved 
notoriety as an attorney for the Cra\'ath law firm in an espionage case 
223 See id. at 29-32. 
224 See id. at 33. 
225 See id. at 29, 38. 
226 IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 49. 
2271d. Irons does not, of course, believe Bendetson ,,-as solely responsible for keeping the 
internment on the government's agenda. Rather, Irons acknmdedges the responsibility both of 
leaders for final authorization and of lower level bureaucrats who often play indsible but key 
roles in shaping the policy articulation processes of institutions. See id. at 49. Irons also discusses 
the role of the culture of racism toward people of Asian descent generally. See id. at 7-8. But see 
Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-",'hites" in Amflican Legal HistOJ)': A Review of justice at War, 85 COLU~1. 
1. REv. 1186, 1187 (1985) ("[Irons] presents history only as a product of indidduals' actions, 
describing these events exclusively in terms of the actions of lawyers and judges. This approach 
to history extends particularly to his understandings of race. For Irons, racism is situated in the 
personal prejudices of the lawyers and officials imolved."). 
228 See IRONS,JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 15, 363. 
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from World War 1,229 Although McCloy worked on that case as counsel 
for a private litigant seeking damages for a New Jersey railyard explo-
sion, his involvement earned him an appointment in the War Depart-
ment under Secretary Henry Stimson as consultant on counterintelli-
gence issues.23u McCloy, at first concerned over the constitutionality of 
interning a racially defined class of citizens, eventually gave in to 
pressure over "threats" posed by the civilian Japanese American popu-
lation. 231 He teamed with Gullion and Bendetson in opposing lawyers 
from the Justice Department who objected to plans for the intern-
ment.232 Finally, top level Cabinet members, Stimson and Attorney 
General Biddle, and President Roosevelt approved or acquiesced in 
the internment, and Executive Order 9066233 infamously authorized 
America's concentration camps.23~ 
Bendetson's role is significant in that he penned many of the 
outrageous claims in DeWitt's final recommendation regarding the 
existence of security threats that allegedly derived from, in essence, 
genetic predispositions of Japanese Americans.235 The report states: "In 
the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed 
by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many 
second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, 
possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' 
the racial strains are undiluted. "236 DeWitt subsequently reiterated this 
sentiment in newspaper interviews, asserting "aJap's a Jap."237 Almost 
forty years later in his testimony before the congressional Commis-
sion on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (hereinafter 
CWRIC), Bendetson defensively cited "human nature" as the basis for 
his belief that Japanese Americans would have assisted a Japanese 
invasion of the West Coast.238 
Bendetson's racialization of national security was given a more 
respectable veneer in an important memorandum to Attorney General 
Biddle regarding the constitutionality of the internment.239 Perhaps 
sensing that both Stimson and President Roosevelt were being per-
~~9 See id. at 15-16. 
~3l1 See id. at 16. 
231 See id. at 43. 
232 See id. at 6l. 
~'13Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). 
234 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 61-63. 
23J See id. at 58-59. 
~:lti Id. (quoting U.S. Department of War, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West 
Coast, 1942 (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 34). 
237 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DE:-IIED, supra note 212, at 222. 
238 IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 355. 
239 See id. at 54-55. 
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suaded to support the internment by lobbying efforts from outside and 
inside the government240 and facing stiff opposition to the internment 
by members of his own staff, Biddle solicited legal advice from three 
governmental lawyers outside the Justice Department.241 Oscar Cox, 
Ben Cohen, and Joseph Rauh opposed the internment but neverthe-
less cited racial characteristics as a distinguishing factor possibly justi-
fYing disparate treatment of Japanese Americans:242 
Since the Occidental eye cannot readily distinguish one Japa-
nese resident from another, effective surveillance of the 
movements of particular Japanese residents suspected of dis-
loyalty is extremely difficult if not practically impossible ... 
the normal Caucasian countenances of such [German and 
Italian descended] persons enable the average American to 
recognize particular individuals by distinguishing minor fa-
cial characteristics.243 
These and other such biologistic rationalizations would buttress the 
"racial characteristics"244 prong of the government's argument in 
the internment cases, which asserted the inscrutability and natural 
disloyalty of Japanese Americans as a race. 245 
The central role of racist ideology in vicious combination with 
professional, economic and political ambition in the government's 
policy formation process is evident throughout the historical record. 
Consider, for example, white farmers who were in competition with 
Japanese American farmers and effectively pressured West Coast poli-
ticians to push for the internment in Congress. A representative of the 
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association, a group supported by Califor-
nia Congress member Jack Anderson, stated frankly: "We're charged 
with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well 
be honest. We do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on 
the Pacific Coast or the brown man. "246 
The political leaders of the interior states also placed political 
considerations first, articulating and defending their constituencies' 
racism when they were approached by the Army and War Department 
on the question of "voluntary" relocation of dislocated Japanese Ameri-
240 See id. at 53, 62. 
241 See id. at 53. 
242 See id. at 54. 
24~ IRONS, JUSTICE AT "fAR, supra note 138, at 54 (quoting Memo, "The japanese Situation 
on the West Coast," File 146-13-7-2-0, Records of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, DOj). 
244 See infra text accompanying notes 304--33. 
245 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 138, 148. 
246 See id. at 39-40. 
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cans to their states.247 "We want to keep this a white man's country," 
stated Idaho Attorney General Bert Miller.248 Governor Nels Smith of 
Wyoming said the people of Wyoming "have a dislike of any Orientals, 
and simply will not stand for being California's dumping ground." 
Smith warned that allowing the dislocated to move to Wyoming would 
mean "[t]here would be Japs hanging from every pine tree."24~) 
As well, the propaganda of hate groups was adopted by govern-
mental rationalizers of the internment such as future Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. 230 Warren testified before the Tolan Committee in 1942 that 
Japanese American organizations were undertaking extensive subver-
sive activities.251 Warren's "evidence" came directly from the files of the 
discredited House Committee on Un-American Activities,252 chaired by 
racist Congress member Martin Dies (hereinafter Dies Committee).253 
The Dies Committee in turn got the material for Warren's testimony 
from unverified sources, extrapolating outlandish conclusions of "anti-
American" conspiracies from the most innocent of circumstances.254 
The Dies Committee's Report on Japanese Activities stated that "no 
Japanese can ever be loyal to any other nation thanJapan." No "Ameri-
canization" of Japanese Americans was possible.255 Warren's testimony 
is significant because it legitimized and perpetuated the otherwise 
dubious assertions of hate-mongering fringe groupS.256 Irons traces the 
various unsubstantiated conspiracy claims from obscure West Coast 
sources to the Dies Committee, through Warren's Tolan Committee 
testimony to DeWitt's Final Report, and the Western States' unethically 
247 See id. at 71-72. 
248 See id. at 72 (quoting Bert Miller from Memo, "Report in Meeting, April 7,1942, at Salt 
Lake City, with Governors, Attorneys General, and Other State and Federal Officials of 10 Western 
States," Box 8, RG lO7, NA). 
249 See id. at 71-72 (quoting Memo, "Report in Meeting, April 7, 1942, at Salt Lake City, with 
Governors, Attorneys General, and Other State and Federal Officials of lO Western States," Box 
8, RG lO7, NA). 
250 See IRONS,jUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 212-14; Sumi K. Cho, Redeeming Whiteness 
in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, in this issue, 
at 111-12. 
2[>1 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 213. 
252 See id. 
203 See id. at 214 (referring to Dies as an "avowed anti-black and anti-Oriental racist"). 
254 For example, from the fact that several japanese American community groups shared mail 
boxes, an inference was drawn that the groups were likely involved in espionage. See id. at 216. 
255 See id. at 213-16. 
250 Of course, '>VatTen was himself affiliated with anti-Asian groups such as the Native Sons 
of the Golden West and the American Legion. See Cho, supra note 250. 
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authored2S7 amicus brief in Hirabayashi into the Supreme Court's de-
liberations. 25R 
Another governmental investigative body, headed by Supreme 
CourtJustice Roberts, who would belatedly offer a dissent in Korematsu, 
provided no documentation for its insinuation thatJapanese Hawaiians 
committed acts of espionage in support of the Japanese bombing of 
Pearl Harbor. 259 Prior to Roberts' report, Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox had recklessly spread unsubstantiated allegations of Japanese 
Hawaiian "fifth column"260 support for the Pearl Harbor attack. 261 
CWRIC concluded that the Roberts Commission "did not use language 
designed to allay the unease spread by Knox. "262 Instead, the Roberts 
Commission report was pivotal in building the momentum toward 
internment.263 
The media as well played a significant role in shaping internment 
policy. Columnists and editors of various political persuasions began 
attacking the government's initial respect for the constitutional rights 
of Japanese Anlericans. 264 Henry McLemore agitated in the San Fran-
cisco Examiner: "Herd 'em Uapanese Americans] up, pack 'em off and 
give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, 
hungry and dead up against it .... Personally, I hate the Japanese. And 
that goes for all of them."265 Walter Lippman, at the behest of DeWitt 
(and probably Earl Warren),26!i wrote an alarmist piece on alleged fifth 
column activities and urged disregard for the constitutional rights of 
Japanese Americans:267 "Nobody's constitutional rights include the 
207 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 212-18. The Western States amicus brief 
in Hirabayashi was filed jointly by the Attorneys General of California, Oregon, and ·Washington. 
However, the primary author of the brief ,,'as Captain Herbert Wenig, a staff member under 
DeWitt. Since the Government was a party to the Hiraba)'ashi case, it was inappropriate for Wenig 
to have authored the amicus brief. Amicus briefs may not be prepared by participants in the 
underlying lawsuit. See id. 
258 See id. at 212-18. 
259 See id. at 40. 
260 See id. at 21 (explaining origin of the term "fifth column" in the Spanish Ch'il War where 
General Franco's civilian s)111pathizers constituted a fifth column, which augmented the four 
columns of troops Franco led in the march on Madrid). 
261 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 212, at 55-56. 
262Id. at 58. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. at 71-72. 
260Id. at 72. 
266 See Cho, supra note 250. 
267 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 212, at 80; IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 
138, at 60. 
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right to reside and do business on a battlefield [sic]. "268 Lippman's 
column became a jumping off point for other voices of repression such 
as Westbrook Pegler who referred to Lippman's piece in concluding: 
"We are so dumb and considerate of the minute constitutional rights 
and even of the political feelings [of the Japanese Americans]. The 
Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man 
and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger 
is over. "269 
At least the media blitz suggested an awareness that there were 
constitutional obstacles to internment, although it also correctly iden-
tified a possible circumvention of that problem in the assertion of 
military necessity. Of course, the obvious diminution of individual 
liberties resulting from the state's un tethered assertion of a compelling 
security interest should have triggered a massive response from the civil 
liberties community. However, the National Lawyers Guild maintained 
complete support for the government's wartime actions, including the 
internment.27u The response of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) was ambivalent. On the one hand, ACLU founder and direc-
tor Roger Baldwin raised funds for the Supreme Court appeal of 
Kore11latsll. 271 On the other hand, the ACLU Board of Directors were 
loath to support the cases of Minoru Yasui272 and Ernest and Toki 
Wakayamay~l Yasui's case was distasteful to the Board because Yasui 
had worked for the Japanese consulate in Chicago prior to the Pearl 
Harbor attack and prior to being arrested for violation of DeWitt's 
curfew order.2H The Wakayamas' case became disfavored because Er-
nest Wakayama had been arrested in the Santa Anita assembly center 
for organizing a protest of the camp's conditions.275 Irons notes that 
26~IRONS, JUSTICE AT \VAR, supra note 138, at 60. 
269 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 212, at 80 (quoting Westbrook Pegler, "Fifth 
Column Problem on Pacific Coast Very Serious-japs Should be under Guard," Feb. 16, 1942, 
DOj 146-13-7-2-0 (CWRIC 13333)). 
270 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 180-81. 
271 See id. at 170. 
272 See Yasui \'. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). Yasui was arrested for violating DeWitt's 
curfew order. See iel. 
27:l See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 114-15. The Wakayamas reported to an 
assembly center and filed a habeas corpus petition. After being interned, however, and after the 
ACLU began doubting the idealness of the Wakayamas as a test case, Ernest Wakayama applied 
for repatriation and the habeas petition was eventually dropped. 
274 See id. at 114. 
275 See iel. at 115. Although the local ACLU attorney, Al Wirin, continued to represent the 
Wakayamas on their habeas petitions, "[Ernest] Wakayama's arrest ... unsettled the ACLU 
national office." lei. 
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"[iJn the end, the ACLU wound up with no case of its own that tested 
in tern men t .... "276 
Moreover, the ACLU Board voted by a margin of two-to-one to 
support the Government's right during wartime "to establish military 
zones and to remove persons, either citizens or aliens, from such zones 
when their presence may endanger national security, even in the ab-
sence of a declaration of martial law."277 The only limitations on this 
right were that it be exercised "only if directly necessary to the prose-
cution of the war or the defense of the national security" and "based 
upon a classification having a reasonable relationship to the danger 
intended to be met."278 In essence, it was assured that the ACLU would 
not support direct constitutional challenges to the President's power to 
authorize the internment. It should be noted, however, that the local 
ACLU lawyers in San Francisco and Seattle rejected the national of-
fice's directives to drop constitutional challenges to Executive Order 
9066.27~J Later, the ACLU recanted its wartime position on the intern-
ment. 280 
The history of the government's legal campaign to defend the 
internment is intricate, but crucial to understanding how policy was 
effected inside the state. In the end, the fight within the government 
between two camps came down to the wording of a footnote in the 
government's Supreme Court brief in the Korematsu case.2R1 Lawyers 
from the Justice Department, Edward Ennis and John Burling, wanted 
to signal the Court that DeWitt's Final Report did not contain credible 
evidence upon which a legal determination could be based.282 Various 
other Justice Department and War Department lawyers, some of whom 
27fi Id. at 116. 
277 Id. at 129. 
278 IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 129 (quoting Memo, ''To the Active Members 
of the Corporation," May 22, 1942, Vol. 2444, ACLU, PULl. 
279 See id. at 130-32. In particular, Mar" Farquharson, Ernest Besig, and Wa)11e Collins 
continued their plans for constitutional challenges to the Executive Order at issue in the Hira-
ba)'ashi and KOl'ematsu cases. 
280 See id. at 349. Edward Ennis, ,dlO had been ajustice Department la",)'er on the internment 
cases, later presented to C'>\1UC the ACLU's "iew "that the mass evacuation and subsequent 
detention of the entire japanese American population from the West Coast in 1942 was the 
greatest deprivation of cidlliberties by government in this country since slavery." Id. Ernst Besig 
later alleged that the ACLU's official involvement ,dth the Korematsll Supreme Court appeal 
actually undermined the strength of Korematsu's defense. See id. at 361. Nevertheless, fonner 
ACLU head Roger Baldwin's introduction to Captain Allan Bosworth's 1967 expose on the 
internment portrays the ACLU record in an uncritical light. See Roger Baldwin, Introduction to 
ALLAN R. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 6-8 (1967). 
281 See IRONS,jUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 287-92. 
282 See id. at 288. 
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had surreptitiously forwarded material from the Final Report to the 
Court through the Western States' amicus brief in the Hirabayashi case, 
fought Ennis and Burling.283 Ultimately, Assistant Attorney General 
Herbert vVechsler drafted a "compromise" footnote that used such 
ambiguous language that the Court could not possibly have been made 
to understand the extent of misinformation that was at the heart of 
the government's case.284 
In preparing the government's Supreme Court brief for the Kore-
matsu case, Ennis and Burling obtained a copy of DeWitt's Final Re-
port. 285 This was a doctored version of an original report that War 
Department lawyers McCloy and Bendetson had expunged from the 
records because it contained material that contradicted aspects of the 
government's rationalization of the internment. 286 For example, the 
government had asserted that it would have been temporally impossi-
ble to conduct individual loyalty hearings for the Japanese AIneri-
cans.287 The first draft of DeWitt's report plainly stated that time was 
not an issue. 28B In addition, DeWitt's main justification boiled down to 
a racist assumption that there was no way to separate the "sheep 
from the goats" because the Japanese were such a "tightly-knit racial 
group. "289 McCloy called for a redrafting of the report to expunge 
DeWitt's admission on the question of time and his overt racism.290 
Nevertheless, the version of the Final Report that Ennis and Burl-
ing saw still gave the Justice Department lawyers pause. Ennis, while 
working on the Hirabayashi brief, had already been alerted to the 
existence of intelligence reports directly refuting governmental claims 
of widespread espionage among Japanese Americans. 291 Upon receipt 
of the Final Report, Ennis asked Attorney General Biddle to initiate an 
independent check of DeWitt's claims concerning acts of espionage by 
Japanese Americans around the time of Pearl Harbor.292 The investiga-
tions of both the FBI and Federal Communications Commission re-
vealed not only that DeWitt's allegations were erroneous, but also that 
they were the result of gross incompetence on the part of army intel-
ligence operatives.293 
2'3 See id. at 287-92. 
2~4 See id. at 289-92. 
2~5 See id. at 278. 
2'1; See IRONS,JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 207-12. 
2tl7 See iel. at 208. 
2"" See id. 
2H'I See id. 
C~IO See iel. at 210. 
291 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 202-05. 
292 See iel. at 280. 
293 See iel. at 280-84. 
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Despite the efforts of Ennis and Burling, the government brief in 
Korematsu never distanced itself sufficiently from the badly flawed Final 
Report.294 McCloy, on behalf of the War Department, insisted that So-
licitor General Charles Fahy overrule Ennis and Burling's attempt to 
signal the Court about the inaccuracies of the Final Report. 295 Fahy left 
Herbert Wechsler to resolve the dispute between the two camps.296 
Wechsler accommodated the War Department,297 not heeding the pre-
scient warning of Ennis and Burling: "If we fail to act forthrightly on 
our own ground in the courts, the whole historical record of this matter 
will be as the military choose [sic] to state it."298 Fahy later deliberately 
misled the Supreme Court in oral argument, insisting on the veracity 
of the Final Report and thus cementing the military monopoly over the 
historical record that Ennis and Burling had predicted.299 Only the 
intervention, against odds, of later historians and lawyers brought to 
the surface the concealed history of governmental abuse. 
In addition to the fraudulent actions of the government that were 
eventually decisive in later efforts to exonerate Mr. Korematsu,3fJO the 
Supreme Court's deliberations, as shaped by the government's legal 
strategies, constituted a distinct level of inside-the-state foreign affairs 
process. Members of the Court voted unanimously in the Hirabayashi 
and Yasui cases to uphold the lower courts' convictions for violations 
of DeWitt's curfew orders, and they voted six-to-three in favor of the 
294 See id. at 280, 284-92. 
295 See id. at 287-88. 
296 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 288-89. 
297The "compromise footnote" authored by Wechsler appeared in the GO\'ernment's brief. 
It read: "We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the justification for the 
evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Final Report 
only to the extent that it relates to such facts." Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsll. 
Burling's proposed footnote was direct and unequivocal: 
The Final Report of General DeWitt is relied on in this brief for statistics and other 
details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent 
thereto. The recital of the circumstances justifying the e\'acuation as a matter of 
military necessity, however, is in se\'eral respects, particularly with reference to the 
use of illegal radio transmitters and shore-to-ship signaling by persons of japanese 
ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession of the Department of justice. In 
Tliew of the contrariety of the reports on this matter we do not ash the Court to talle judicial 
notice of the recital of those facts contained in the Report. 
IRONS,jUSTlCE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 286 (emphasis added) (quoting Burling to Wechsler, 
September 11, 1944, File 146-42-7, DOj). 
298 IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 288 (quoting Ennis to Wechsler, September 
30, 1944, Box 27, Folder 31, Fahy Papers, FDRL). 
299 See Peter Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Palace, 3 CONST. COMM. 143, 147-53 (1986) 
(discussing the transcript of Fahy's oral argument in Korematstl and the "flat out lie" and 
misrepresentations it contains). 
300 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N,D. Cal. 1984) (granting coram nobis 
petition and vacating Korematsu's 40 yealcold com;ction). 
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exclusion orders at issue in Korematsu. The assembling of voting blocs 
in these cases involved substantial maneuvering30J that saw the Justices 
conflating facile patriotic and racist impulses with jurisprudential con-
cerns in their consideration of the internment. The Court's analysis of 
the government's authority to intern civilians without individual deter-
minations of guilt came down to the question of whether there had 
been a reasonable basis, in the face of a "national security threat," for 
doing SO.31)2 The case for reasonableness rested on the government's 
so-called racial characteristics argument, which portrayed Japanese 
Americans, as a group, as inscrutable and disloyaP03 
Chief Justice Stone's opinion for the Court in Hirabayashi clearly 
drew upon the racial characteristics argument in finding DeWitt's 
curfew order reasonable. As noted above, the "data" behind the racial 
characteristics argument came to the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi 
from obscure sources by way of the racist Dies Committee propaganda 
campaign, Earl Warren's testimony before the Tolan Committee, 
DeWitt's Final Report, and the unethically authored Western States' 
amicus brief.31J-l Stone included in his opinion the more innocuous 
strands of the racially contingent case made by these sources against 
the Japanese Americans, including a possible allusion to Warren's 
highly attentuated geographic proof of conspiracy,305 and a reference 
to the fact that Japan's jus sanguinis nationality law may have created 
dual citizenship for Japanese Americans.306 
301 See IRONS,jUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 250, Irons points out that at the outset of 
the HirabaJashi and Yasui deliberations, a possible majority of five justices "voiced serious doubts 
about the legality of DeWitt's orders and their constitutional basis, Compromise, cajolery, and 
their own concerns that the Court should maintain unity in wartime finally persuaded this 
potential majority for reversal to make [Chief justice) Stone's opinion unanimous," [d. 
302 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) ("Our investigation here does 
not go beyond the inquiry whether, in the light of all the relevant circumstances pl'eceding and 
attending their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute afforded a reasonable basis for 
the action taken in imposing the curfew."). 
303 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 137-39. The government's stnltegy had 
been to get the courts to take judicial notice of the racial characteristics argument so that the 
"e\·idence" would not face attack or rebuttal at trial. See infra text accompanying notes 317-25. 
304 See sllpra text accompanying notes 251-59. 
305 See BOSWORTH, supra note 280, at 73-75, Before the Tolan Committee, Warren had 
presented maps and census data in order to prm'e the existence of a conspiracy among japanese 
Amel"icans to commit sabotage. See id. Warren's conspiracy theory was based on the fact that 
japanese Americans owned or leased property near railroads, airports, roads, power lines, and 
canals. See id. To the extent Warren's representations were accunlte, there were better explana-
tions for them than sabotage. For example, "Issei immigrants had laid a great deal of the railroad 
tracks, and , .. many of them were paid in land grants along the right of way. This was land 
nobody else wanted. It was cheap, and loud with the noise of passing freight trains. The japanese 
made it fmitful." Id. at 76; see Cho, supra note 250. 
306 See Hiraba)'ashi, 320 U.S. at 96-98. 
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Perhaps the most outrageous moment in the opinion is Stone's 
recitation of the history of official and private discrimination against 
Japanese Americans as evidence that it was reasonable to doubt their 
loyalty to the United States: "There is support for the view that social, 
economic and political conditions which have prevailed since the close 
of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this country 
in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in 
large measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the 
white population."307 Stone then cites to federal and state anti-Asian 
and antijapanese laws on naturalization, immigration, land ownership, 
racial intermarriage, and employment.308 The Chief Justice concludes: 
As a result of all these conditions affecting the life of the 
Japanese, both aliens and citizens, in the Pacific Coast area, 
there has been relatively little social intercourse 'between 
them and the white population. The restrictions, both prac-
tical and legal, affecting the privileges and opportunities af-
forded to persons of Japanese extraction residing in the 
United States, have been sources of irritation and may well 
have tended to increase their isolation, and in many instances 
their attachments to Japan and its institutions.309 
The racial characteristics argument, based on a factual record that 
was never subjected to the adversarial process, thus became integral 
even to the Court's published holding. The law of foreign affairs, ef-
fected through the internment jurisprudence, is inextricably bound 
up with the racial contingency at the heart of the government's 
case. 3JO 
Interestingly, Justice Douglas was joined by Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge in rejecting the racial characteristics argument implicitly 
endorsed by Stone.311 Douglas wrote a draft concurrence for the Hira-
bayashi case protesting the government's racially contingent rationale, 
but nevertheless adopting language that, in Irons' words, "matched the 
jingoism of the Hearst press": "We are engaged in a war for survival 
against enemies who have placed a premium on barbarity and ruth-
307 [d. at 96. Irons notes that the original draft of the gm'ernment's brief contained a much 
more balanced, less racist, rendering of the social conditions argument. The justice Department 
rejected this version however. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 196-98. 
308 See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96 nA. 
309 [d. at 98. 
310 See infra discussion accompanying notes 408-22, regarding justice Rehnquist's defense 
of the internment. 
311 See IRONS,jUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 105-14. 
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lessness. Self-preservation comes first. The United States wages war to 
win. And the war power in its command over the people and resources 
of the nation is ample for that purpose."?,]2 Douglas goes on to assert 
that the Court cannot judge such result-oriented military decisions, a 
position which was retained in the published opinion.313 
There is a telling tension evident in Douglas' draft opinion be-
tween his patriotically hyped assertion of the government's nonjudi-
cially reviewable war power and his rejection of the "factual basis" in 
the case before him that comprised both a general wartime context 
and presumed racial characteristics of the targeted Japanese American 
community. Indeed, this tension existed by design as the government's 
lawyers had intentionally manufactured a strategic conflation of law 
and "facts" from the earliest stages of the litigation in order to over-
come several formidable legal obstacles. First, they had to contend with 
Supreme Court precedent regarding constitutional limitations on the 
government's war powers, especially as represented by the case of Ex 
parte Milligan.3H Second, although the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection mandate had not yet been applied to the Federal Govern-
ment, it was unlikely that the New Deal Court would give blanket 
approval to plainly discriminatory treatment of a "discrete and insular 
minority":\J5 without further rationalization. 
3121d. at 238 (quoting Douglas, draft of concurring opinion in Hirabayashi, June 7, 1943, 
pp.I-2, Box 79, Himbayashi and II'lSui cases folder, Douglas Papers, LC). Douglas' published 
concurrence in Himbayashi did not include the macho jingoism of the draft. 
313 See Hiraba)'ashi, 320 U.S. at 106 (Douglas, j., conculTing) (asserting that the Court can 
not "sit in judgment on the military requirements" behind the internment). 
314 71 U.S. 2 (1866). In Alilligan, the Court curtailed the government's emergency powers 
by declaring the operation of a wartime military commission (tribunal) in Indiana ultra vires 
under the Constitution. The defendant in the case, accused of engaging in traitorous activities 
as a so-called Copperhead or Confederate sympathizer, was tried and com'icted by the military 
commission acting under authority of presidential order. The Milligan Court refused to grant 
such s,,"eeping powers to the gm"emment, even under color of martial law. See id. at 127-31. In 
his opinion for the Court, Justice Davis refused the proposition that: 
in a time of war the commander of an armed force (if in his opinion the exigencies 
of the country demand it, and of which he is to judge), has the powel; within the 
lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject 
citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will; and in the exercise of his lawful 
authority cannot be restrained, except by his superior officer or the President of 
the United States. 
/d. at 124. Further, "[mlartial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper 
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." Id. at 127. "Martial law cannot arise from a 
threatened invasion. The necessity must be actnal and present; the invasion real, such as effectually 
closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." Id. 
315The call in footnote four of Carotene Products, United States v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), for a higher level of scrutiny in cases involving classes of discrete and 
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The government's lawyers planned to have judicial notice taken of 
"facts" that were mainly stereotypes, lies, and innuendos.3If; In this man-
ner, they would avoid having to litigate propagandistic representations 
of Japanese Americans in court. Charles Burdell, aJustice Department 
lawyer working on the Yasui case who adopted the judicial notice 
stategy, drafted a memorandum for submission to the trial judge that 
contained a straightforward statement of the argument.317 Irons relates 
the contents of the memorandum: 
'Jap citizens are inevitably bound, by intangible ties, to the 
people of the Empire of Japan," [Burdell] wrote. "They are 
alike, physically and psychologically." Burdell then elaborated 
his genetic theory of loyalty. "Even now, though we have been 
separated from the English people for over 100 years, we still 
take pride in the exploits of the R.A.F. over Berlin, and the 
courageous fighting of the Aussies in Northern Mrica. Why? 
Because they are people like us. They are Anglo-Saxons." 
Burdell's theory equally fit the Japanese Americans. "Who 
can doubt that these Japs in this country, citizens as well as 
aliens, feel a sense of pride in the feats of the J ap Army-this 
feeling of pride is strong in some, weak in others, but the 
germ of it must be present in the mind of everyone of 
thelll."318 
There is no proof that the memorandum was delivered to the judge 
in the trial of Minoru Yasui, but it shows how the lawyers imagined 
judicial notice would work in the test cases. Indeed, at trial, Judge 
James Fee interrogated Yasui from the bench regarding the Shinto 
religion even as Yasui testified that he had been raised Methodist 
by Methodist parents.3I9 Fee seemed convinced that all Japanese 
insular minorities was nominally heeded in Korematsu. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("It should 
be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. 
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). 
316 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 138-39. War Relocation Authority lawyers 
who came up with the judicial notice strategy listed a number of "propositions" of which the 
courts may take judicial notice. These included: difficulties posed by "Caucasian experiences with 
Oriental psychology"; loyalty to Japan because of education or membership in the Shinto religion 
and a resulting racial affinity; and the threat to themseh'es posed by Japanese Americans who 
remained at large. See id. Of course, evidence of which judicial notice may be taken should invoh'e 
only "undisputed" factual matters. See id. at 137-38. 
317 See id. at 139-40. 
3IS/d. (quoting Charles Burdell to Tom Clark, Apr. 27, 1942 (with attached brief), File 
146-13-7-2-0, DOJ). 
319 See id. at 141. 
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Americans were adherents of the Shinto religion and thus obliged 
to remain loyal to the Emperor of Japan.320 
The government's lawyers sought to assert a new conception of 
war powers,321 shot through with authority to instantiate the white 
nationalism that had created the momentum toward internment in the 
first place.322 Philip Glick, the War Relocation Authority's (WRA) so-
licitor, saw a way around Milligan and equal protection arguments by 
reading into the war powers a transcendent constitutional governmen-
tal power to act with impunity toward a racial minority.323 Glick recog-
nized that the government's racially discriminatory action would have 
to relate to a "genuine war need," and that a determination would be 
made by the courts as to reasonableness.324 Yet, the balance to be struck 
between the war powers and equal protection or due process could be 
settled well in advance of any real assessment if the courts were made 
to understand the racial content that lay behind the reworked war 
powers construct. 
Such was the substance embedded in the government's proce-
dural strategy of judicial notice. The courts' determination of reason-
ableness was not to, and did not, occur outside the underlying concep-
tion of white nationhood that reanimated the concept of war powers. 
The blending of "facts" and doctrine created a normative and episte-
mological fabric in which were interwoven the strands of racially con-
tingent patriotism-cum-foreign affairs jurisprudence. Indeed, the lines 
along which doctrinal divisions congealed among the Justices show the 
imbrication of racial and foreign affairs ontologies. 
320 See id. 
321 In addition to Milligan, other precedent had laid out the contours of the war powers and 
suggested that constitutional limits and robust judicial review we.·e the nom). See Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) ("Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived 
from the Constitution."); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134-35 (1851) ("Our duty is to 
determine under what circumstances private property may be taken from the owner by a military 
officer in time of wou: And the question here is, whether the law permits it to be taken to insure 
the success of any enterprise against a public enemy which the commanding officer may deem 
it advisable to undertake. And we think it very clear that the law does not permit it."); Sterling 
v. Constantin, 287 u.S. 378 (1932) (holding that a state govemor's declaration of martial law was 
subject to judicial scrutiny and rejection). But cf. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827); The Prize 
Cases, 2 Black 635 (1862); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 u.S. 78 (1909). See generally Rostow, supra note 
146, at 530 (1945) ("What lies behind Ex parte jHilligan, Mitchell v. Harmony, and Sterling 11. 
Constantin is the principle of responsibility. The war power is the power to wage war successfully, 
as Chief Justice Hughes once remarked. But it is the power to wage war, not a license to do 
unnecessary and dictatorial things in the name of the war power."). 
322 See sllpra text accompanying notes 236-59. 
323 See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 138, at 125-28. 
324 See id. at 126. 
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For example, Justice Murphy, who most clearly saw the racially 
contingent nature of the internment,325 also was most insistent on the 
justiciability of issues arising under the exercise of the war power: 
"While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that the 
mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty exists in time of 
war as well as in time of peace .... "326 To the contrary, Justices Stone, 
Black, and Frankfurter, who each refused to see as germane the racially 
discriminatory basis at the heart of the internment,32i signed their 
names to judicial opinions328 suggesting nonreviewability of the war 
325 In Hirabayshi, Justice Murphy drafted a dissent which was never filed. See IRONS, JUSTICE 
AT WAR, supra note 138, at 244-46. In it he wrote: "Instead of [a serious attempt to identify disloyal 
individuals], by a gigantic round-up no less than 70,000 [sic) American citizens are placed under 
a special ban and deprived of their liberty because of a particular racial inheritance .... This is 
so utterly inconsistent with our ideals and traditions, and in my judgement so contrary to 
constitutional sanctions, that I cannot lend my assent." Id. at 244 (quoting Murphy, draft of 
dissenting opinion in Hirabayashi, pp. 4-5, Box 132, Murphy Papers, UML). In the end, Murphy 
succumbed to pressure and dropped his dissent. See id. at 246. However, Murphy filed a dissent 
in Korematsu that spoke of the internment in direct terms: "Such exclusion [under DeWitt's 
order) goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." 
Korematsll, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, j., dissenting). 
326Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,113 (1943) (Murphy,j., concurring). 
327 See Stone's opinion for the Court in Hiraba)'ashi, 320 U.S. at 101. Stone stated: 
[t)he adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of 
measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and circum-
stances which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace that 
safety more than others [sic], is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution 
and is not to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances 
racial distinctions are ilTelevan t. 
Id.; see also Black's opinion for the Court in Korematsll, 323 U.S. at 223 (,To cast this case into 
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented 
[sic], merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hostility to him or his race."). In Frankfurter's concurrence in Korematsll, he stated: 
If a military order such as that under re\"iew [DeWitt's exclusion order) does not 
transcend the means appropriate for conducting war, such action by the military is 
as constitutional as would be any authorized action by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission within the limits of the constitntional power to regulate commerce. 
And being an exercise of the war power explicitly granted by the Constitution for 
safeguarding the national life by prosecuting war effectively, I find nothing in the 
Constitution which denies to Congress the power to enforce such a valid military 
order by making its violation an offense triable in the civil courts. 
Korematsll, 323 U.S. at 225 (Frankfurter, j., conculTing). 
328 See Douglas' conculTence in Hiraba)'ashi, 320 U.S. at 106 (Douglas, j., conculTing); see 
also Black's opinion for the majority in KOI-ematSll, 323 U.S. at 225 ("To find the Constitution 
does not forbid the military measures now complained of does not carry with it approval of that 
which Congress and the Executive did. That is their business, not ours."). In Jackson's dissent in 
Korematsu, he stated: 
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent 
judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on 
information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not 
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power.3~9 Justice Stone's opinion for the Court in Hirabayashi, which 
was echoed in the opinions of his like-minded colleagues, drew such a 
firm line between the war-making powers of the government, exclu-
sively exercised by Congress and the executive rather than the judici-
ary, that in retrospect it is easy to infer the Court's unstated bias.330 
Such absolute nonreviewability of the war power had never been held 
by a majority of the Court. 331 Frankfurter went so far as to groundlessly 
hypothesize a kind of fourth branch of Government-the war-making 
branch-operating in a separate constitutional sphere.332 
The due process analysis, undertaken by the Court only indi-
rectly,333 further instantiates the racially contingent foreign affairs ju-
be proved .... My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a 
military judgment as to whether General DeWitt's evacuation and detention pro-
gram was a reasonable military necessity. I do not suggest that the courts should 
have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task. 
Korematslt, 323 U.S. at 245, 248 (Jackson, j., dissenting). 
329To an extent, the commitment to nonreviewability was more rhetorical than actual as the 
Justices' opinions were a study in perfonnative contradiction. ''''hile suggesting that the govern-
ment's actions were nonreviewable, the opinions contained legal and factual analysis that strongly 
resembled standard judicial review. Tracing the particular nonreviewability tradition begun hy 
the internment cases, Professor Yamamoto discusses cases from the 1980s in which the Burger 
Court adopted a similar discretionary 'Judicial value judgment that the government's self-protec-
the concerns, whether latent or explicit, specific or general, justify essentially unreviewable 
gO\'ernment restrictions of civil liberties." Yamamoto, sit/ira note 141, at 33. 
330 Justice Stone wrote: 
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of 
the ,,'ar power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily 
given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining 
the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of 
the means for resisting it. "'here, as they did here, the conditions call for the 
exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by [Congress and 
the President], it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action 
or suhstitute its judgment for theirs. 
Hiraba)'(I5hi, 320 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). 
m See HDIKI~, sltpra note 14, at 141-48. 
:1:12 See Korematslt, 323 U.S. at 224-25 (Frankfurter, j., concurring). Frankfurter wrote in his 
Korematslt concurrence: 
Id. 
the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of 
war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of 
peace ,wuld be lawless. To talk about a military order that expresses an allowable 
judgment of war needs by those entrusted with duty of conducting war as "an 
unconstitutional order" is to suffuse a part of the Constitution with an atmosphere 
of unconstitutionality. The respective spheres of action of military authorities and 
of judges are of course very different. But within their sphere, military authorities 
are no more outside the bounds of obedience to the Constitution than are judges 
within theirs. 
333 See Yamamoto, supra note 141, at 23. 
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risprudence. In Hirabayashi, Justice Stone weighs the reasonableness 
of the curfew order against a hypertrophied war power.334 Stone's 
discussion correctly considers a less racially discriminatory alternative 
to the existing curfew orders that targeted only Japanese Americans. 
Might not DeWitt have ordered a blanket curfew in the designated 
sensitive areas, affecting all racial groups equally, and still effectively 
achieved the desired end? The Court, however, flatly rejects such a 
policy as it "balances" the interests involved. "In a case of threatened 
danger requiring prompt action, [the alternative would require] a 
choice between inflicting obviously needless hardship on the many, or 
si tting passive and unresisting in the presence of the threat. "~135 
The liberty interests of non:Japanese Americans in the zone are 
weighed favorably vis-a-vis the presumed military necessity of guarding 
against domestically based sabotage and espionage.331i These non:Japa-
nese American interests are found to warrant protection in the all-or-
nothing logic of the Court ("needless hardship on the many" versus 
"sitting passive and unresisting"), whereas the trampled liberty interests 
of Gordon Hirabayashi and fellow Japanese Americans are relegable 
to secondary status as an incidental burden to be borne during "war-
time." The Court does not explain why the "doctrine of equality," 
which would have been maintained by such a universal curfew order, 
is less significant than safeguarding the interests of the non:Japanese 
Americans in the military zone. Indeed, by the Court's own assessment, 
"every military control of the population of a dangerous zone in war 
time ... necessarily involves some infringement of individual liberty 
•••. "337 In light of the Court's analysis and holding in Hirabayashi, 
however, the concepts of necessity and national sacrifice themselves 
must be understood as racially contingent, as must the resulting due 
process calculus. 
A final aspect of the internment that warrants attention here is 
the resistance movement by Japanese Americans inside the camps. The 
"no-no" movement, so named because its members refused to give 
affirmative answers to two questions put to internees on a loyalty 
questionnaire, met with government repression in the form of a seg-
regation program that placed "disloyal" Japanese Americans in the 
334 See 320 u.s. at 95. 
3:l5Id. 
33G Ind('('d, it has be('n pointed out that Americans arr('st('d as japan('s(' spi('s aft('r th(' initial 
round-up of known japan('se ag('nts inllll('diatdy follml"ing P('ad Harbor "'ere all whites. See 
Rostow, supra note 146, at 523. 
337 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99. 
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camp at Tule Lake.:~3tl Questions 27 and 28 on the WRA's "Application 
for Leave Clearance" asked, respectively, whether the internee would 
be willing to serve in the U.S. armed forces and swear unqualified 
allegiance to the United States.339 Approximately 9000 Japanese Ameri-
can internees refused to give an unqualified affirmative answer to 
question 28 and thus were categorized as disloyal by the WRA.340 In 
addition, some internees attempted, with the "help" of Congress,341 to 
renounce their U.S. citizenship.342 
The motivations of those answering "no-no" and renouncing U.S. 
citizenship, however, had little to do with either their loyalty to the state 
(whatever that meant) or, other things being equal, their willingness 
to serve in the armed forces. 343 Rather, these resisters objected to their 
maltreatment at the hands of the government. 344 Their branding and 
handling as "disloyal" in a sense completes the absurd picture painted 
by the application of a simplistic understanding of the state and its 
"unitary" identity. 
As Chris Iijima shows in his article on the redress and reparations 
movement,345 the concept of patriotism-the imaginary proper rela-
tionship between citizens and the state-that was enforced by Congress 
in creating the Civil Liberties Act itself acts to suppress the expression 
of legitimate dissent within the state. ThatJapanese American resisters 
inside the camps were labeled as "disloyal" reveals again the internal 
contradiction of the unitary state construct that animates foreign af-
fairs law. Even as the government acted to exclude Japanese Americans 
from its definition of the state's imagined unity, it categorized and 
further penalized those among the excluded who dared to protest the 
iI~ustice. Such an absurd outcome is the result of a faulty grasp of the 
relationship between states and groups of actors whose political iden-
tities do not correspond with the unitary state construct. 
In summary, the internment history discussed in this Part reveals 
a number of aspects of foreign affairs processes inside the state that 
3:18 See DANIELS, Sllpra note 215, at 112-14. 
339 See id. at 113. 
:HO See id. at 114. 
:w Congress passed the Denationalization Act in 1944 in order to make it easier for Japanese 
Americans to renounce their U.S. citizenship. See id. at 116. 
342 See id. 
:14:1 See DANIELS, supra note 215, at 114, 116-17. Several hundred Japanese American males 
refused induction into the armed senices and 263 were convicted of draft evasion. Theil' resis-
tance was expressly an act of resistance to the internment. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra 
note 212, at 246-47. 
3H See td. 
:145 See Iijima, supra note 5. 
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throw into question the basic tenets of the IR realist framework of 
foreign affairs law. The actions of individuals, both outright racists and 
aspiring bureaucrats, were central to intra-governmental pressure to 
intern. Similarly, racist and opportunistic politicians and "special inter-
est" organizations from civil society played a significant role in applying 
pressure from outside the government. The media's role, in particular 
the actions of a few influential publicists and editors, contributed 
greatly to the pro-internment atmosphere. Intra-governmental agency 
competition also fueled the dynamics behind internment. 
The legal history, regarding both the Court and government and 
civil libertarian attorneys, reveals another set of factors that had little 
connection with national security concerns and certainly prevented a 
fair consideration of the internment's legality. Furthermore, the resis-
tance that arose among Japanese Americans led to additional manipu-
lations of statist logic (loyalty/patriotism) as the interning authorities 
disposed of such challenges. The case made here by looking inside the 
state is that there is very little "state" to observe in the processes that 
led to the internment. Rather, a sordid array of individual actors and 
ignoble motivations congeal to produce this legally sanctioned pursuit 
of "national interest." In the remainder of this article, I will suggest 
that the internment is a critical precedential instance of IR realist-
driven foreign affairs law, precisely because it reveals how conceptual 
blindspots flowing from the underlying ontological framework insure 
the likelihood of particularistic outcomes passed off as universalist 
realizations of the national interest. 
III. OF NEW PRECEDENTS 
This section will outline the conceptual framework for a different 
approach to foreign affairs based on the perspectives of IR critical 
theory. The IR critical theory breakthrough of the 1980s and 1990s has 
challenged fundamental IR realist conceptual frameworks by question-
ing the ontological given-ness of the state, internal/external spatiality, 
and national security.346 These critiques of IR realism open the way to 
a different understanding of the internment as part of the genealogy 
of foreign affairs law. Cultural and social determinants, such as the 
racism behind internment,34i condition international relations and 
346 See infra discussion accompanying notes 353-89. 
347 For a scathing critique registered at the time of the internment, see justice Murphy's 
dissenting opinion in Korernatsu, 323 U.S. at 233, 234, \\'here the justice referred to the exclusion 
program as falling "m'er 'the very brink of constitutional pO\\'er'" and "into the ugly abyss of 
racism." See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 212, at 18 ("The broad historical causes which 
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foreign affairs law at a fundamental level. In this light, the internment 
cases are not anomalous in U.S. jurisprudence, but rather should be 
understood critically as "leading cases" in the trajectory of foreign 
affairs law. From this perspective, the internment suggests a close 
connection between identity-contingent formations, racism and xeno-
phobia, and legal structuring of the field. 
A. IR Critical Theory 348 
IR critical theory arose in the 1980s as part of a wider movement 
across many disciplines that, put simply, viewed established intellectual 
paradigms as historically contingent effects of modernity. Modernity 
here is understood as the western civilizational project whereby par-
ticular, but not ine"itable, forms of knowledge, and social and political 
ordering become ascendant, enabling a narrowly defined vision of 
progress and emancipation.:H9 IR critical theory includes various diver-
gent approaches that derive from poststructuralism, deconstruction, 
and Habermasian and Gramscian critical theory.35o What these ap-
proaches share in common is a rejection of the epistemological and 
ontological predilections of IR realism.351 
shaped these decisions [to exclude and intern Japanese descended citizens and residents] were 
race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership."). 
348IR critical theory, like IR realism, is imperfect shorthand for a varied body of scholarship 
including so-called constructivist, post-structural and, generally, postmodern approaches. See 
Robert \V. Cox, Social Forces, States, and norld Orders: Beyond International Relations Them), 10 
l\IILLE1>1>IUM 126, 128-30 (1981) (distinguishing problem-solving theory that accepts existing 
conditions from critical theory which seeks to transform those conditions). The commonality 
linking these approaches is their rejection of IR realism's basic tenets. IR critical approaches, for 
example, critically problematize states, sovereignty, security, threat, etc. as effects, rather than 
privileging them as a PliOli categories of analysis. Depending on the particular type of IR critical 
theory adopted, emphasis may be placed on discursive, institutional, political-economic and 
gender relations as constituting the given construction. See Jepperson, supm note 51, at 45-47 
(citing and describing what he terms "constl'llctivist" and "radical constructivist" approaches). IR 
critical approaches might also be grouped together under the general rubric of "post-positivist." 
See BROWN, supra note 20, at 55 (''It]he new discourses are, above all else, anti-positivist .... "). 
349 See generally KEYMAN, supra note 49, at 91-95. The Frankfurt School of social theory is 
often credited with initiating the systematic critique of modernity. See, e.g., THEODOR ADORNO & 
MAX HORKHEIMER, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1979);JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES (1987). 
350 I focus here on those elements ofIR critical theory most useful for the present project of 
understanding how racial formation relates to foreign affairs law. Largely omitted from the 
discussion are so-called structural (historical materialist) approaches, which are nevertheless 
important components of the critical literature in the field. See, e.g., ROBERT W. COX, PRODUC-
TION, POWER AND WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MAKING OF HISTORY (1987); GRAMSCI, 
HISTORICAL l\1.UERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Stephen Gill ed., 1993); ANDREW 
LINKLATER, BEYOND REALISM AND MARXISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1990). 
351 So, for example, whereas IR realism is unabashedly posithist with its faith in the objectivity 
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Three insights from the growing body of IR critical theory are 
especially pertinent to the argument forwarded here. These involve 
critiques of the state, the inside/outside dichotomy, and the security 
construct. First, critical theorists have problematized IR realist reliance 
on the state as the foundational element from which all descriptive and 
normative consequences flow. Richard Ashley, for example, rejects the 
image of the state as "an unproblematic unity, an entity whose exist-
ence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, 
interests and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated 
as given. "352 Similarly, Jens Bartelson critiques the concept of state 
sovereignty, asserting that "sovereignty and knowledge implicate each 
other logically and produce each other historically. "353 Knowledge in 
turn is political, resulting from a series of contingent ontological 
choices.354 Drawing more directly on French deconstruction, Cynthia 
Weber asserts that "[t]he state is a sign without a referent,"355 and that 
states exist only through the process by which they are "written" by 
political actors and political scientists.3"r, Dm'id Campbell's study of 
United States foreign policy concludes that foreign policy discourse is 
integral to the construction of the state's identity. Campbell questions 
the state's ontological status by re\'ealing the centrality of particular 
discursive practices that constitute it. 3:;i 
In addition to this political theory, a useful body of social theory, 
associated with Theda Skocpol and others, has been developed in 
response to instrumentalist and structuralist approaches that under-
stood the state mainly from the perspective of its role in enabling the 
of the scientific method, and adherence to the bottom-line ontological distinction be1ween the 
observing subject and the observed object, IR critical theory is post-positivist and reflexive, placing 
science in a social and cultural context, and conceh-ing of subjects and objects as part of a 
mutually constituting process. Knowledge and power are thus linked, and epistemology and 
ontology are open invitations to critical inquiry, not a priOli categories upon which to erect 
"disinterested" disciplines. For an introduction to the cultural turn in international studies that 
most clearly breaks with the IR realist tradition, see generally essays collected in THE RETURN OF 
CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN IR THEORY (YosefLapid & Friedrich V. Kratochwil eds., 1996). 
352 Richard K. Ashley, The Potlert)' of Neo-Realism, 38 1NT'L ORG. 238 (1984). See generall), 
WILLIAM C. OLSON & AJ.R. GROOM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEN & No\\' (1991) (describing 
the evolution of the state as subject in international relations). 
353JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (1995). 
354 See id. at 6-7. 
355CYNTHIA WEBER, SIMULATING Sm'EREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE AND SYMBOLIC 
EXCHANGE 123 (1995). 
356 See id. at 1-10. ",reber's notion of "writillg the state" refers to the process by ,,-hich states 
and their "referent," sovereignty, are called into being by the actions of statespersons, particularly 
through the transgression of sovereignty in the form of inten·entions. ,rebel' examines a number 
of historical interventions including the recent United States invasions of Panama and Grenada. 
357 See CAMPBELL, supra note 73, at 9, 68-70 ("Foreign policy was not something subsequent 
to the state or the interstate system, but integral to their constitution."). 
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maintenance of particular relations of production under capitalism.358 
This theory asserts that the state's relative autonomy resulted from the 
"transnational structure of military competition" that was "not origi-
nally created by capitalism" but was a product of the territorialized 
international system.359 The state is "brought back in" to social history 
as a "dual anchor" between internal socioeconomic conditions and 
external international relations. 3GO Such a dual understanding of the 
state rejects the functionalism that viewed the state as determined 
either wholly by capitalist actors or by the structure of internal social 
conflict and cooperation. Skocpol's project was designed to return the 
state to its particular historicity and understand its development as an 
organizational form apart from the development of global capital-
iSln.%1 
From the perspective of IR critical theory, there are both strengths 
and weaknesses of the social theoretical project to rethink the state. 
The primary strength is that the state is expressly viewed as a social 
agen t and thus potentially subject to scrutiny as a product of social and 
cultural processes. Such scrutiny suggests alternative perspectives on 
foreign affairs law precluded by the IR realist reification of the state. 
A weakness, however, is that such social theories of the state have 
themselves led to the "assumption that the agency [Le., the state] 
possesses a coherent self,"362 perhaps unwittingly buttressing status quo 
ontologies. Such social theoretical approaches may thus fail to recog-
nize the "historical and discursive construction of [state] identity."363 
The social theoretical approach places the state at the nodal point 
between internal social and cultural conditions and the external realm 
whose conditions derive primarily from the defining features of mili-
tarism and territoriality.364 Thus, the basic IR realist binarisrn of a 
358 See THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1979) [hereinafter SKOCPOL, 
STATES]; Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back III: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in 
BRINGI1';G THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter EYans et at. eds., 1985) [hereinafter Skocpol, Blinging the 
State Back Ill]. Skocpol's intervention was in part a response to the heavily structural critiques of 
global political economy such as that of world systems theory. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE 
N.HION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (1985); MICHAEL l\IANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER (1986); 
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF WORLD ECONOMY (1984). 
359 SKOCPOL, STATES, supra note 358, at ilO; see also Skocpol, Blinging the State Back In, supra 
note 358. 
:Iii!) See SKOCPOL, STATE, sup/a note 358, at 32. 
361 See KEYMAN, supra note 49, at 54-86 (discussing how the social theory of the state could 
contribute positively to a post-realist theory of the state in international relations). 
362 Id. at 84. 
363 See id. at 86. 
3li4 The duality of states as the nodal point between the internal, socioeconomically-deter-
mined order and the external, territorially and militarily-contested order offers a more nuanced 
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domestic inside and an international outside365 is complicated by the 
presence of the more or less autonomous third element of the state. 
The state becomes analytically distinct from either the internal realm 
of the social and cultural or the external territorialized realm of mili-
taristic "relations." However, the state is conceived as an important 
institutional factor that may create effects and respond to conditions 
in both realms, and which is no longer the mysterious "black box" of 
IR realism. 
Decoupling the state from such imaginary entities3GG as the "na-
tion," the "republic," or "we the people," may be an important step in 
reconstructing foreign affairs law. The normative primacy given to 
governmental exercises of power-the equating of military or eco-
nomic capability to act with proper "national interest" in such action-
in foreign affairs legal discourse is undermined when the particularis-
tic institutional dynamics behind, and resistances to, policy formation 
are foregrounded. Moreover, the nature of the state can be seen to 
derive from a differently conceived relationship to the international 
realm than is implied by the anarchy problematique. Instead of the 
state protecting the internal order from the chaotic external, the state 
asserts license on its own behalf to cope with territorialized imperatives 
of the militaristic external realm. The state-as-institution may thus 
respond to external stimuli in a manner that resembles other institu-
tions law typically regulates-corporations, churches, and other agen-
cies of civil society and local government. The result, then, of applying 
poststructural critical theory and social theoretical approaches to the 
state in foreign affairs law could be an understanding of the state as 
understanding of state behavior by adding back an element of social agency that opposes the 
functionalism of classical structuralist accounts of the state. See Fred Hallidav, Siaies alld Sociel)" 
in International Relations, 16 MILLENNIUM 215, 217 (1987). However, I would defend a modified 
structuralism that sees states (and, for example, foreign affairs) as embedded in internal and 
external socio-cultural and economic imperath'es based on difference, which are "structured into" 
state action. Social historians argue that the state system developed under the historical impera-
tives of territoriality and, therefore, that states were not products of the expansion of global 
capitalism. It is also true, however, that dle territorial principle at the heart of the state system's 
historical and conceptual foundation de\'eloped in concert with a basic logic of difference. This 
logic tied certain territories and the privileged status of peoples within those territories to a 
conception of religious identity, gender, nationality, ethnicity or race. For works "'hich have traced 
the role of these types of identity formations against the rise of the nation-state s),stem, see 
generally, BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS 0"1 THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); PAUL GILROY, THERE AIN'T No BLACK 1"1 THE CKION JACK 
(1987); ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990); WO~IAK, NATION, STATE 
(Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias eds., 1989). 
365 See infra discussion accompanying notes 368-76. 
366 See ANDERSON, supra note 364. 
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socially, culturally and discursively constructed; a decoupling of the 
state from the imaginary unity of the body politic; a jurisprudential 
deprivileging of foreign affairs and national security "imperatives" and 
the placing of state action in an institutional context comparable to 
other forms of bureacratic and institutional action. 
Second, IR critical theory has exposed and de mystified a number 
of significant ontological choices implicit in the IR realist paradigm. 
One among these, the inside/outside dichotomy which grounds the 
dominant epistemological framework of international relations, builds 
on the basic understanding of the state as a unified and territorially 
determined subjectivity. Through the binary logic of difference, the 
characteristics of the "absent" external realm (unchanging structure, 
ahistoricity, chaos, lack of community, irrationality) define the "pre-
sent" internal realm and its characteristics (agency, history, order, 
community and rationality) .367 Critiquing this binarism, R.BJ. Walker 
sees "modern theories of international relations as a discourse that 
systematically reifies an historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp 
delineation of here and there, a discourse that both expresses and 
constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and 
outside the modern state as the only ground on which structural 
necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history 
can be revealed. "3G8 
Walker explains sovereignty as a spatialized answer to difficult 
political theoretical questions that arise over the contradiction between 
universalist claims of authority and legitimacy and the particularistic 
nature of interests that come to be served through formalized govern-
ance. He writes: "Within states, universalist aspirations to the good, the 
true and the beautiful may be realizable, but only within the spatially 
delimited territory."3@ Outside states, only radical contingency is pos-
sible.~\ilJ A whole set of binarisms is put in place by this spatial ontology. 
The inside becomes the realm of ethics, progress, community, self and 
identity, while the outside is the realm of power politics, structural 
stalemates, anarchy, and inscrutable difference. 371 This reified spatial 
367 See KEYMAN, supra note 49, at 134-35. Keyman summarizes several texts by Ashley in 
making this point, chiefly Richard K. Ashley, The Geopolitics of Geographical Space: Towards a 
Oitical Social Theol) of International Relations, 12 ALTERNATIVES 413 (1987). The notion of 
presences/absences is drawn from deconstruction's critique of logocentrism as the primary logic 
of western metaphysics. See generally JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 92-94 (1982). 
36~ See WALKER, supra note 56, at ix. 
369Id. at 62. 
:17tl Of course, sovereignty can also bring about the denial of the "true and the beautiful," for 
example, when governments shield themselves from international scrutiny based on claims of 
exclusi\'e domestic jurisdiction, See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 374. 
371 See WALKER, supra note 56, at 63-64, 67. 
December 1998] 19 B.G. THIRD WORUJ LAWJOURNAL 179 251 
order has important consequences. The anarchy of the external realm 
is rendered impossible to analyze and ahistorical.372 Further, the duality 
suggests the necessity of subjecting the inside to the disciplinary re-
gimes of modern societies,373 making IR realism a legitimating dis-
course of internal subjugation. Indeed, Jim George finds a direct link 
between the dynamics of the outside and inside realms: "the [external] 
anarchy problematique acts to empower ruling elites by silencing dif-
ferences, discontinuities, and conflicts within 'domestic' states, and 
converting them in to the anarchical basis of conflict between states. "374 
E. Fuat Keyman argues that "a successful critique of realism should 
start with the inside and its problematization. "375 
This spatial ontology results in varying approaches to domestic 
and foreign affairs theories of law. In short, the spatial political imagi-
nation of modernity has limited the operation of "real law" to the 
internal realm. In the liberal legal story, law acts as a neutralizing force 
that, in a sense, balances destabilizing vagaries of the potentially Hob-
besian internal social and cultural order. Relations, the hyperpolitics 
of the international realm, are "outside law" because they are outside 
the potentially unruly but ultimately manageable realm of the social 
and cultural. Thus, the critique of IR realism's inside/outside spatial 
ontology destabilizes a foreign affairs legal discourse that operates by 
placing the entire sphere of externally directed action outside "nor-
mal" liberal legal frameworks. In the Appendix, Figure (2) graphically 
depicts this spatial ontology, which IR critical theory rejects. Also lo-
cated in the Appendix, Figure (3) diagrams a possible "transnational" 
political and legal model underwritten by IR critical theory's revision-
ing of the state and inside/outside spatial ontology. 
A third relevant focus of IR critical theory has been the discursive 
construction of national security around which a whole subdiscipline 
of international relations, known as security studies, has formed. Criti-
cal approaches reject the IR realist privileging of security as an a jJriori 
concept, instead problematizing it as a construct that is operationalized 
through societal, cultural, and institutional practices and discourse. 
Various critical methodologies have been used in stripping security of 
its primacy. Peter Katzenstein has argued that, contrary to mainstream 
assumptions, national security does not stand in a transparent relation-
ship to a predetermined set of interests rationally formed by a unified 
372 See Richard K. Ashley. A Double Reading of the Anarch), Problematique. 17 MILLEKNWM 141 
(1988); KEYMAN. supra note 49. at 135. 
373 See HUNT & WICKHAM. supra note 18. at 22-23 (explaining Foucault's concept of discipli-
nary society in a legal theoretical perspecth'e); KEYMAN. sujJra note 49. at 136. 
374George. supra note 29. at 63. 
375KEntAN. supra note 49. at 136. 
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national community.37G This means national security is a proper object 
of sociological investigation because "security interests are defined by 
actors who respond to cultural factors,"'l77 including, I would argue, 
those factors which contribute to raced, classed, sexed, and gendered 
systems of subordination. In this view, the meanings attached by actors 
to national security, not "real threats out there," are of primary sig-
nificance. These meanings are important for understanding "the cul-
tural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the con-
structed identity of states, governments and other political actors on 
the other. "378 It is necessary, in the first instance, to "focus on the 
character of the state's environment and on the contested nature of 
political identities."379 
National security is, in this sense, a metaphor that ascribes to "the 
nation" the ability to perceive safety and well-being in the same way 
individual subjects presumably do in their "survival struggles." The 
metaphor collapses the multiplicity of society into a monolithic same-
ness of nation.380 The underlying notion of "the national interest"381 
underwrites the legitimacy of "the national security" through the epis-
temological operation of positivism. Katzenstein counters: "State inter-
ests do not exist to be 'discovered' by self-interested, rational actors. 
Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction."382 
National interest and thus determinations of national security, as-
sumed to be legitimate and rational, are valorized when set over against 
their Other-a realm of purely passionate and chaotic non-security 
and the non-rationality of interest misperception.383 
376 See Katzenstein, supra note 46, at 2. 
377 Katzenstein, supra note 46, at 2. Katzenstein's edited anthology THE CULTURE OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY, supra note 46, contains nine detailed case studies, ranging from a focus on 
NATO to the concept of humanitarian intervention, that provide persuasive empirical data 
supporting the thesis of security as social and cultural construct. 
:17~ !d. at 4. 
379Id. 
3~1J See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 397 n.21 (describing the "mainstream practice" in international 
relations of anthropomorphically equating states and individuals). ' 
3~1 See BARTELSON, supra note 353, at 162. In Bartelson's analysis, "the concept of interest is 
as ambiguous and primitive as it is central. Interest is never defined in the abstract, but used to 
define all other concepts with which it entertains inferential or metaphorical connections." Id. 
The national in terest is ex hypothesi univ'ersal, onto logically unitary, given by some unexplained 
subject-the nation. See id. 
3~2 Katzenstein, supra note 46, at 2. To illustrate the nonfixity of national security issues, 
Katzenstein describes the changes that hav'e occurred since the early twentieth century when 
pronatalism, eugenics, and other forms of population control were viewed as key national security 
issues. It is only with the onset of the Cold ';Var that national security took on its predominantly 
military definition. See id. at 10. More recently, the security concept has undergone further 
changes. See supra note 54. 
3H3 See BARTELSON, supra note 353, at 180. 
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Liberal legal reformism has not escaped the effects of "securitiza-
tion," a process whereby societal institutions and practices undergo 
fundamental transformations in response to a cultural climate of fear 
and perceived perpetual national security crisis.384 Yet, the concept of 
security arguably underlying all postwar foreign affairs law3s5 has not 
been subjected to systematic critique. 38G As a result, scholars have left 
unexamined the process by which foreign affairs law has been ideo-
logically, epistemologically, and culturally inflected through the proc-
ess of securitization.387 Indeed, many now accept the image of "national 
security state" as the very paradigm of the state in late modernity.388 
These three contributions of IR critical theory-rejecting the uni-
tary state and offering in its place, for example, the culturally and 
socially constructed state-as-institution; challenging the inside/outside 
384 I borrow the term "securitization" from Ole Waen"r. Ole Wae\'er, SeclIIitization and 
Desecuritization, in ON SECURITY 46, 47-54 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995). 
380 See Paul, supra note 7, at 708. 
386 See HENKIN, sujJra note 14, at 53. Henkin \\Tites: '''National Security' is not a constitutional 
term, and it is a concept too uncertain to support authority beyond what can be distilled from 
the responsibilities and powers bestowed on the President by the Constitution." [d. 
387 But cf Paul, supra note 7 (arguing that "exigency" discourse affected all of foreign affairs 
law). The concept of national security has changed dramatically during the period from before 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japan through the post-Cold '''''ar years. Koh describes changes 
of the era as involving the United States' pursuit of its perceived interests through war, treaty 
making, military spending, and "international summitry." Furthermore, there ,,"ere changes in 
the way national security would be prosecuted under the law. In 1947, for example, the National 
Security Act created two institutions which were to profoundly shape the way the United States 
would conceive of and pursue national security-the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
National Security Council (NSC). Both the CIA and NSC developed operational styles which 
greatly diverged from the respective missions emisioned by Congress for these "ad\"isory" organi-
zations. See KOH, supra note 67, at 48-64 (arguing that the usurpation by the CIA and NSC of 
operational powers, ultra vires of their congressional mandate, has amounted to a rewriting of 
the consitutional regime covering national security); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 73, at 153-243 
(tracing discursive continuities and discontinuities in the "writing of national security," i.e., the 
contingent process by which security has been constructed over the course of U.S. history). 
388The term "national security state" refers generally to Cold 'far governmental practices, 
beliefs, and the statutory framework instantiating "national security." See, e.g., National Security 
Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-413, 421-26 (1982 
& Supp. I 1983», as amended by Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 
98-477, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 2209 (1984) (creating the National Security Council, and Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Department of Defense); Professor Harold Koh traces first usage of the term 
"national security" to the title of the 1947 Act. See KOH, supra note 67, at 262 n.23. See general(\' 
Morton H. Halperin, The National Securit)' State: Never Question the President, in THE BURGER 
YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 50 (Herman Schwartz, ed., 
1987); SAUL LANDAU, THE DANGEROUS DOCTRINE 2 (1988). For a discussion of the national 
security state in the context of the struggle for lesbian and gay dghts, see Richard Cleaver, Sexual 
Dissidents and the National Sewrit)' State, 1942-1992, in A CERTAIN TERROR: HETEROSEXISM, 
MILITARISM, VIOLENCE AND CHANGE 1 (Richard Cleaver & Patricia I\fyers eds., 1993). Harold 
Lasswell first suggested the related concept of the "garrison state" in 1937. See Harold D. Lasswell, 
Sino-japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State, II CHINA Q. 643 (1937). 
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dichotomy and its effects; and viewing "security" as a social and cultural 
(discursive) construct-constitute a radical challenge to the IR realist 
foundations of foreign affairs law. If, as IR critical theorists argue, IR 
realism comprises a set of ideas whose time has passed, then it may be 
appropriate to reject the conceptual framework of foreign affairs law. 
An important step toward disengaging the discipline from its past 
commitments is to foreground those experiences, such as internment, 
where the contradictions and vagaries of IR realist ontologized foreign 
affairs law are manifest. Toward this end the next section suggests a way 
to place the internment within the post-IR realist conceptual frame-
work of a reconstructed foreign affairs law. 
B. The Legacy of Internment: Shadow or "Loaded Weapon" 
In understanding the legacy of the internment, we might consider 
two different metaphors: the "loaded weapon," suggested in Justice 
Jackson's Korematsu opinion,389 and the "shadow," from the title of this 
Symposium. Jackson's reference to the loaded weapon implied the 
direct precedential effect the internment cases might have under the 
doctrine of stare decisis. He knew that once the Court sanctioned the 
government's actions it would be hard to constrain similar future 
abuses of governmental power. The shadow metaphor suggests a legacy 
that is at once more inscrutable and potentially more insidious. As 
shadow, the internment may have unexpected consequences, not all 
of which, however, are necessarily deleterious. For reasons I will ex-
plain in this and the next section, although both are important, I 
think the shadow metaphor of the internment's legacy may be more 
useful for understanding the role of race in foreign affairs and ways of 
using race critical approaches to target elusive "non-raced" paradigms 
such as IR realist-driven foreign affairs law. Sadly, however, the loaded 
weapon of the internment precedents may persist as well. 
To begin this discussion let us return briefly to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's book on civil liberties in wartime since it no doubt will 
have reinvigorated the battle over the internment's legacy. 390 The book, 
ostensibly a historical survey of situations ("wartime") in which the 
government was compelled to sacrifice civil liberties of citizens in the 
name of national interest,391 is troubling for various reasons. Not least 
389 See 323 U.S. at 246 Oackson, j., dissenting) ("The principle [endorsed by the majority] 
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward 
a plausible claim of an urgent need. "). 
390 See REHNQUIST, supra note 1. 
391 The bulk of Rehnquist's book looks at Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and related 
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of these is how the Chief Justice normalizes the internment by smooth-
ing out the historical record3'12 and concluding that in "wartime" the 
courts might as well give the government (especially the President) 
wide latitude even in the face of "occasional presidential excesses. "393 
Although he foresees the continuance of a "trend against the least 
justified of the curtailments of civil liberty in wartime," Chief Justice 
Rehnquist views philosophizing about the desirability of the President's 
wide discretion as an undertaking that is "very largely academic."~194 He 
writes: "There is no reason to think that future wartime Presidents will 
act differently from ... Roosevelt [in interning the Japanese Ameri-
cans], or that future Justices of the Supreme Court will decide ques-
tions differently from their predecessors. "395 
Rehnquist's normalization of the internment and other repressive 
governmental acts rests in large part on his assertion of temporal limits 
within which such acts will occur. He invokes the Roman maxim, "inter 
arma silent leges,"396 roughly translated as "in time of war the laws are 
silent,"397 to express the distinction he wants to draw between "wartime" 
and "peacetime" and the different conceptions of law each allows.:198 
cases during the Civil War. See id. at 3-169. He includes a chapter on World War I and prosecu-
tions under the Espionage Act, see id. at 1 iO-83, two chapters on the internment, see id. at 
184-211, and a short chapter on the imposition of martial law in Hawai'i during World War II, 
see id. at 212-1 i. He includes an express disclaimer that the book is "limited to cases of declared 
war .... " See id. at 218. 
192 In a move that is hard to square with his detailed depiction of Lincoln's suspension of 
habeas corpus during the Civil War, and the Afilligan case, see supra note 314, the Chief Justice 
virtually ignores the historical significance of the massh'e fraud perpetrated on the courts by the 
military and governmental actors who defended the internment. See supra Part II. Although 
Irons' indispensable book and the Government's critical self-study PersonalJllstice Denied are listed 
in the book's bibliography, there is little indication in the text or notes that the author actually 
consulted them. See id. at 232, 23i-38. In addition to these omissions, the Chief Justice quotes 
from the Western States' amicus brief without mentioning that it was unethically authored under 
the auspices of a party to the suit or its prohlematic likely origins in the anti-Asian movement. 
See id. at 19i-98. In addition, Rehnquist asserts that "[t]here was no physical brutality" suffered 
by the Japanese Americans who were victims of the internment, see id. at 192, a claim which the 
record does not support. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 212, at 10, 150-51, 162-65, 
1 i8-80 (describing inhumane conditions and \'iolence suffered by the internees); DANIELS, supra 
note 215, at 108-09 (describing violence and hardships of camp life). 
393 See REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224. 
394 See id. 
3!)" Id. 
3% See id. at 218. 
397 See id. at 225. 
39R Rehnquist's wartime/peacetime dichotomy may not in fact even represent a meaningful 
empirical distinction. It is unclear whether there ,,;11 ever be another war officially declared by 
Congress as required by the Constitution. Indeed, in the whole history of the United States, out 
of over 200 active deployments of U.S. troops abroad, only five wars have been declared by 
Congress, none since World War II. See FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 105, at 649. 
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However, it is obvious that despite its articulation in temporal terms 
Rehnquist's book looks at the relationship between an external condi-
tion, war, and the internal legal order.399 This is more than a matter of 
semantics, and we should consider how that which Rehnquist has 
stated in temporal terms is actually a spatialized conception of foreign 
affairs that IR critical theorists10U have linked to IR realist-derived un-
derstandings of international relations.1u1 I would argue that Rehnquist 
refers implicitly to a spatial condition of necessity that obtains "per-
petually" in the vast external realm1u2 of foreign affairs, where threats 
to the national interest exist structurally and atemporally. 
The same slide from wartime necessity (temporally delimited, 
exceptional) to vast external realm necessity (spatio-structural, ubiqui-
tous) occurs naturally, almost imperceptibly, in the postwar era's for-
eign affairs law. 1uCI There has been a seepage from the paradigmatic IR 
realist condition-war-into the broader realm of foreign affairs law, 
and even into domestic law as wel1. 11H In this light, Rehnquist's treat-
019"This relationship of the "outside" conditioning the "inside" continues to take new forms. 
Unwanted immigration, environmental degradation, terrorism, drug trafficking, overpopulation, 
industrial espionage, and COlTUpt business practices of overseas companies are examples of 
external "threats" that are thought to warrant internal legal fixes, sometimes repressive, presump-
tively conservative in nature. Sometimes this relationship takes the form of a refusal by courts to 
extend internal legal protections, such as ch'il rights, beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
United States. See generally cases cited infra note 405; EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991) (refusing to apply U.S. employment discrimination law extraterritorially). 
40" See s 1/ p ra Part II I.A. 
401 Indeed, the Roman maxim Rehnquist invokes is quoted as "silent enim leges inter anna" 
and translated elsewhere as the "laws are silent among the arms of war," suggesting much less the 
temporal notion of "wartime" than a spatial one ("among arms") more in keeping with the 
ritualistic and formalized war declarations of Rome. See Thomas David Jones, The International 
Law of Alaritime Blockade-A .'Heasure of Naval Economic Interdiction, 26 How. LJ. 759, 761 
(1983); see general(~ A. Mishulin, The Declaration of War and the Conclusion of Peace in Ancient 
Rome, 10-11 HIST.j. 106 (1944). Taken alone the maxim even misrepresents the actual content 
of Roman law that did regulate warfare. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm: R.E. Lee, 
or nn: Shennan?, 136 MIL. L. REv. 115, 130 n.63 (1992). Moreover, the spatial ontology of 
modern foreign affairs law (based in the nation-state system) differs from that of Roman law 
(based on the "universal" law of jus gentium and jus naturale) in that the fonner does not provide 
a limiting logic for the operation of a nonlegal realm of "international relations." See supra Part 
I. I am grateful to Cherif Bassiouni for alerting me to the potential problems in Rehnquist's 
deployment of the given Roman Law maxim. 
40~ Rehnquist signed two opinions, one of which he authored, that referred expressly to the 
vast external realm of Curtiss-Wright. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (upholding 
Government's restriction of travel to Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (upholding 
Government's refusal to grant passport to former CIA operative turned dissident). 
403 C! R.BJ. Walker, International Relations and the Concept of the Political, in INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS THEORY TODAY, supra note 29, at 306, 308-09 (describing the relevance of spatial 
\'ersus temporal conceptualizations of international relations). 
41H For evidence of the slide and seepage described in the text see, for example, Paul, supra 
note 7, at 708-22; Jules Lobel, The Political Tilt of Separation of Powers, in POLITICS OF LAW, supra 
note 26, at 591, 599-600 [hereinafter Lobel, Separation of Power:s]; KOH, supra note 67, at 74--100. 
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ment of the internment may be taken as a defense of the whole 
structure of postwar foreign affairs jurisprudence, which has, not co-
incidentally, culminated during his tenure on the Court. 405 
Rehnquist needs and is able to discount the historical record of 
the internment because his understanding of foreign affairs relies on 
the IR realist ontological structure discussed in Part I. The distinct 
temporal demarcations-wartime and peacetime-and their respective 
spatio-ontological counterparts-outside and inside-are the trump-
ing arguments Rehnquist can use to assert the inedtability of law 
having sometimes to speak "with a somewhat different voice."4(J(j "War-
time" invokes the operation of hyperpolitics ("relations") under con-
ditions of anarchy's war of all-against-all. Norms and processes (e.g., 
equal protection, due process, and judicial review) designed to enjoin 
in the domestic context the anarchic operation of social and cultural 
forces neither survive the temporal redesignation nor the imposed 
spatial narrative of an outside condition extruding into the internal 
order. 
The importance of the internment for understanding foreign 
affairs jurisprudence lies precisely in how it historicizes the legal para-
digm Rehnquist seeks selectively to place in the abstract. In a move 
that is somewhat inversely related to the one made by government 
lawyers who knew they had to imbue the legal questions raised by the 
internment with the judicially noticed "factual record" of stereotypes 
and worse,4(J7 Rehnquist avoids the particular social and cultural deter-
minants of the legal by hadng us take 'Judicial notice" of a particular 
ontological structure-wartime/peacetime and, implicitly, outside/in-
40;, Rehnquist'S tenure has been marked by the Court's selecti,'e deference to one or both of 
the political branches' exercise of foreign affairs po\\'ers, usually leading to an outcome that could 
be construed as conservative, protectionist, nationalist or imperial. Compare, e.g., Breard ,'. 
Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (refusing to stay state of Virginia execution of prisoner in light of 
possible treaty violations and request for stay bv International Court of Justice under the treaty); 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that President's high seas 
interdiction and return policy targeting potential refugees from Haiti did not violate lall' of 
refugees as incorporated into U.S. law by Congress); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 
506 U.S. 764 (1993) (extending Sherman Act extraterritorially to protect U.S. insurance industry 
from anti-competitiYe British companies' practices); United States ". Alvarez-l\fachain, 504 U.S. 
655 (1992) (finding that federal court has jurisdiction over foreign national seized abroad by 
persons operating under the allspices of federal agency); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to Government searches 
and seizures overseas targetting nonnationals); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 243; Haig ". Agee, 453 
U.S. at 292, with EEOC Y. Arab American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (refusing to apply U.S. 
employment discrimination law extraterritorially). See generall), Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections 
on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HAR\·. INT'L LJ. 1 (1994); Patrick 1\1. McFadden, 
Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. RE\,. 4 (1995). 
406 See REHNQVIST, supra note I, at 224-25. 
407 See supra text accompanying notes 317-25. 
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side. The noticeable imbalance in Rehnquist's book, which takes great 
care to historicize Lincoln's actions (wartime suspension of civilliber-
ties) and the Milligan decision that invalidated them, is necessary to 
achieve the end goal of defending the entire foreign affairs legal 
paradigm. 
On the one hand, Rehnquist's selective historicization of Milligan 
allows him both to subtly undermine its validity40ll and occlude the 
particular social and cultural factors at work in the case (suggested 
facially in the vindication it afforded a pro-South northern sympa-
thizer) .41J9 On the other hand, the minimal historicization provided in 
his discussion of the internment allows the Chief Justice to defend its 
validity without having to seriously engage the problematic racial and 
xenophobic determinants of state action outlined in Part II. The IR 
realist paradigm of foreign affairs law is most defensible through such 
selective historicization. More careful examinations of the social and 
cultural determinants of state action and state identity debunk the 
unitary state-as-subject concept and other attendant notions, such as 
national security (and military necessity), that underwrite the para-
digm. 410 When the state and national security are understood as social 
and cultural constructs, and thus ontologically deprivileged, the para-
digm of foreign affairs law that the Chief Justice has pursued in his 
years on the Court is demystified and rendered less defensible. 411 The 
relative interests of "insider" and "outsider" groups in the maintenance 
of that paradigm can be weighed in the absence of the analysis-ending 
40" His conclusion regarding AIilligan seems to be that the case was an important statement 
abom civil liberties, but that it represents an unwise intervention in a matter that was too delicate 
for the courts to decide and a departure from standard narrowly targeted judicial review of 
government action. See REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 136-37,223. 
40Y The book provides two chapters of background material on the repressive attitudes and 
deeds of Secretary of State 'William Seward, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and General 
Ambrose Burnside that resulted in the incarceration of oyer 13,000 ciyilians during the war. See 
id. at 40-74. Ho\\,eyer, the IHilliga/l case arose in another equally important context that 
Rehnquist avoids-postwar reconstruction politics. Eric Foner has suggested that iHilligan was an 
early indication of a campaign by the Court to challenge Republican reconstruction efforts. See 
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 272 (1988) 
("Although Justice David Dav'is, who wrote the [iHilligan] opinion, insisted it had nothing to do 
with the Somh, the case threw into question the legality of martial law [operative in parts of the 
South to suppress 'depredations by armed bands of whites,'] and Freedmen's Bureau courts."). 
See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968). 
410 See supra Parts II, lILA. Rehnquist's anthropomorphization of law speaking with a "differ-
ent voice," see REHNQUIST, supra note I, at 225, is typical of a discourse of the state-as-subject that 
strives rhetorically to unify the divergent threads of ciyil society into one sovereign subjectivity. 
See supra Part I, lILA. 
411 See supra Part lILA. 
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assertion of an inside/outside (peacetime/wartime) ontological struc-
ture. 
To understand the more positive aspect of the internment's "sha-
dow" we might consider how it may help us see more clearly the 
faulty IR realist on to logical underpinnings of foreign affairs law. In the 
same way that Marshall's Indian trilogy,412 Dred Scott,413 the Civil Rights 
Cases,414 the Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping),415 Plessy,4IIi the 
Insular Cases,417 Bowers,418 and Adarand 419 are part of a critical canon of 
precedents that reveal the trajectories of subordinationist legal para-
digms, the internment plays a key role in explaining postwar foreign 
affairs law. 
The critiques of state, inside/outside, and national security out-
lined above serve as points of departure for the critique of foreign 
affairs law. Each of these critiques corresponds to a broader claim that 
the conditions of modernity have shifted. Not only is modernity epis-
temologically limited by blindness to its own contingency, but the 
project of modernity is being challenged, if not replaced, in its material 
conditions of possibility. This is evident from the burgeoning of radi-
cally pluralistic types of political and cultural formation that increas-
ingly structure "public" and "private" life at the millennium. Diversity 
movements, identity-based politics, syncretic cultural resistances to wes-
tern cultural imperialism and, methodologically, transdisciplinarity, are 
all manifestations of these post-modern conditions. 42o Morem'er, day-
to-day social and cultural relations have become increasingly trans-na-
tional, with "civil society" impacting the realms of law and gm'ernance 
from both the "inside" and the "outside." 
To be sure, we can expect the forms of modernity to be defended 
by social and political groups that gain advantage from their mainte-
nance; such may be the context of Chief Justice Rehnquist's interven-
412Johnson v. l\1'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I (1831); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
mOred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Ho\\'.) 393 (1857). 
414 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
415Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
416Plessy Y. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
417 See, e.g., OO\\1les Y. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
418 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
419 Adarand Constructors, Inc. Y. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
420 "Post-modern" as used here is primarily an historical designation, literally "after modem," 
and does not imply an endorsement of particular postmodern critical forms such as deconstruc-
tion or radical anti-essentialism that tend tm,'ard rejection of "deterministic" political analysis and 
"identity politics" of the type that are consistent with the post-modern political manifestations 
listed in the text. 
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tion. These groups are not monolithic and their boundaries are some-
what porous; nevertheless, power is exercised-consolidated by some 
but denied to others.421 But even such modernist strongholds as foreign 
affairs law must face the post-modern condition. What are the parame-
ters of the defense of modernism in the field, and how does this 
defense articulate with the imperial project that seemingly has always 
stood in a close relationship to foreign affairs law? To address these 
issues, the structures of foreign affairs law can be questioned by elevat-
ing to the level of "precedent" the breaks with "reality" that the mod-
ernist system of foreign affairs must negotiate in exercising its domin-
ion. The internment represents just such a break because it confronts 
modernist IR realist ontology with a "postmodern reality"-incommen-
surable difference. Here, IR realist-derived conceptualizations of the 
state, inside/outside, and security are contradicted in the overt par-
ticularisms and identity-contingent (racist, xenophobic) exercises of 
power that drove state action and resistance to it. The internment 
jurisprudence, despite its rehabilitation by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
continues to be a moment of truth for the IR realist framing of foreign 
affairs law. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis here on the internment's legacy 
as shadow, it bears repeating that the "loaded weapon" of the intern-
ment as precedent for racial repression in the name of national interest 
is still available. Two recent examples suggest that the authorities 
Justice Jackson feared, those who would avail themselves of the loaded 
weapon, are not just a thing of the past. In the late 1980s it was 
reported that the Reagan administration had begun to plan for sus-
pension of the Constitution and martial detention of dissidents, target-
ing in particular Central American refugees. 422 In 1991, during the Gulf 
War, the FBI engaged in sweeping investigations of Arab Americans 
that were likened to steps taken prior to the internment. 423 These 
m SeeIglesias, supra note 26, at 377-86 (discussing how Latinas/ os are affected by allocations 
of power in the trade-human rights linkage debates through the modernist discourses of 
de\dopment, dependency and neoliberalism). 
4~2 See Lobel, Emergency Power, supra note 54, at 1!\85. 
423 See Jamin B. Raskin, A Precedent for Arab-Americans? Internment of japanese-Americans 
dwing World ni'u II, 252 THE NATION 117 (1991), available in LEXIS, News Library; Joanne 
Hirase, The Intemment of japanese Americans: The Constitutional Threat Fifty Yean Later, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 143, 182 n.253 (993). For another example fwm the late 1960s of the Government 
contemplating detention of racial minority dissidents, see George Lardner,Jr., Detention Suggested 
for Black Guerrillas, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1968, at 1, which describes House Committee on Un-
American Activities report suggesting that Black Nationalist activities may constitute a state of war, 
walTanting use of detention centers and suspension' of civil rights protections. For a recent 
Holl}wood treatment of the mass-detention-of-lInpopular-minorities motif, see THE SIEGE (Fox 
1998), which depicts Arab American internment in response to a terrorism scare. 
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examples are sobering reminders that the fascistic potential of the 
internment as loaded weapon is still alive; indeed, the internment cases 
are still "good law," never having been overruled by a decision of the 
Supreme Court.424 
IV. RACE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Nobody will ever convince me that the foreign and domestic policies 
of this country do not come straight from the South. 
-Paul Robes01142', 
The relationship between race and foreign affairs, or race and 
international relations, remains undertheorized, especially from a legal 
perspective. Scholars in areas such as immigration law and the law of 
U.S. imperialism have made progress recently in placing race at the 
center of the discipline's self-image.42G In the context of international 
human rights, scholars have brought the insights of LatCrit theory427 
to bear on an area that, in this country, had remained remarkably 
424 See Raskin, supra note 423. A lasting irony of the internment is that the application of 
"rigid scrutiny" in those cases (that amounted to nonscrutiny) has been the precedent for "strict 
scrutiny" review of affirmative action legislation, the device used by the courts to \irtually outlaw 
society's attempt at race-conscious remediation of racial subordination. See gfJ1erally R{'ggie Oh 
& Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme COllrt A1mles ji'Oln Aflproving Internment 
of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for Ajiicall Americans, I MICH. J. R<\CE & 
L. 165 (1996). As this articl{' w{'nt to press I b{'cam{' awar{' of th{' publication of an ('xcdl{'nt 
articl{' on the I{'gacy of KOl'ematsu. See Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The LegaC)' ofKorematsu v. united 
States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. LJ. i2 (1996) (declaring Korematsu's 
continued pr{'cedential effect in various areas of constitutional law). 
425 Carl T. Rowan, Has Palll Robeson Betrayed the Negro?, 12 EBONY 31, 33 (I95i), quoted ill 
PENNY M. VON ESCHEN, RACE AGAINST EMPIRE: BLACK AMERICANS AND ANTiCOLO!'lIALlSM, I93i-
I95i 180 (199i). 
42Gln the area of immigration and nationality law see, for example, the Oregon Law Re\iew 
two-part symposium Citizenship and Its Discontents: Centeling the Immigrant in the Inter/National 
Imagination, i6 OR. L. REv., yol. 2-3 (199i). See also K{'\'in R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration 
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A Afagic Mirror into the Heart of Dm/mess, i3 IND. LJ. 1111 
(1998); Ke\in R Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular DemoC1YlC)', and California'S 
Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, iO WASH. L. RE,', 629 (1995). 
In the area of U.S. legal imperialism see, for example, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR" THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Ediberto Roman, 
Empire Forgotten: The United States' Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1119 (199i); Efr{'n 
RiYera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 
REV.JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996). 
427 LatCrit theory draws together scholars from different communities "to reinyigorate the 
antisubordination agenda of Critical Race th{'ory .. , reyi\'e its ethical aspirations, and expand 
its substantive scope by introducing new themes, perspectiYes, and methodologies." Elizabeth M. 
Iglesias, FOre1l1ord: International Law, HU1l1an Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-!UI. 
L. REv. I ii, I i8. See generall)' Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Oitical Race Theory, and 
Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Pmctiees to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA LJ. I 
(1996). 
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devoid of race-critical perspectives.~28 However, whether scholars will 
develop a comprehensive race-critical approach to foreign affairs law 
generally remains to be seen.m 
I will look briefly at four possible models for understanding the 
relevance of race in the "external realm," two of which have been 
discussed (IR realism and IR critical theory) and two of which derive 
from foreign affairs-related legal scholarship which has not yet been 
touched upon (interest convergence and race-internationalism). IR 
realism and IR critical theory suggest competing models of foreign 
affairs law and may underwrite widely diverging approaches to race 
and international relations, and race and foreign affairs law. The in-
terest convergence and race-internationalist approaches offer race-
critical theorists of foreign affairs law instructive points of departure. 
First, IR realist approaches, because of their statist and positivist 
commitments, would be unlikely to countenance the effects of race in 
international relations. In turn, an IR realist-informed theory of for-
eign affairs law would be unlikely to delve beneath the surface of the 
state and related constructs (security, inside/outside) to conceive of 
doctrines, processes, and norms that would account for, let alone 
challenge, the operation of racist particularisms masquerading as na-
tional interest or related conceptual frameworks. Indeed, IR realist 
thinking would evince the same irreducible race-blindness typical of 
conservative domestic race legal theories that seek to construct im-
penetrable formal veneers around doctrines of equal protection and 
due process, insuring a jurisprudence devoid of substantive anti-subor-
dinationist commitment. In both IR realist-derived foreign affairs and 
domestic race-blind formal egalitarianism, judicious considerations of 
race and other social and cultural determinants of state and private 
action are precluded at the level of paradigmatic assumptions.43u 
4~~ See, e.g., Symposium, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-A]'.I. L. REv. (1997). For a recent article that uses human rights perspectives to mount a 
racial critique of U.S. immigration and welfare reform, see Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol 
& Kimberly AJohns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and LegalFixes: An International Human Rights 
Critique of Immigration and Welfare "Reform," 71 S. CAl.. L. REv. 547 (1998). 
4~Y A number of sessions were organized at the New Approaches to International Law (NAIL) 
conferences of the mid-1990s that attempted to place critical race theorists in dialogue with 
critical international legal scholars. Unfortunately, the NAIL initiative seems to have ended before 
collaboration bet\veen the two groups could reach its fullest potential. 
4~() So, for example, an IR realist framing would not be compatible with the analysis of the 
Gulf \\'ar from the perspecti\'es of African Americans as undertaken by Henry Richardson. See 
infra discussion in this section of Henry]. Richardson III, Gulf Crisis and African-American 
Interests Under Illternational Law, 87 AM.]. INT'I. L. 42 (1993). The IR realist paradigm rules out 
any appreciable significance of sub- or interstate minority group interest formation for interna-
tional relations and, by extension, for foreign affairs law. 
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Second, IR critical theory approaches offer a more fertile ground 
for planting race at the center of the discussion. In particular, the 
so-called constructivist school,431 which sees states' identities as variable 
and historically, culturally, politically, and socially determined,432 pro-
vides an opening for race-critical approaches. However, as with other 
postmodern forms, constructivist theory may yield broadly distinct 
approaches to "identity politics. "4~~ "Radical constructivism" tends to 
reject foundationalist accounts of identity, which posit, if even provi-
sionally, the closure of iden ti ty formation processes, and which forward 
'an analysis of the effects of such identities. 434 "Conventional construc-
tivism," by contrast, accepts the possibility of such closure of identity 
formation processes and thus, theoretically, countenances as analyti-
cally significant racially contingent identity formations. Even conven-
tional constructivist approaches, however, do not necessarily view race 
and its effects as indispensable to an understanding of the external 
actions and discourses of nation-states, their representatives and insti-
tutions. Indeed, as far as I can determine, there has not been a sig-
nificant body of international relations scholarship, even from the 
constructivist school, that has pursued a specifically race-critical ap-
proach.435 
A third model for incorporating race into the study of interna-
tional relations and foreign affairs law emanates from United States-
based legal scholars of race and law. Derrick Bell's interest convergence 
thesis43G has inspired work by Mary Dudziak showing that a "Cold War 
431 See supra note 349. 
432 See Ted Hopf, The Promise of ConstT1lctiliism in International Relations Theo))" 23 INT'L 
SECURITY 171, 181-85 (1998). 
433 See Sumi K. Cho, Essential Politics, 2 HARY. LAT. L. REY. 433, 434 (1997) ("If our postmod-
ern sensibility leads LIS to a dead end of de-collectivized particlilarism, "'ith a complete loss of 
vision for coalitional solidarity and audaciolls racial politics, then the lIseflilness of that kind of 
postmodernism needs to be rethollght."). 
434 See Hopf, supra note 432, at 183. 
43~. For one attempt to deal with race within a constructi\'ist understanding of international 
relations, see Roxanne Lynn Dot:y, The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations, 22 l\IILLENIlTM: 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 454 (1993). Of COllrse, the post-colonial literature, some of 
which deals directly with international relations bllt usually only indirectly "'ith race, is vast. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this work has looked closely at the concept of sO\'ereignty and its 
implication for non-Western "nation-states." See generall), SIBA N'ZATIOULA GOVOGUI, Sm'EREIGNS, 
QUASI-SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS (1996); PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD-WORLD SOHREIGNTY: THE 
POSTMODERN PARADOX (Mark E. Denham & Mark O,,'en Lombardi eds., 1996). For a recent 
comparativist analysis (though not "international" in focus) of the parallel significance of race in 
the nation-state formation processes of the United States, Brazil and South Africa, see .>\."ITHONY 
W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISOK OF SOUTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES. AND 
BRAZIL (1998). 
436 Bell developed the interest-com'ergence thesis and argued that the Cold \far affected the 
case of Brown 11. Board of Education. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education alld the 
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imperative" affected the anti-segregationist politics and jurisprudence 
of the Brown era.437 White interests may have momentarily coincided 
with Black and other minority interests around desegregation as a 
result of the danger that Third World peoples would reject U.S. lead-
ership and favor the Soviet alternative because of the persistence of 
state-sanctioned white supremacy in the United States. 
The interest convergence approach is significant for race-critical 
foreign affairs legal scholarship because it combines the study of do-
mestic race relations with an awareness of conditions in the external 
realm. Performatively, it makes race an indispensable part of the in-
quiry. That is, in explaining domestic racial politics by looking to 
foreign affairs, the interest convergence approach prefigures its under-
standing of the international by application of a racialized explicative 
paradigm. Race is the impulse behind problematization of the external 
realm. The way data is collected, grouped, and narrated will be deter-
mined by the projection of a racialized paradigm of understanding 
onto the international terrain. In this way, the interest convergence 
approach might perform in a manner that is highly suggestive for the 
present discussion. 
Consider, for example, the speech by President Eisenhower,438 in 
which he refers to Little Rock's defiance of federal orders to desegre-
gate as a "blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation. "439 
Eisenhower stresses, seemingly with sincerity, that Little Rock's recalci-
trance poses a grave international threat "to the prestige and influence, 
and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world. "440 I would argue 
that Eisenhower's concern for the foreign affairs implications of de-
segregation should be understood as part of a projected understanding 
of race relations onto the international realm. In other words, the Cold 
War imperative behind desegregation was actually constituted by con-
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523-24 (1980) ("Translated from judicial 
activity in racial cases before and after Brown, this principle of 'interest convergence' provides: 
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges 
with the interests of whites."). 
m See Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 119 (1988) 
(adopting the interest-<:onvergence thesis of Derrick Bell in tying 1950s desegregation efforts to 
the perceived need to bolster the international image of the United States for purposes of winning 
the Cold War); Mary Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Fareign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the 
Image of Ame/iean Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1641 1715-16 (1997) (arguing that the Federal 
Government's response to the Little Rock desegregation crisis resulted primarily from a concern 
fOI' foreign affairs consequences and maintenance of federal authority) [hereinafter Dudziak, 
Little Rock Crisis]. 
m See Dudziak, Little Rock Crisis, supra note 437, at 1681-82. 
mId. at 1682. 
440Id. 
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ditions in the external realm and the socially constructed categories of 
understanding that were a result of "internal" racial formation impera-
tives being shaped by the political struggle over civil rights.HI Indeed, 
the "Cold War" itself should not escape inquiry as a social and cultural 
construct and projection, which we may come to see more in terms of 
the politics of race, sexuality, and gender, and much less in terms of 
"geopolitics. " 
The drawback to the interest convergence approach, at least as it 
has been applied thus far, is that while it explains how domestic racial 
politics may be partially dependent on the imperatives of national 
interest pursuit in "external" relations, it does not analyze the interna-
tional realm as a projection of, and dependent upon, "internal" con-
ditions of racial subordination and resistance. Further, it does not 
provide a theoretical framework for grasping the foundational role of 
race in constructing conceptions of the national interest.H2 The inter-
est convergence approach seems to assume pre-existing domestic and 
international political realms that confront the scholar or statesperson 
as givens. In this sense, although interest convergence theory suggests 
an approach superior to foreign affairs scholarship which fails to take 
any account of race and provides an important supplement to race 
analysis that "stops at the water's edge," it may replicate certain aspects 
of IR realism. At least for the particular purposes of analyzing a causal 
link between perceived external conditions and internal race politics, 
it may adopt overly positivist conceptualizations of both the national 
interest and external realm. 
In contrast, a fourth model suggested by Henry Richardson's 
provocative inquiry into the Gulf War from the perspecth'e of Mrican 
American interests complexifies the ontology of interest convergence 
thinking and adopts a constructivist sensibility in its understanding of 
the relationship between race and foreign affairs law.443 Richardson 
evokes a long tradition of scholarship and activism in positing a 
uniquely Mrican American interest in U.S. foreign policym and trans-
441 Cf VON ESCHEN, supra note 425, at 145-46 (describing WEB. Du Bois' concern that 
postwar African American civil rights leaders had abandoned the cause of African liberation, 
assuming instead an anti-Communist mantle in the hopes of securing domestic civil rights 
concessions in return). 
442 Also, to the extent the interest convergence approach would explain racialized phenom-
ena (civil rights politics and jurisprudence) through the non-raced category of a "Cold War 
imperative," it may, no doubt as an unintended consequence, analytically decenter race. 
443 See Richardson, supra note 430. 
444 See generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, ETHl\'ICITY, RACE, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
A HISTORY (1992); GERALD HORNE, BLACK AND RED: W.E.B. Du BOIS AND THE AFRo-AMERICAN 
RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR, 1944-1963 (1986); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PRFjUDICE: 
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national racial formation along an "axis of the local-national-interna-
tional unity of Mrican-Americans as a people. "445 So, for example, 
Richardson attributes the relatively lower levels of support for U.S. 
military intervention in Iraq among Mrican Americans as compared 
to other Americans to an understanding by Mrican Americans of the 
linkage between in ternational and domestic trends. 446 He asserts, "Mro-
America views the furtherance of its own welfare as achievable only by 
breaking down the distinction-long inscribed in American law, policy 
and rhetoric-between the government's 'foreign' policy and 'domes-
tic' policy."H7 Richardson offers an interpretation of Mrican American 
internationalismH8 that sees empowerment of Mrican Americans as 
necessarily tied to international strategies "for the liberation of all 
similarly situated peoples."H9 Such an interpretation disaggregates M-
rican American and U.S. official positions on foreign affairs law (un-
derstood as international law incorporated into the domestic sys-
tem).450 
Richardson's understanding of Mrican American in ternational-
ism and his tracing of its consequences for foreign affairs and interna-
tional law are signal. Consider his proposal for a race-conscious law of 
self-defense: "the right of a state to use military force in self-defense 
should be conditioned on the equitable participation of the diverse 
peoples and 'minorities' represented in its population in the effective 
power processes and authoritative decision processes regarding its 
characterization of the situation as requiring a military response."451 
The proposal also includes a meta-procedural requirement of "authen-
tic" representation to preclude tokenistic participation.452 As Richard-
son himself is well aware, such a proposal is unlikely to become part 
of the international law of self-defense anytime soon.453 However, as an 
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1988); BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER, 
RISING WIND: BLACK AMERICANS AND U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1935-1960 (1996); VON ESCHEN, 
supra note 425. I am grateful to Gerald Horne for directing me to this body of scholarship. See 
also Dudziak, Little Rock Clisis, supra note 437, at 1648 n.26 (citing works by historians on race 
and foreign affairs). 
H5 See Richardson, supra note 430, at 50. 
HG ld. at 54. 
447Id. (tracing this thinking back to ''''T.E.B. Du Bois). 
Hq focus on one of two variants of African American internationalism discussed by Richard-
son. The other one, obviously less useful for the approach taken here and not championed by 
Richardson, holds "that excellence in military sen'ice during U.S. wars confirms blacks' stakes in 
this country and promotes enforcement of their legal rights." ld. at 60. 
+19 1d. at 63. 
~',o See Richardson, supra note 430, at 63-64. 
mId. at 70. 
~,,2 ld. 
~,,3 ld. ("[Ulnder current law such an interpretation would be de lege ferenda rather than lex 
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illustration of a race-conscious constructivism that rejects unitary no-
tions of state identity and positivist understandings of external threat, 
the proposal takes us a long way toward imagining a race-critical ap-
proach to foreign affairs law. 
By extrapolating from the interest convergence and race-interna-
tionalist approaches of Dudziak and Richardson, respectively, one can 
begin to imagine a theory that views both internal and external realms 
as mutually constituted through a transnational process of racial for-
mation. 454 A race-critical approach to foreign affairs law should strive 
to problematize both realms as mutually determined constructs rooted 
in the racial formation process. Developing a genealogy of foreign 
affairs law, then, means reading the record with an eye toward under-
standing possible implications of discursive events for the broader 
project of racial formation. These implications can be both subordina-
tionist and resistant. 455 Developing a project to transform foreign affairs 
law means conceptually reforming the field by structuring race and 
other identity-contingent elements into the discipline's ontological 
foundation. 456 
As noted above, reformers of foreign affairs law often pin their 
hopes on the promise of a more balanced system of power-sharing 
between the legislative and executive branches. Under such a system, 
the courts would actively referee separation issues, while insuring that 
the political branches do not unduly trample individual rights in the 
exercise of their shared foreign affairs powers. However, as Professor 
Lobel points out, such process-oriented reform will only be effective if 
lata. There is no authority for assessing the equity of a state's 'internal' decision processes to test 
the legality of the dispatch of military forces in the name of self-defense."). 
454 See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
THE 19605 TO THE 1990555-56 (2d ed. 1994). The definition of racial formation as stated by 
Omi and Winant entails "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, 
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed." Id. at 55. Further, racial formation "is a process of 
historically situated projects in "'hich human bodies and social structures are represented and 
organized," id. at 55-56, and is linked to the "emlution of hegemony, the way society is organized 
and ruled," id. at 56. "From a racial formation perspecth"e, race is a matter of both social structure 
and cultural representation." Id. Omi and Winant do not expressly posit transnational racial 
formation, but arguably their theory supports such an extension. 
455 See id. at 56--59 (using the concept of the "racial project" to show the politically dh'er-
gent-regressive as well as progressive-interventions that together constitute racial formation). 
Thus, histories of resistances such as the "no-no" movement, see supra Part II, must not be 
overlooked. 
456 Although it is still a contested element of liberal legalism, such an identity-contingent 
ontology has already insinuated itself into the domestic legal framework. See generally Martha 
Minow's two books on the subject of law's treatment of identity and difference, MARTHA MINo\\', 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LA\\, (1990); MARTHA 
MINO\\', NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS AND THE LA\\, (1997). 
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the "substantive worldview" behind foreign affairs policies changes.457 
To be sure, Lobel views favorably a return to a more traditional sepa-
ration of foreign affairs power.-l58 But he also suggests a more transfor-
mative vision of foreign affairs power separation that would entail: 
"internationalizing government" by subjecting "all states, including the 
United States, to the rulings and orders of international bodies such 
as an international court or legislature"; and "reviving communalist 
politics in which the citizenry, often acting through local communities, 
plays a more active role in determining our relations with peoples of 
other nations and in our national system of governance. "459 
A race-critical approach to foreign affairs law that builds on the 
critique of foreign affairs law offered in this article is actually consistent 
with Lobel's straightforward, two-pronged (simultaneously interna-
tionalizing and localizing) reconstruction of the field. Once the IR 
realist ontology of foreign affairs law is challenged and the theory of 
unitary state-as-subject, et aI., debunked, an argument that the govern-
ment should be bound by international standards of conduct takes on 
heightened resonance. Constituent members of the now non-unitary 
state, such as racial minorities, can expect to benefit from an interna-
tionalized sphere of normativity and political obligation that may be 
more in keeping with their race-internationalist communities of inter-
est. As well, the local arena of political action that Lobel valorizes may 
rise ascendant in foreign affairs politics and law because the vaunted 
"one voice"461J with which the nation must speak in foreign affairs gives 
way to the multiplicity of voices and interests obscured by the state-as-
subject construct. 
Returning briefly to the significance of the internment for devel-
oping this genealogy and transformative theory of foreign affairs, con-
sider how the analysis above has suggested that the institutionalization 
of the imaginary sovereign self, the unified state-as-subject, has been a 
key on tological basis/ effect of twen tieth century foreign affairs law. 
From a race-critical perspective this development might be seen as an 
ongoing "corrective" to the particular racial formative legacy of civil 
457 See Lobel, Separation of Powers, supra note 404, at 604-05 (calling for substantive, in 
addition to pmcedural, reassessment in the area of foreign affairs law). 
458 See id. at 608 ("Our Constitution's separation of powers contains a conservative bias toward 
preserving existing social relations yet also pmvides a forum of struggle that is flexible enough 
to be used by popular movements to advance their aspirations."). 
459Id. at 609-10; see also Iglesias, supra note 26, at 383 (arguing for an "increasingly integrated 
international legal order that recognizes individuals and stakeholder gmups as subjects of inter-
national law"). 
460 See supra note 204. 
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war and reconstruction, when difference threatened to displace iden-
tity as the defining feature of the imagined national self. From this 
perspective the internment can be seen as a key discursive event4Gl 
because it helped reestablish the racial unity of the national self. The 
racial unity implicit in the judicial voice of Korematsu and Hirabayashi 
provided a kind of historical counterpoint-thus aiding in the restora-
tion of America's constitutive Anglo-Saxon unity-precisely at the quin-
tessential modern nation state-defining moment, "wartime. "462 
An important aspect of the ensuing Cold War era is the reinstate-
ment and rehabilitatation of this Anglo-American sense of national 
self.463 The Cold War-declared, managed and profited from by elite 
whites46'L-can be viewed as the continuance of this reconstruction of 
an Anglo-American national subjectivity. The internment was part of 
the practice that recreated this "one voice" of foreign affairs. Indeed, 
only after Korematsu and Hirabayashi did the totalizing vision of Cur-
tiss-Wright became truly viable. As well, Youngstown's balancing ap-
proach appears as epiphenomenal procedural ism next to this national 
self-enunciative telos of foreign affairs law-the restoration of particu-
laristic white nationalism qua universalism that is part of the shadow 
legacy of the internment jurisprudence. A race-critical model of for-
eign affairs law would foreground the internment in launching a new 
vision of the discipline that prioritizes, et aI., an overt anti-subordina-
tionist commitment informed by expressly anti-IR realist insights. 
461 The reference here to !lIe internment as a discursive event includes physical aspects of 
the Japanese Americans' victimization. "Discourse" as used in this article includes social practices 
such as physical injury inflicted on minority group members, but also the forms of representation 
that constitute an indispensable part of those practices. See supra notes 18, 64. 
462 See JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 190-91 (1979) 
(discussing the importance of war and military resource mobilization in general for the consoli-
dation of the nation-state). 
463 Cf Cho, supra note 250 (discussing Warren Court race jurisprudence in terms of its role 
in "redeeming whiteness"). 
464 Cf Introduction to BLACK WORKERS 47-50 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds., 1989) 
(suggesting the abandonment of Black working class interests by unions in the Cold War period 
as a condition of the anti-Communist labor-capital accord of the postwar period). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article mounts a critique of foreign affairs law by viewing the 
internment experience as an originary point in its modern develop-
ment. It thus rejects treatment of the internment as anomalous and 
places it instead at the center of an important area of constitutional 
law and policy formation-foreign affairs. In order to understand the 
relationship of the internment to foreign affairs law, and to defeat the 
reinvocation of the foreign affairs legal framework in rationalizing the 
internment, it is necessary to isolate the ontological elements behind 
the legal framework. These ontological elements, in particular the no-
tion of a unitary state-as-subject, the discipline-defining binarism of in-
side/outside (along with the attendant politics/relations distinction), 
and national security are shown to be IR realist in nature. The disci-
pline's orthodoxy-its tale of two precedents (and related theory of 
foreign affairs constitutionalism), and the "little" constitutional dialec-
tics (President versus Congress, individual rights versus state interests, 
and judicial review versus political branch autonomy)-is shown to be 
consistent with IR realist ontology. 
Using the Japanese American internment history to gain a look 
"inside the state" as it purports to carry out its foreign affairs function, 
the critique of the ontological basis of foreign affairs finds empirical 
grounding. In contradiction to IR realism's uncritical and unnuanced 
positivism, examination of the internment reveals the micro-workings 
of state action, "national interest" pursuit, and foreign affairs law proc-
esses. Far from IR realist conceptions, highly particularized determi-
nants of "state action," such as racism, xenophobia, economic exploi-
tation, and bureaucratic competition, drive the policy and law of the 
internment. An alternative school of international relations thought, 
IR critical theory, is introduced to explain the lessons of the intern-
ment history. IR critical theory, by rejecting IR realist concepts of the 
unitary state, inside/outside (politics/relations), and security, facili-
tates using the internment as part of a new critical canon of foreign 
affairs law that places the status quo in a more critical light. 
Finally, the article discusses the possibility of constructing a race-
critical theory of foreign affairs law based in part on the internment 
experience. Four different models are examined for their promise 
in constructing such an alternative model. IR realist approaches, the 
least useful of the four models, do not countenance examination of 
the social and cultural constructedness of states and their foreign 
affairs processes. IR critical approaches may, but do not necessarily, 
foster a race-critical approach. So-called conventional constructivist 
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approaches contain the most potential for the immediate project. The 
interest convergence and race-internationalist approaches, both ema-
nating from legal studies, hold much promise. The interest conver-
gence approach applies a racial paradigm in its problematization of 
the "external realm," but may be O\'erly positivist in its assumptions 
about the givenness of conditions in such a realm and the nature of 
the "national interest." The race-internationalist approach adopts a 
more constructivist sensibility, thus ayoiding uncritical posith'ism and 
providing a highly suggestive model for race-critical foreign affairs law 
scholarship. 
The approach taken in this article departs from mainstream for-
eign affairs law scholarship by centralizing a discussion of the ways 
racially contingent constructs may be allowed to operate through the 
deep structures of the discipline's conceptual framework and dis-
course. The analysis attempts to see the significance of internment for 
foreign affairs law beyond the doctrinal level, offering a genealogical 
and ontological understanding of the internment's significance. It 
rescripts the internment cases as key discursiye events in the construc-
tion of a racialized, unitary national identity and national security 
culture that was and remains an important aspect of American culture 
and society during the postwar period. The significance of the intern-
ment cases cannot be tested only by measuring the doctrinal ripple 
effects the cases openly generate. Rather, the cases should be under-
stood as the inauguration of foreign affairs law's postwar dance with a 
modern national security-derived state identity. As such, the intern-
ment precedent suggests the racial contingency of an area of legal 
discourse and social practice-foreign affairs-normally viewed as "po-
litically," but not racially, constituted. 
272 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 179 [Symposium 
APPENDIX 
Figure 1 A Liberal Model of Internal Affairs and Law 
Interests 
(particularistic; from 
ci\'il society) 
Interests 
(particularistic; from 
ch'il society) 
Interests 
(particularistic; from 
civil society) 
\ I 
STATE 
(forum mediating pluralistic interest competition; realm of 
rational "politics"; executive and legislatures represent 
constituents' interests) 
LAW 
(constrainer of state abuses and illiberal 
impetuses from ch'i\ society; guarantor of 
rational "political" process) 
DOMESTIC CML SOCIETY 1-----------' 
In the liberal model of internal law and politics, interests originate from among groups 
and indi\'iduals in domestic ch'il society. These interests, or preferences, are 
particularistic but rational, reflecting the individual subjects' or groups' calculus of 
interest maximization. The state and the organs of government mediate these often 
competing interests. Bargains are struck, compromises are reached, and "politics" in its 
rational, plural-democratic form obtains. Law may constrain the activities of the state 
and guard against arbitrary or illiberal outcomes of the political process. Domestic civil 
society is thus protected by law and its institutions from illiberal excesses that may 
Oliginate in particularistic social or cultural interest formations and survive the state's 
mediation process. Both the state and the law appear as neutral entities. 
December 1998] 19 B.C. THIRD WORllJ LA1VJOURNAL Ji9 
Figure 2 An IR Realist Model of External Affairs and Law 
SOVEREIGN STATE AS SUBJECT 
(a priori, ontologicaUy privileged conception; realm of "history" (agency), 
reason, order, civilization) 
State Interest 
National Security 
Survival Imperative 
"Imperial President" 
("voice of the nation "; 
embodies the State) 
.l 
...... .f. 
INTERNATIONAL lAW 
(mostly irrelevant, weakly: .... 
constraining normative . 
expectations) 
~ 
Congress as 'Junior partner" 
(in pursuit of national interest 
in external realm) 
DOMESTIC lAW 
.. ... ~: ("Other" of the state; 
weakly constraining 
"different voice") 
Anarchic "relations," contingent, chaotic (structUl-al), 
all-against-all, Hobbesian state of nature 
INTERNATIONAL/EXTERNAL REAlM 
273 
The IR realist model of external affairs posits a unitary state in dh-ect relationship to an 
anarchic external realm. Law (hybrid "dualist-monist" mix of domestic foreign affai,-s 
and international law) plays an attenuated role in constraining state actors and 
regulating the external realm. The state is treated as if it were an individual possessed of 
preformed interests and needs. Particular social, institutional and cultural determinants 
of state action remain untheorized (state as "black box"). The political organs of the 
state are assumed to transparently reflect state interests in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
The external realm is anarchic, making law (both domestic foreign affairs, and inter-
national law) relatively unimportant and potentially distracting to states pursuing their 
interests directly vis-a-vis other states. The internal realm defines the limits of history, 
agency, reason, order and civilization. The external realm is contingent (structural), 
ahistorical, and viewed as being perpetually in an anarchic state of nature. 
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Figure 3 A Critical Model of Transnational Mfairs and Law 
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A possible critical model of transnational affairs and law assumes the social and cultural 
constrtlctedness of "interests," which can arise from domestic or transnational civil 
society (non mutually exclusive realms). The state (nonunitary) behaves like other 
societal institutions. It is the forum in which "nationalized interests"-contested, 
shifting-m·e formed and articulated in relation to the nation-state, but do not represent 
"national interests" in a monolithic modernist sense. Similarly the transnational realm is 
a constructed and mutable mediating forum, a network of institutions that facilitates 
"transnationalized interest" formation. Law (domestic and international) may constitute 
a possible constraining mechanism, providing a forum for progressive contestation of 
subordinationist and imperial policies and norms. 
